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Abstract
This thesis studies the rise of non-financial and future-oriented narratives in the 
regulatory framework for financial reporting standard-setting and legislation in the 
UK in the 1990s. The questioning of financial reporting numbers that surfaced in 
these debates is called here a “mistrust in numbers”.
To study the moments when a ‘trust in numbers’ is destabilised through these 
debates, the thesis focuses on three interrelated processes of financial reporting 
change. First, the thesis addresses the ways in which accounting sought to expand 
into new territory -  territory in which the emergence of a category of non-financial 
and future-oriented accounting became closely linked to a rethinking of the 
concepts of how to govern British companies in the last two decades of the 20th 
century. Second, the thesis analyses how the expansion of accounting standard- 
setting beyond a focus on the financial statements in the early 1990s was made 
possible by the interplay of a number of ideas -  some complementary, others 
competing -  about the technical, professional, and international role of the British 
Accounting Standards Board. Third, the thesis analyses the agenda-setting process 
for the British Company Law Review between 1998 and 2002. It outlines how, 
through this reform process, a realignment between law, accounting, and “the State” 
was sought, one that mediated and structured at the same time modes of economic 
governance pertaining to both “the State” and “the market”.
This thesis concludes that the calls in the UK for supplementing financial 
statements with non-financial and future-oriented reporting elements constitute a 
significant rethinking of the roles of accounting and regulation in organising 
economic life. This rethinking entails, it is suggested, a move away from an 
emphasis on the neutrality and objectivity which has typically been associated with 
accounting numbers, and towards one aspiring to provide “transparency” based on 
an underlying economic reality.
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C h a p t e r  1
FINANCIAL REPORTING BEYOND THE NUMBERS
‘7  think the OFR is going to be THE document that should be really 
looked at, because the [financial] accounts will only be the 
appendices to it ”
(Standard-setter F)
1 Expansions of financial reporting frameworks
Narrative non-financial and future-oriented reports have increasingly been 
elaborated as an integral part of the financial reporting framework, both in the UK 
and internationally. They are expected to give visibility to a broad range of 
economic activities and relations -  much broader than those contained in the 
financial statements. In these reports, company directors are supposed to present an 
evaluation of the performance and the prospects the business. This is supposed to 
include reporting on the objectives of the business and the strategies for 
successfully achieving them -  given the resources available, and the principal risks 
and uncertainties facing the company. From the perspective of report-users, 
additional non-financial and future-oriented statements in the annual report of 
companies are seen as a means of interpreting the current and future operating 
performance and financial position of companies in increasingly complex and 
dynamic economic environments.
This research analyses the events that made financial reporting “beyond the 
numbers” possible. It focuses on the rise of regulatory frameworks for non-financial 
and future-oriented reporting in accounting standard-setting and regulation in the 
UK in the 1990s. Britain has been leading the regulatory developments in this area 
for almost two decades. The British Accounting Standards Board (ASB) was the 
first national standard-setter which launched a project for standardising the 
voluntary presentation of non-financial and future-oriented management 
commentary in the annual report of companies. The Statement: Operating and
8
Financial Review was published in 1993.1 The UK was also the first jurisdiction to 
pick up ideas of non-financial and future-oriented accounting as subject for 
statutory regulation. A mandatory Operating and Financial Review (OFR) was 
proposed during the British Company Law Review (CLR) launched in March 1998 
by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). In 2005, a legal requirement for 
directors of British listed companies to prepare a mandatory OFR as part of the 
annual report was introduced. Although the OFR Regulations 2005 were repealed 
after a short political turmoil in the same year (Brown 2005; DTI 2005), section 417 
of the New Companies Act 2006 still requires all medium to large British companies 
to prepare a conceptually similar “enhanced Business Review”.3
Since the start of the 21st century, similar expansions of the financial reporting 
framework into the areas of non-financial and future-oriented reporting have taken 
place in other countries, too. The Australian Corporations Act 2001, for example, 
introduced a requirement for listed companies to report on strategies and future 
prospects.4 In Canada, the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) reformed the 
existing requirement to produce a Management's Discussion and Analysis o f  
Financial Condition and Results o f  Operations (MD&A) in 2004 to discuss and 
analyse past corporate performance and future prospects.5 Since 2005, formal 
requirements for additional non-financial and future-oriented narrative disclosures 
in financial reporting have also been introduced in the European Member States. 
They were implemented into national law following the introduction of the 
Modernisation Directive (EC 2003a). It introduced a basic Business Review 
requirement, including the reporting of financial and non-financial key performance 
indicators (KPIs). The Directive also demanded that environmental and employee 
matters be covered “to the extent necessary” for an understanding of the current and
1 The term “Operating and Financial Review” (OFR) was coined by the ASB in one of the meetings of the Board
in 1991/92 to describe narrative statements in which company directors explained their perception of the 
current position and future prospects of the business (Standard-setter D).
2 The Companies Act 1985 (Operating and Financial Review and Directors'Report etc.) Regulations 2005.
3 The requirement came into force for financial years beginning on or after 1 October 2007 (BERR 2007a). For
the definition of medium sized companies and a concluding definition of large companies, see sections 465 to 
467 CA 2006.
4 Section 299A Corporations Act 2001.
5 The original Canadian MD&A requirement was introduced in 1989 with the Policy Statement No. 5.10 Annual
Information Form and Management's Discussion and Analysis o f Financial Condition and Results o f 
Operations. The 2004 revisions are laid out in Canadian Securities Regulators National Instrument 51-102 
Continuous Disclosure Obligations.
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future performance of the business.6 Most recently, on 23 June 2009, the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) published an Exposure Draft: 
Management Commentary (IASB 2009) with proposals for a non-mandatory 
framework to guide the preparation of additional narrative disclosures on the 
underlying financial and non-financial drivers of long-term business performance. It 
will provide the first set of international financial reporting guidelines for voluntary 
disclosure on non-financial and future-oriented information.7
The regulation of OFR-type reporting, including the enhanced Business review, in 
the UK and internationally emphasises the role narrative statements from the point 
of view of company directors play in providing the context within which the 
information that is provided in the financial statements should be interpreted. The 
preparation of OFR-type reports, therefore, significantly extends the range of 
reporting issues within the financial reporting framework: The stress on reporting 
on the main trends and issues which are likely to affect the future of the business 
open up financial reporting to environmental, social, and community 
considerations. They also require that wider stakeholder relationships, including 
employees, customers, and suppliers, be taken into account and discussed in 
financial and quantitative, but also in non-financial and qualitative statements. 
Although accounting professionals were already developing alternative 
measurement and reporting techniques by the end of the 1970s (Abbott & Monsen
1979), the focus of OFR-type management commentary is different from that of 
voluntary frameworks for environmental and social disclosure.8 Ideas of “social 
accounting”, which originated in the early 1970s, focus on accountability 
mechanisms that go beyond representations of corporate activity in economic terms 
and, instead, emphasise their ethical and ecological aspects (cf. Gray 2002). In 
contrast, calls for additional non-financial and future-oriented statements in 
financial reporting stem from a development in the 1980s and the 1990s during
6 The Directive 2003/51/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (Modernisation Directive) amended
the 4th (EEC 1978) Council Directive on annual accounts of companies and 7th (EEC 1983) Council Directive 
on consolidated accounts.
7 The MC project was added to the active agenda of the IASB in December 2007 (IASB 2008). The comment
period on the ED will end on 1 March 2010 (IASB 2009).
8 For example, Ernst & Ernst, which was then a “big 8” accounting firm, was the first to develop a list of
measurement categories for “social responsibility disclosures” in the UK (Abbott & Monsen 1979). For a 
review of professional initiatives in the emerging field of social reporting in the US during the 1970s, see 
Ramanathan (1976).
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which notions of social and environmental performance became more closely 
linked to ideas of financial reporting and economic performance (Shaw 1990, p. 
xxi; Eccles 1991).
However, the recent calls for additional disclosures to supplement the financial 
reports in the UK and internationally are in themselves not new. The provision and 
regulation of additional narratives in the annual report has a relatively long history 
in the UK and other jurisdictions, such as Germany and the US. Germany already 
introduced a mandatory management report (Lagebericht) to explain and comment 
on the financial statements of public limited companies in the 
Aktienrechts(not)verordnung 1931 (Eierle 2005). And directors of UK companies 
have published voluntary narrative statements on “the state of the company's 
affairs” for more than a century (Lynex 1945; Camfferman & Zeff 2003). The 
British legislator introduced regulatory provisions for the preparation of a 
“Directors’ Report” in the UK as far back as the Companies Act 1948? In the US, 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) introduced the requirement for the 
presentation of an MD&A in the annual report of US public companies in 1968 
(Dieter & Sandefur 1989; Collins et al. 1993; Hufher 2007).10 Transnational 
regulation at European Union (EU) level also introduced a basic management 
commentary requirement for limited liability companies through the 1978 Fourth 
European Accounting Directive. This required companies in all Member States to 
“[...] include at least a fair review of the development of the company's business 
and of its position” in their annual report (EEC 1978, art. 46).
Despite the relatively long history of regulating additional disclosures in the annual 
report, the recent debate differs in three ways. First, it no longer focuses only on the 
past. Recent proposals for narrative disclosure emphasise the provision of 
information on the current potential of the firm to meet its long-term objectives. 
Second, it regards the presentation of additional narratives as an integral part of the 
financial reporting package rather than a separate form of disclosure. The third and 
most striking aspect of the proposals for additional management commentaries in
9 Section 157 CA 1948.
10 The US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) reformed the framework for “Management’s Discussion 
and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations” in 1980 (SEC 1980). The current framework 
emphasises a focus on the financial statements as a whole. The original MD&A (SEC 1968) had been 
primarily concerned with a summary analysis of earnings and their components (Dieter & Sandefur 1989).
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financial reporting has been the fundamental questioning of financial reporting 
numbers as an issue for governing that has surfaced in many different environments 
in the UK as well as internationally. Ideas of non-financial and future-oriented 
reporting can be traced back to the emergence of significant doubts about the 
neutrality and objectivity of financial reporting numbers as an instrument for 
intervening in business enterprises and the economy. The development of new ways 
of questioning the role of accounting in governance is described as a “mistrust in 
numbers” in this research. The term is used in this thesis to describe the view that 
financial statements alone were not sufficient to convey a picture of the economic 
reality of companies to internal and external decision-makers in times of 
increasingly complex and dynamic business environments. These observations 
seem to be contrary to the argument that the role of accounting in governance is 
founded on a “trust in numbers” (cf. Porter 1995). This idea of a “trust in numbers” 
refers to a financial mentality that accords numbers a particular neutrality and 
objectivity in the operationalisation of political programmes aimed at governing 
social and economic activities in many different domains (cf. Miller 1990; Rose 
1991; Robson 1992; Miller 1994a, 2001; Mennicken & Vollmer 2007; Mennicken 
et al. 2008). In particular, the idea of translating complex processes of production 
and exchange into a “single financial figure” (Miller 1994a, 2001) has been referred 
to in explanations of the close ties between accounting and economic decision­
making (Hopwood 1992).11
This thesis explains the problematisations of financial reporting numbers as an issue 
for governing and their translation into regulatory reform projects in the last two 
decades of the 20th century. This is also a study of the conditions which made the 
rise of a category of non-financial and future-oriented accounting possible as an 
issue for accounting standard-setters and regulators in the UK during the 1990s. 
Moreover, what distinguishes this study of the role of accounting in regimes of 
governing economic life is the attention paid to the interplay between accounting 
and other forms of ordering, such as law. Studies of die role of accounting in 
government have so far concentrated on the role of accounting as an element of 
decentralised regimes of governing which were somewhat distanced from the
11 The discussion of accounting numbers in the “pursuit of objectivity” (cf. Porter 1995) in economic governance 
is further elaborated in the final chapter of this thesis.
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administrative apparatus of “the State” (Miller 1990). The mandatory OFR event, 
however, suggests to explain the role of accounting in governance in relation to the 
moments in which accounting was caught up in the making of centralised forms of 
regulation in state-law.
The remainder of this chapter outlines the theoretical, conceptual, and 
methodological considerations which underlie the study of the moments in which 
financial reporting numbers were problematised as an issue for governing. This is 
done in three parts. The next section presents the conceptual implications of studies 
of accounting and government that have focused on similar destabilising moments 
of accounting change. It introduces the body of literature which provides the 
analytical framework for the study of the specific moments of problematising 
financial reporting numbers and proposing non-financial and future-oriented 
practices as alternative “accounting solutions” The concepts that are referred to 
include a perspective on accounting as an element of govemmentality; ideas of 
change as processes of problematising; a notion of arenas and constellations of 
accounting change; and the concepts of regulatory space and logics o f  
appropriateness. The third section that follows addresses the “questions of method” 
regarding the collection and analysis of data that result from the conceptual 
framework in this research. The section outlines the central role of the study of 
discourses in analyses of governance reform. In addition, it gives an overview of the 
sources that have provided the primary empirical data for addressing the questions 
in this research and outlines the process of the data collection. This chapter ends 
with an overview of the issues that are addressed in the remaining four chapters of 
this thesis.
2 Destabilising moments
Studies of accounting and governance have proposed that accounting reform is 
never complete. This is because new accounting practices, once introduced, seldom 
achieve full operationalisation of the programmatic aspirations in the name of 
which they were put forward. This results in further problematisations of existing 
modes of governing and the perpetual translation of “failures” of accounting into 
proposals for the “improvement” of accounting practice (Hopwood 1983b; Miller & 
Rose 1990, p. 10; Hoskin & Macve 1994; Young 1995). Correspondingly, this 
thesis sees the OFR events as destabilising moments - moments of change in which
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the ideas and practices of governing economic life were contested, adjusted, and 
reinvented.
The study of the rise of non-financial and future-oriented reporting in accounting 
standard-setting and regulation in the UK in this thesis draws considerably on a 
small number of writings that describe similar destabilising moments in which the 
roles and purposes of the financial reporting statements as an issue for governing 
were called into question. These studies of financial reporting standard-setting and 
regulation have drawn on multiple concepts and theories from other areas and 
disciplines, such as sociology and political science, and developed new perspectives 
on the study of accounting change. For example, they proposed to examine 
accounting change at the intersection of the wider accounting and non-accounting 
debates that make their distinct and otherwise disparate concerns self-evident in 
accounting terms (Burchell et al. 1985; Robson 1991). Furthermore, they suggested 
that incremental changes in regulation take place when accounting issues come to 
be seen as problematic and lead to calls for improvements to the financial reporting 
framework (Young 1994). These studies have also emphasised that what counts as 
“right” accounting may differ according to the different programmes of governing 
in whose name financial reporting reform is mobilised (Young 1995). Finally, 
existing studies of financial reporting standard-setting have proposed that regulatory 
reform is driven by concerns with the ability of financial statements to provide input 
into the economic decisions of account users (Young 2006).
Interestingly, these studies of accounting regulation have not suggested a general 
questioning of financial reporting numbers as a central element in regimes of 
governing social and economic life. Their analyses of processes of financial 
reporting change do not indicate doubts about an underlying ability of accounting 
numbers to provide “facts” (Young 1995). Although the studies by Burchell et al. 
(1985) and Robson (1991) are also concerned with the introduction of additional 
accounting reports, the “value added event” in the UK in the 1970s, which they 
analysed, still attempted to improve financial measures of corporate performance 
and wealth creation. This study of the OFR events in the UK, however, suggests 
that the proposals for non-financial and future-oriented reporting co-emerged with 
problematisations of the roles and purposes of financial reporting numbers as an 
issue for governing business enterprises and economic life at large. Accordingly,
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the accounting change in the OFR events in the UK was not a case of calls for 
“better” financial representations, but of calls for different accountings.
The observation of a “mistrust in numbers”, therefore, opens up a new set of 
questions in the study of accounting change. First, how do “new” categories of non- 
financial and future-oriented accounting emerge? Second, how do they become an 
issue for regulatory reform in accounting standard-setting and legislation? And, 
finally, how does this change existing views on the interrelations between 
accounting and wider ideas of governing businesses and economic life? To address 
these questions, this research focuses on the particular moments in which 
accounting numbers have been problematised and non-financial and future-oriented 
“solutions” were proposed. In doing so, the analysis draws upon a set of interlinked 
literatures which focus on the interrelations of political programmes and the 
calculative practices of accounting in the governance of social and economic life.
The remaining paragraphs of this section develop the conceptual approach in this 
thesis. They outline the benefits and limits of drawing on studies of accounting as 
an element of govemmentality and on die analytical constructs of the accounting 
constellation, regulatory space, and logics o f appropriateness.
2.1 Accounting and government
The calculative practices of accounting have come to be seen as an intrinsic and 
constitutive element in the governance of social and economic relations throughout 
the 20th century (Miller 2001; Vollmer 2003).12 Studies of accounting and 
government generally relate to an intellectual movement of die 1970s which 
expressed growing reservations about Marxist accounts of power and conflict 
between interest groups and “the State” as the central element in public policy 
making (Krasner 1978, p. 6; Skocpol 1985, pp. 4 & 7; Hall 1993).13 As part of this 
movement, the social sciences and policy makers increasingly described “the State” 
as a heterogeneous actor, that was made up of dispersed social networks, which
12 The works of Weber (1978) already proposed a central role for the monetaiy practices of “capital accounting” 
in the rise of capitalism. Recent writings in the area of economic sociology have emphasised a performativity 
of calculating practices in constituting “the economy” (cf. Callon 1998; Mackenzie et al. 2007).
13 The term “policy” is used in this research in its broadest definition as “the objectives and practices of any 
agent in the economic sphere” that “are articulated and made operable through particular calculative 
practices” (Miller 1994b, p. 13). “Public policy” in this research will be referred to in a narrower sense as 
Governmental policy.
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replaced “realist” perceptions of a relative power-monopoly of regulatory 
authorities (Foucault 1976, p. 123).14 From that point of view, “the State” only 
indirectly shapes political and social processes while it is at the same time 
constituted and influenced by them (cf. Skocpol 1985; Foucault 1991b; Rose & 
Miller 1992; Hall 1993; Hunt 1997; Wickham 2006). As Burchell et. al. (1991, p. x) 
suggest:
“[GJovemment is not just a power needing to be tamed or an 
authority needing to be legitimized. It is an activity and an art which 
concerns all and which touches each. ”
The departure from Marxist perceptions of “the State” as a “unitary agent” (Hunt 
1992) was among other things reflected in an emerging scholarly body of studies of 
govemmentality (cf. Foucault 1991a). They propose a view of “the State” as a 
“mythicized abstraction” (ibid., p. 103) whose powers to govern “the wealth, health 
and happiness of populations” (Rose & Miller 1992) are widely dispersed in 
“governance networks”. These networks consist of complex and fluid associations 
between multiple political entities and practices which rise above a dichotomy 
between “State” and “civil-society” (cf. Miller 1990; Miller & Rose 1990; Foucault 
1991a; Rose & Miller 1992; Miller & Rose 2008a). Nevertheless, the notion of 
“governance” maintains the assumption that the “real” is programmable and “can be 
acted upon and improved by authorities” in the name of higher ends (Rose & Miller 
1992, p. 183; Miller 2001).15 Accordingly, it has been proposed that:
“As with government, we find  a conviction that there exists a 
calculable answer to the problems o f the enterprise and even o f  
social life. ” (Miller 1994a)
To describe the networks that attempt to act upon social and economic activities, 
analyses of govemmentality suggest a focus on the historically and spatially specific 
rationalities, programmes, and technologies of government. Highly abstracted
14 Foucault interpreted the powers that govern behaviour in modem society as widely dispersed “micro-powers” 
that align and realign in specific moments (Foucault 1980b, 1981; Hunt 1994, p. 18).
15 In this research, the terms “governance” and “government” are used interchangeably to refer to any 
mechanism for steering the conduct of others or oneself (Hunt 1997, p. 116; Pierre & Peters 2000, pp. 1-2). 
This is consistent with a notion of “regulation” in its widest sense, involving all forms of social control over 
the actions of individuals, organisations, or society as a whole (Baldwin et al. 1998a). The term “law” is used 
exclusively in relation to public laws. The capitalised term “Government” is used to refer to the group of 
persons who hold the principal executive positions in a nation state. In the United Kingdom, they are the 
Prime Minister and the Cabinet, including the heads of government departments.
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political rationalities outline the ways of thinking about who governs what and how 
(Miller 1990; Miller & Rose 1990; Gordon 1991; Miller 1991; Rose & Miller
1992). These “principles of government” (Miller 1990) do not necessarily describe 
clearly distinguishable historic eras, yet particular vocabularies for describing 
authority may be shared over longer periods of time. This has allowed the social 
sciences to identify general families of govem-mentalities. For example, the 
governing rationales of “liberalism” have been associated with a notion of “the 
private”. Ideas of “the welfare state” are based on common aspirations to “the 
social”. Contemporary “neo-liberal” and “advanced liberal” regimes of governing 
have been linked to an emphasis on “the market” and “ideas of freedom” as the 
structuring themes of government (Miller & Rose 2008b).
On the issue of how these abstract ideas link to the local activities that they seek to 
govern, writings in govemmentality suggest an analytical focus on the more specific 
programmes and technologies that make the practices of government possible 
(Miller 1990; Miller & Rose 1990; Rose & Miller 1992; Miller & Rose 2008b). 
Programmes of government outline particular strategies, claims, and prescriptions, 
such as getting accounting “right” (Young 1995) or “securing” economic 
competitiveness within the wider frameworks of political rationalities. They are 
closely linked to notions of technologies of government. These refer to the explicit 
practices and techniques that are expected to help operationalising abstract ideals at 
the level of local processes and activities (Miller 1990; Miller & Rose 1990; Miller 
1991).
‘‘[T]echnologies o f  government seek to translate thought into the 
domain o f reality, and to establish ‘in the world o f persons and 
things ’ spaces and devices for acting upon those entities o f which 
they dream and scheme. ” (Miller & Rose 1990)
The argument that government is at the same time technical and ideological is 
consistent with studies of accounting as a social and institutional practice (cf. 
Hopwood 1983b; Hopwood & Miller 1994; Napier 2006). These studies are built 
on the idea that accounting is “much more than an isolated technical endeavour” but 
“imbued with an ever expanding set of purposes” (Hopwood 1992) that define the
17
roles of accounting “in the context in which it operates” (Hopwood 1983b).16 This 
links the study of government to the study of accounting. Programmes of governing 
“at a distance” (cf. Latour 1987) in widely dispersed governance networks have 
placed particular weight on mechanisms of information gathering and devices of 
inscription:
“Recording, counting, tabulating, calculating, comparing have 
become both the means by which governmental intervention expands 
and one o f its chief by-products. ” (Hunt 1994, p. 27)
The calculative practices of accounting in particular have been ascribed a key role 
in rendering the objects of economic government visible and comparable to norms 
and standards of social and economic behaviour. By elaborating the calculative 
techniques of accounting in terms of a political language of, for instance, “economic 
efficiency” (Hopwood 1992), “modernising society” (Miller & Rose 1990), or 
“order and commerce” (Miller 1990), accounting practices become a translation 
mechanism between highly abstract policy programmes and the activities of 
individuals and organisations.17 This means that, on the one hand, accounting 
allows the recorded activities to be seen in terms of these abstract notions. On the 
other hand, accounting representations create possibilities for direct modes of 
monitoring and intervening by others or through indirect modes of self-control and 
self-governance (Miller 1990; Miller & Rose 1990; Miller 1991; Miller & Power 
1992; Rose & Miller 1992; Miller 1994a; Rose 1999, p. 153; Miller 2001).
Above all, the language of “neoliberalism” has been associated with regimes of 
governing that are only loosely connected to modes of formal intervention by the 
executives and bureaucracies of national Governments (Miller & Rose 1990, p. I).18 
Related studies of the relationship between neoliberal modes of economic 
management and accounting suggest a conceptual interconnection of accounting 
and “the economy” (Miller 1990; Hopwood 1992). The “transformative capacities” 
of accounting in regulation, therefore, rest on the idea that processes of information
16 Similarly, Hacking points at the idea that new ways of categorising accounting do not emerge in a social and 
historic vacuum (Hacking 1986, p. 233).
17 The emergence of accounting and “the State” as “mutually supportive sets of practices” is not a new 
phenomenon in modem capitalist societies but has already been shown for the period of Louis XIV (Miller 
1990, p. 332).
18 Power (1994; 1997) presents a related discussion on the rise of audit in regimes of governing that emphasise 
self-regulation, performance standards and accountability (cf. BRTF 1999,2000).
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gathering, recording, and reporting have the potential to shape decision-making in 
the name of more abstract ideas of “efficiency” and “effectiveness” even without 
the direct interventions of a governing authority (Miller 1990; Miller & Rose 1990; 
Rose 1991; Rose & Miller 1992; Miller & O'Leary 1993; Miller 1998a; Rose 1999, 
p. 153). That is, accounting practices are expected to contribute to the 
transformation of individuals into economic “decision makers” by translating policy 
programmes into presumably neutral indicators of economic performance that 
facilitate “rational” decision-making for actors inside and outside the organisation 
(Hopwood 1983a; Miller 1990, 2001). In addition, studies of the role of accounting 
in neoliberal governance have proposed a de-politicising role for accounting 
knowledge (and in a wider sense the formal human sciences) in connecting the local 
sites of economic activity to the programmatic ideals of government. Accounting 
has been understood as offering a particular form of objectivity that translates the 
inherently political interests of authorities into seemingly apolitical “scientific- 
technical” terms (Miller & Rose 1990; Rose 1991).19 Accordingly, accounting 
numbers have been described as a means to “tame” the political power of 
authorities. That is, claims to decision making on the basis of accounting 
information assign interventions in the activities of individuals and organisations an 
aura of acting according to neutral and objective decision models (Rose 1999p. 
153).
2.2 Processes of problematising
Studies of govemmentality have proposed a particular focus on the situations “in 
which governing is called into question” (Dean 1999, p. 27) in order to explain how 
new regimes of governing emerge. This shifts the analytical focus from the study of 
programmes, technologies, and rationalities that constitute a particular regime of 
governing to a study of the processes in which abstract macro-level programmes 
and specific micro-level practices become linked and mobilise each other in 
processes of governance reform (cf. Miller 1990; Miller & Rose 2008a). 
Furthermore, studies of accounting and governance have drawn on the concepts of 
translation (cf. Miller 1991; Robson 1991) and problematisation (cf. Miller 1991; 
Rose & Miller 1992; Miller 1998a) to analyse accounting change in terms of the
19 For further discussion of the political powers of numbers, see Rose (1991; 1999, p. 197) or Hopwood (1992).
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processes in which multiple and diverse “problems” of government begin to be 
linked to accounting.
“Frequently, these alleged problems have nothing immediately or 
self-evidently to do with accounting. But, with some guidance, 
people can often be helped or persuaded to recognize hitherto 
unintended connections [...] ” (Miller 1998b, p. 607)
Although the related writings on actor-network theory (ANT) in science and 
technology studies (STS) have not been explicitly referred to in this research (cf. 
Callon 1980; Callon & Law 1982; Latour 1987; Law 1992; Callon 1999; Law 
1999), a focus on die moments of translation and problematisation (cf. Callon 
1980; Callon 1999) gives a sense about emphasising processes rather than structure 
in the interrelations between human and non-human actors (Law 1992).
Accordingly this thesis interprets the emergence of fundamental doubts about ideas 
of governing through financial reporting numbers as destabilising moments -  points 
in time in which “problems” with governing emerged and were translated into calls 
for new accounting practices and techniques. This leads this thesis to examine the 
multiple events and processes that gave rise to significant doubts about the 
neutrality and objectivity of financial reporting representations of the economic 
reality of business enterprises. The analysis includes the processes of translation 
and problematisation that make the emergence of links between high-level ideas of 
governing and non-financial and future-oriented accounting possible. However, a 
focus on the destabilising moments of government does not explain how 
programmes and technologies of governing emerge in the first place. To address the 
question how a category of non-financial and future-oriented reporting and the 
problems of government it was supposed to solve emerged during the OFR events, 
this study referred to the concept of the accounting constellation as introduced by 
Burchell et al. (1985).
2.3 Accounting constellations
Starting from the view that accounting issues are “not simply there” (Young 1994) 
but have themselves a history of increasingly being seen as “accounting”, the 
concept of the accounting constellation helped to study the rise of new ways of 
reasoning and categorising accounting within a programmatic language of 
government. The concept is based on the idea that accounting changes within a
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historically and spatially specific interplay of accounting and non-accounting 
arenas of discourse which come to express their distinct and otherwise disparate 
concerns in accounting terms.20 Thinking about accounting change in terms of 
arenas and constellations directs this study to the multiple events, bodies of 
knowledge, institutions, and practices that create possibilities for new ways of 
reasoning and categorising the rationales and practices that come to be seen as 
“accounting” (Miller & Napier 1993).
“For what we call ‘accounting' is an entity that has been made up 
out o f  techniques and practices drawn from diverse disciplines and 
domains. Accounting changes in both content and form over time, 
only ever achieving a temporary stability. ” (Miller 1994b)
However, similar to a notion of problematisation in the study of accounting in 
regimes of governing, the problem discourses which give rise to new ways of 
reasoning and categorising accounting are understood to be “something relatively 
rare” (Dean 1999, p. 27).
“[Problematisations] have particular dates and places, and occur at 
particular locales or within specific institutions or organizations. ”
(Dean 1999, p. 27)
Accordingly, accounting constellations are understood to emerge largely 
haphazardly out of the actions of a number of different actors, who seek different 
things when relating their distinct concerns to accounting (Miller 1991). Robson 
(1991, p. 552) also calls the arenas “demarcated field[s] of problems”, which may 
share an accounting issue as a common point of reference. Accordingly, an 
accounting constellation is created when they start linking -  intendedly or 
unintendedly -  the particular “problems” of their own arena to perceived failures of 
accounting.21
The use of the concept of the accounting constellation has three implications for 
this research. First, the analytical perspective on the historically specific 
constellations of accounting change helps to unravel the multiple events that gave
20 The idea that accounting becomes a shared element in expressing the expectations and ideals of diverse actors, 
agencies, or bodies of knowledge is conceptually similar to the idea of “boundary objects” as presented in 
science and technology studies (Star & Griesemer 1989).
21 The concept of the accounting constellation is similar to the notion of an accounting complex, in which 
accounting becomes part of broader discourses in other bodies of knowledge (Miller 1986).
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rise to a category of non-financial and future-oriented accounting at a specific 
moment in the late 1980s. Second, it is consistent with the proposed focus on the 
destabilising moments in which accounting and government are problematised. 
Ideas of translation and problematisation between the arenas of accounting change 
shift the empirical focus from a study of the wider arenas that get linked to the 
processes in which a programmatic language of “problematics of government” 
reframes certain practices and ideas as “accounting solutions” (Miller 1991; Robson
1991). Third, this focus on the emergence of links between programmes and 
technologies in constellations of accounting and non-accounting debates points at 
the reflexivity and constitutive capacities of accounting change (cf. Burchell et al.
1980). It allows to study how the emergence of a category of non-financial and 
future-oriented accounting created possibilities for reshaping and expanding “the 
terms of political debate” (Rose 1999, p. 277).
2.4 Regulatory spaces and logics of appropriateness
The study of change at “the margins of accounting” also means to recognise that 
problematisations of accounting may be advanced from within the discipline of 
accounting, but also by non-accounting actors from other disciplines, such as 
economics or law (Miller 1998a). The concept of regulatory space (cf. Hancher & 
Moran 1989b) emphasises more explicitly the multiple actors and ideas that 
mobilise a technical language of accounting in attempts to intervene in economic 
activities by means of accounting regulation and standard-setting. Similar to the 
accounting constellation, the concept of regulatory space stresses the social and 
political elements of change. It suggests that the “experience of regulation” is 
framed by the political, legal, and cultural factors that define the scope of issues that 
become subject to regulatory debate in a community (Hancher & Moran 1989b; 
Scott 2001). The original concept as introduced by Hancher and Moran (1989b) 
places particular weight on processes of bargaining between large and powerful 
organisations and the interplay of state and non-state actors in regulatory change. In 
particular, a strand of socio-legal literature in law and studies in political science 
have drawn on regulatory space when analysing power-struggles over the 
regulation of social and economic activities (Black 1997; Hall et al. 2000; Scott 
2001; Lange 2003; Lodge 2003; Thatcher 2008). Their analyses of the factors that 
shape the actors, issues, and power relations in regulatory reform processes have
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been closely aligned with ideas of the embeddedness of change in national cultural,
99political, and institutional environments.
“Expectations about the purpose o f regulation, about who are the 
legitimate participants and about their relations with each other, are 
subject to great variations -  across historical time, across nations, 
and between different economic sectors in industries. ” (Hancher &
Moran 1989a, p. 3-4)
Accounting research has also examined power relations and institutional 
environments and the ways in which they play out in regulatory space. For 
example, Sikka (2002) referred to the analytical construct of regulatory space to 
evaluate the formation of the UK Auditing Practices Board (APB) in the interplay 
of power relations among “the State”, the audit industry, and accounting 
professionals. Similarly, a study of the formation of the Public Accountant's 
Council of Ontario stressed the role of multiple actors and ideas in the construction 
of identity for the new regulatory agency in Canada (MacDonald & Richardson 
2004). Recent studies of the dynamics of agenda-setting at the IASB have featured 
processes of accounting change in transnational regulatory spaces (cf. Djelic & 
Sahlin-Andersson 2006) which an even greater variety of actors may enter and exit 
over the term of a regulatory debate (Botzem & Quack 2006).23 In these studies, 
disputes over the production of “material traces” for organisational activities in 
accounting terms have been attributed to expected social and “economic 
consequences” of accounting (cf. Zeff 1978). Control over processes of accounting 
regulation allows particular actors to define the standards according to which 
organisations are made “calculable”, visible, and held accountable in the name of 
abstract programmes of government (Miller & O'Leary 1987; Miller & O'Leary 
1994).
This research also draws upon the concept of regulatory space to emphasise the 
situational and relational nature of the processes of contest and agreement among a 
multiplicity of actors and agencies over the “the proper ends and means of
22 A concept closely related to notions of institutionalised environments and power relations in regulatory space 
is that of the organisational field  in which “conceptions of control” outline the scope of organisational activity 
(cf. Fligstein 1990; Fligstein 2001).
23 A notion of “soft actors” further captures the idea that the identity of the participants in regulatory space is 
“always somewhat blurred” (Djelic & Sahlin-Andersson 2006)
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government” (Miller & Rose 1990, p. 5).24This means that the powers to intervene 
in the production of accounts of economic activities are not limited to die regulatory 
agencies that are formally responsible for the administration of the processes of 
accounting standard-setting and regulation, such as the ASB or the DTI in the UK 
(ibid.). This thesis, however, does not explicitly analyse the power relations 
between the individual actors in regulatory space. Instead, it aligns the study of 
accounting change with a focus on the emergence of links between programmes and 
technologies of government in processes of regulatory reform. References to the 
concept of regulatory space help to outline the “specific problem space” (Rose & 
Miller 1992, p. 182) in which accounting and the sphere of governing connect. This 
puts greater weight on the study of ideas rather than particular organisations in 
creating possibilities for regulatory reform and the emergence of particular 
regulatory “solutions” at specific moments in history.
Not a lot of accounting research has addressed the question of how high-level ideas 
of governing make change in financial accounting standard-setting and regulation 
possible. Studies of the agenda-setting at the FASB in the US have emphasised the 
“uneasy position” of decision making at the FASB within a wider social and 
institutional context (Young 1994, 1996). Young (1994) also introduced a notion of 
logics o f appropriateness (cf. March & Olsen 1989) to explain the actions (and 
inactions) of actors within the regulatory space.25 The concept generally replaces 
anticipatory and consequential explanations of decision making with a focus on the 
roles actors play in a particular social context (ibid., pp. 160-161). For the situation 
of agenda-setting, a notion of logics o f appropriateness implies that a regulator will 
take an issue on its agenda if it meets the expectations about the role and purpose of 
the regulator in dealing with a particular “accounting problem” (Young 1994). 
Accordingly, self-interested behaviour in regulatory agenda setting is not entirely 
obviated, but it will be limited to situations where it is consistent with expectations 
of other actors in regulatory space (ibid.).
24 Although not explicitly discussed in this research, ideas from ANT on the linkages between human and non­
human actors and the role they play within an elaborate network (Latour 1986; Callon 1998) might further 
help answering the question for the assemblage of actors and issues in events of accounting regulation for 
specific situations.
25 For a discussion of logics o f appropriateness in organisational action, see, e.g. Czamiawska & Sevon (1996), 
or Lounsbury (2007) on the interplay of multiple rationalities in processes of change in organisational fields.
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A small number of accounting studies has employed the concept to study the efforts 
of standard-setters in constructing authority for their activities. These studies 
observe consistency between the activities of the standard-setter with wider social 
and institutional factors in seeking to secure the survival of the organisation (Sikka 
2002; Young 2003; MacDonald & Richardson 2004).26 This research interprets 
logics o f appropriateness as inherently programmatic elements in the construction 
of temporary stability and legitimacy of regulatory issues on the agenda of 
accounting regulators and standard-setters. In line with the observation that much 
accounting change has been driven by ideas of “getting the accounting right” in the 
construction of a regulatory mandate for the FASB in the US (Young 1994, 1995, 
2003), this research highlights the situational and relational emergence of logics o f  
appropriateness in the interplay of wider ideas of governing that outline the 
different demands that are place on the role and mandate of the regulatory body.
Overall, the analytical approaches that are referred to in this research step beyond 
notions of “the micro” and “the macro” in the study of the relations between 
accounting, regulation, and wider ideas about the means and ends of seeking to 
govern economic life. Furthermore, they emphasise the multiple processes and 
encounters between the many actors, issues, and ideas of governing that constitute 
the destabilising moments in which accounting, regulation, and the ideas of 
governing economic life are put into question. This has further implications for the 
collection and analysis of empirical data in this research which will be discussed in 
the next section.
3 “Questions of Method”
Studies of accounting and governance do not provide a closed theory or systematic 
mode of analysis for the study of changes in accounting regulation. Instead, they 
draw on concepts and approaches from many different areas and disciplines, such as 
the writings by Michel Foucault, social studies of science, ideas from economic 
history, economic sociology, or the sociology of the professions (cf. Miller & Rose 
2008a). These approaches share, at most, an interest in discursive processes of
26 Their perspective on the ways in which individual and collective frames of reference affect what is perceived 
as “rational” in the construction of regulatory problems and solutions is consistent with ideas of bounded 
rationality (cf. Simon 1957) and institutional thinking (cf. Douglas 1987). The latter emphasises that 
individuals refer to shared expectations and knowledge in individual thinking, which makes it ultimately a 
social activity (ibid.).
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problematising, in which the use of a specific language and vocabulary establishes 
the issues that “need” governing (Miller & Rose 2008b). The data collection and 
analysis in this research draws upon Foucauldian notions of the discursive nature of 
governance and calculation (Foucault 1991c). The “questions of method” (cf. 
Foucault 199Id) which are associated with the work of Foucault are generally 
interested in the production of power and meaning in the historically specific 
language of regulation of conduct (Hall 1997). Foucault (1976, p. 133) describes 
discourses (and silence) as the instrument and the outcome of power -  in this case 
the power to govern -  but also as the representation of resistance and opposition in 
power relationships. However, as mentioned earlier, this research is less concerned 
with analyses of power relations than with the ways a programmatic and 
technological vocabulary of governing emerges in the local language of specific 
instances of regulatory reform. The work of Foucault provides a general 
methodological reference point which focuses this research on the idea that 
regulatory change is largely about the operation of thought within social and 
political practices (Dean 1999, pp. 17-18). Accordingly, die data collection and 
analysis has been guided by references to Foucauldian ideas of eventalisation (cf. 
Veyne 1979b; Foucault 199Id), genealogy (cf. Foucault 1980a; Miller & Napier
1993), and the discursive nature of governance and calculation (Hacking 1986; 
Foucault 1991c). These concepts stress the role of a historically specific language in 
constituting the singularity of events. The term genealogy signals the departure 
from the search for causalities that has been associated with historical analyses.
“Genealogy, consequently, requires patience and a knowledge o f
details and it depends on a vast accumulation o f source material. ”
(Foucault 1980a, p. 140)
References to a notion of eventalisation meant to trace the multiple branches of 
historical developments and unintended encounters that give rise to new practices. 
This focus on the singularity of events and their genealogy is, therefore, different 
from a historic perspective on the “origins” of practices and ideas as the outcome of 
evolutionary processes in response to contextual conditions (Foucault 1980a, p. 
140; Miller & Napier 1993). It constantly re-focuses the analysis in this study on the 
local processes and interactions that make single events possible (cf. Veyne 1979b). 
At the same time, these single events have the potential to change “what
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subsequently counts as being self-evident, universal and necessary.” (Foucault 
1991d, p. 76).
3.1 Governance reform as discourse
The view that the destabilising moments of accounting change are largely 
constituted by processes of translation and problematisation in which different 
accounting and non-accounting arenas begin to express their distinct and otherwise 
disparate concerns in accounting terms has further implications for the 
methodological approach in this research. It leads this study of the OFR events in 
the UK to focus on the discursive processes of constructing financial reporting 
practices as “problems” of economic governance and the presentation of non- 
financial and future-oriented measurement and reporting as possible accounting 
“solutions”. According to the view that “to govern is to act under a certain 
description” (Rose 1999, p. 28), language in this research is understood to make 
government and regulatory change possible.27 That is, when new categories for 
describing the means, objects and objectives of government emerge, they also 
create new possibilities for acting and intervening in the conduct of others or 
oneself (Hacking 1986; Rose 1999, p. 19). In other words:
“[I]t is through language that governmental fields are composed,
rendered thinkable and manageable. ” (Miller & Rose 1990, pp. 6 &
7)
This implies that the study of regulatory discourse is more than an analysis of mere 
rhetoric or of neutral reflections on what has been stated elsewhere (Carabine 2001, 
p. 275). The vocabulary that is used when developing or reforming regulatory 
regimes frames possibilities for action (cf. Hacking 1986) by making the 
programmes, technologies, problems and solutions of government intelligible.28 
This suggests that studies of regimes of governing should be undertaken through an 
analysis of the ways in which a language of highly abstract political rationalities 
frames the “discursive fields” (Rose & Miller 1992, p. 175) for “intelligible 
contestation” (Rose 1999, p. 28) about the objects and objectives of government.
27 For further discussion of narratives in social science research, see Czamiawska (1997; 2004).
28 For a discussion of framing possibilities for action through language in governance reform, see, Rose (1999, 
pp. 28-30), Miller and Rose (1990), or Rose and Miller (1992).
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"Language here serves as a ‘translation mechanism ’ between the 
general and the particular, establishing a kind o f identity or 
mutuality between political rationalities and regulatory aspirations.
[...] as well as establishing the place o f certain objects and 
problems within the legitimate obligations and power o f rulers 
[regulators], and enabling them to be formulated programmatically 
[...] M (Miller & Rose 1990, pp. 6 & 7)
Although broad families of “govem-mentalities” may be identified in the language 
of “liberalism”, “welfare”, or “neoliberalism”, the study of language in this research 
is mainly concerned with the vocabularies of government that emerge in relation to 
very specific events of regulatory change. This helps to address the question of how 
specific networks of reform actors began to see financial reporting numbers as a 
“problem” of governance. It also tackles why reform actors simultaneously come to 
agree that ideas of non-financial and future-oriented accounting provided a 
“solution” at a certain point in time without presupposing any larger or underlying 
rationality of change.
Although this research is not a study of actor-networks in the sense of ANT (cf. 
Callon 1980; Callon & Law 1982; Latour 1987; Callon 1999), the proposed focus 
on the processes of translation helps to think about, firstly, the different forums in 
which accounting change may take place and, secondly, raises awareness of the 
different actors that may become involved in regulatory change. To unravel the 
moments in which a status quo of governing gets problematised, these studies have 
focused the analysis of change on the processes in which particular problems move 
from one person, place, or arena to another and, thereby, draw in different actors 
and ideas around a shared issue. They lead this research to understand that new 
ideas and vocabularies of governing may be carried from one place to another by 
human an non-human actors, such as academic texts, government publications or 
professional magazines (Miller 1991). However, the methodological implications of 
ANT would only suggest to “follow” these human and non-human actors and 
actants (Law 1992; Latour 2004), but they do not address the role of programmatic 
issues in these networks. This research, therefore, takes a wider focus on discursive 
representations of political rationalities, programmes, and technologies in the 
interactions between discursive fields (cf. Robson 1991). This kind of analysis 
becomes possible through the study of the rationalising language of the persons and 
documents that come to interact in governance reform spaces at certain moments in
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history. Accordingly, the data collection and analysis in this study focuses on the 
articulations of the roles and purposes of financial reporting in relation to wider 
programmatic ideas about the governance of economic life.
In addition, each of the conceptual approaches has specific methodological 
implications for the study of discourses in this research. Although the vocabularies 
of government may be very specific for the relational networks in which they 
emerge (Carabine 2001, p. 275), this research suggests that they may point to a 
more global re-conceptualisations of accounting and the governance of business 
enterprises and economic life. The study assumes that the rise of a category of non- 
financial and future-oriented accounting rests upon a vocabulary that attributes it 
with a range of wider meanings and political ideals (Hopwood 1983b; Miller 1990; 
Miller et al. 1991; Hopwood 1992; Miller & Napier 1993; Miller 1994b). The 
analysis of the different elements of policy discourse which intersect in an intended 
or unintended manner in a particular accounting constellation helps to unpack the 
wider demands in whose name new accounting practices are constructed and 
mobilised in governance reform programmes. However, it is important to 
understand that the arenas of accounting change are themselves constituted to a 
large extent by forms of reasoning and categorising that cannot clearly be 
compartmentalised. Arenas may generally be conceptualised as “bodies of expertise 
that depend upon systematised conceptual and discursive schemas” (Miller & 
Power 1992). This implies looking for the particular discourses that share common 
“concepts, categories, and rhetoric of the discourse” when trying to define the 
arenas of accounting change (Robson 1991, p. 552). Similarly, the categorisation of 
logics o f appropriateness rests on the assumption that ideas about what is 
“appropriate” and what is not emerges from the communications among the actors 
in a regulatory space. From that point of view, not only the language of the 
regulatory agency itself (cf. Young 2003) but also that of other actors in the field 
outlines the “appropriateness” of regulatory issues and the role and responsibility of 
a regulatory body in dealing with it.
In line with the approach proposed by Robson (1991), the data analysis in this study 
starts from tracing the programmatic elaborations of non-financial and future- 
oriented accounting as an issue for governing in the empirical materials. 
Accordingly, the data collection and analysis is concerned with the ways in which
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language constructed the historically specific “problem spaces” (Rose & Miller
1992) that establish non-financial and future-oriented accounting as an issue for 
regulatory reform by “the State”. The review of the materials follows an iterative 
approach. The data is revisited several times to check if certain patterns emerge 
from the debates.
However, the interpretation of the accounts of the reform actors within the 
conceptual framework of this study poses a particular challenge in this research. Ex 
post explanations of regulatory reform tend to represent change as an apolitical, 
technical response to otherwise changing conditions of production and exchange in 
the search for progress and improvement (Miller 1991; Garsten & Jacobsson 2007); 
even though the underlying processes of their construction may “be anything but 
technical” (Brunsson & Jacobsson 2000a). References to accounting and disclosure 
often seemed instrumental and strongly influenced by normative conceptions about 
principal-agent relationships and transactions-costs (cf. Villiers 2006).29 The 
analysis in this thesis, therefore, remains critical about taking the discursive 
rationalisations of events and decisions as representations of an underlying “reality” 
(Colebatch 1989; MacDonald & Richardson 2004). It interprets the verbal and 
written accounts of the events in this study as part of the distinct vocabulary of a 
specific regulatory space which created possibilities for the construction of 
“accounting problems” and “solutions”. In order to support and illustrate the 
findings and conclusions in this research, the discussions of the empirical materials 
in chapters two, three, and four make large use of selected quotes.
3.2 Data sources and collection
Concerning the collection of empirical data, this study understands that the historic- 
specific language of problematising accounting in governance becomes visible in 
academic, professional, governmental, or inter-govemmental texts and publications 
(Miller 1991). A “mistrust in numbers” in the problematisations of financial 
reporting in existing modes of governing is, therefore, studied on the basis of a wide 
range of empirical materials. They include the published and unpublished 
documents and other accounts of events that relate to, first, the rise of a category of
29 For further discussion of economic accounts of disclosure regulation see also Leftwich (1980), Beaver (1998), 
and Healy & Palepu (2001).
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non-financial and future-oriented accounting in British accounting reform-debates 
in the UK from the late-1980s onwards.
A large albeit never complete amount of data has been collected over the term of 
this study. The primary data in this research consists of the published and 
unpublished documents and reports that were prepared as part of calls for financial 
reforms “beyond the numbers”. Furthermore, this research draws on written and 
personal ex-post accounts of key persons who participated in the reform processes. 
The documents which were publicly available were either ordered from the 
regulatory organisations or accessed through libraries or on the internet. Internal 
written documentations of the agenda-setting debates during the CLR were obtained 
directly from the DTI (and later the BERR) during several on-site visits in the 
summer of 2006 and 2007.30 For a chronological overview of the key reports and 
discussion papers that have been reviewed for this study, see appendix 2 in this 
thesis.
In addition, 15 semi-structured research interviews were conducted between 
January 2005 and January 2008. The interview partners were selected according to 
the degree of their involvement in the relevant accounting reform debates. The 
difficulty in drawing from a very small pool of specific people whose schedules 
were oftentimes tight meant that the collection of interview data was constrained. 
For each interview, a list of open-ended interview questions was prepared in 
advance. They covered the personal experience of the interviewee with the events 
under scrutiny and asked for their point of view on key events, points of conflict, 
and the role of particular ideas, individuals, or organisation in shaping the 
regulatory debates. The interviews lasted between 15 and 90 minutes. Eleven 
interviews were digitally recorded. Eight were fully and three partly transcribed by 
the author. Where recording was not possible, minutes were prepared from memory 
and on the basis of detailed notes on the same day of the interview. Copies of six 
transcripts have been sent to the respective interviewees. Four returned a revised 
version of the transcript by e-mail. For a list of interviewees and further details, see 
appendix 3 in this thesis.
30 The DTI was replaced by the Department for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR) in July 
2007. Its predecessor until 1970 was the Board of Trade (BERR 2007b). The BERR has been merged into the 
new Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) in June 2009 (BERR 2009).
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The remaining paragraphs of this section summarise the key data sources that have 
been used to study the emergence of a category of non-financial and future-oriented 
accounting, the voluntary OFR project at the ASB, and the introduction of the 
mandatory OFR during the CLR. The structured collection of empirical data was 
further broadened by tracing further references from the core materials or as 
indicated by interview partners. The author ceased to collect further material and to 
conduct further interviews once they failed to provide any more insights into the 
British accounting reform debates.31 In order to remain within the scope of this 
thesis, other narrative reporting initiatives which were not directly linked to the 
OFR projects in the UK were excluded from the analysis.
The study of the arenas of accounting change in this thesis rests on an in-depth 
analysis of policy proposals for accounting reform in the mid 1970s, in die late 
1980s, and in the mid 1990s. The data consists inter alia of a series of research 
reports and discussion papers that provided some of the key arguments for the 
launch of the voluntary OFR project at the ASB and the mandatory OFR project 
during the CLR. They were identified by tracing back references from documents 
that have been prepared as part of the regulatory reform processes or following the 
recommendations of interview partners. The documents that directly preceded the 
explicit initiatives for regulating supplementary reporting in a voluntary and later a 
mandatory OFR in accounting standard-setting and company law date back to 1988. 
The study Making Corporate Reports Valuable (McMonnies 1988) marked a 
starting point for the financial reporting reform debates which followed throughout 
the 1990s. The review of debates relating to the publication of the discussion paper 
The Corporate Report (ASSC 1975) helped to better understand the points of 
difference between post 1988 calls for accounting reform and those which preceded 
them. To remain within the scope of this thesis, the reviews of secondary sources 
are limited to a review of those debates in the general management literature and in 
accounting research that directly connect to problematisations of financial reporting 
numbers and ideas of non-financial and future-oriented accounting.
The analysis of the agenda-setting process for a voluntary OFR draws on 
documents that outlined a role for the ASB in the regulation of non-financial and
31 For a further reflection on the data collection and analysis in this research, see chapter five.
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future-oriented reporting. The policy of the ASB to hold its meetings behind closed 
doors (Turley 1992) and the confidential treatment of meeting minutes, however, 
limited the data collection to publicly available documents, including the reports 
and discussion papers from the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) and the ASB 
between 1991 and 1993 (ASB 1991; FRC 1991; ASB 1992, 1993). A hard copy of 
102 out of in total 104 responses to the ASB’s invitation for public comment in the 
1992 discussion paper was obtained directly from the ASB.32 However, the 
somewhat limited insight into the internal work of the ASB constrains a discussion 
of the points of conflict and agreement about the macro-ideas of governing within 
the internal debates. Therefore, this research interprets the OFR Discussion Paper 
(ASB 1992) and the OFR Statement (ASB 1993) as representing the consensus that 
had been found between the diverse members of the ASB and other external 
contributors. The degree to which individual responses were taken into account in 
the agenda-setting debates, therefore, remains unclear. The document analysis in 
chapter three is complemented by interviews and written communications with the 
three key members of the original OFR working group at the ASB. To substantiate 
the findings from the primary sources and the ex-post descriptions, the study draws 
on additional secondary sources that elaborate the history and context of accounting 
regulation in the UK in more detail.
The study of the emergence of the OFR on the agenda of the CLR is based on a 
wide range of archival materials that have been produced in the run-up to the CLR 
and following its launch. The former set of documents includes the economic policy 
proposals from the Labour Party in the run-up to the 1997 General Election (Labour 
Party 1997b, 1997a) and ministerial speeches and official documents and press 
releases from the DTI. The latter set of documents includes among others the 
consultation documents published by the DTI (1998b) and the formally independent 
Company Law Review Steering Group (CLRSG 1999a, 2000b, 2000a) and the 
Final Report to the Government (CLRSG 2001). Other data sources include the 
unpublished internal working papers of the DTI and the CLRSG, their meeting 
minutes, and supporting documents that have been prepared by the sub-working 
groups of the CLRSG or by external parties in commissioned research. They also 
include the public responses to the consultation or summary statements thereof.
32 Two letters were missing in the set of documents that could be obtained from the ASB.
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Further insight into the developments under study was gained from short 
conversations with key members of the CLRSG and representatives of other 
organisations which were closely involved at conferences and workshops. In 
addition to these, a review was conducted of related publications by members of the 
CLRSG prepared during and after their participation in the steering group 
(Radcliffe et al. 1998; Kelly & Parkinson 2000; Parkinson 2002; Rickford 2002; 
Davies 2003,2005).
4 Outline of this research
Each of the following chapters focuses on a different aspect of the rise of non- 
financial and future-oriented narratives as an issue for accounting standard-setting 
and regulation in the UK in moments of a severe questioning of financial reporting 
numbers as a problem for governing.
Chapter two on the process of moving accounting into new territory outlines the co­
emergence of non-financial and future-oriented accounting and programmes of 
governing business and the economy in the UK in different policy forums since the 
late 1980s. The study of the different arenas and constellations of accounting 
change illustrates two aspects of the process of reforming accounting and 
governance: First, it shows how a “mistrust in numbers” is founded on the 
expectation that accounting should and could provide information on “economic 
reality” in a managerial context. Second, the discussion in chapter two illustrates 
how new ideas about the roles and purposes of accounting in business management 
create possibilities for co-designing the problems of government that they seek to 
solve at the same time.
Chapters three and four are concerned with the reconfiguring of UK accounting 
regulation in regulatory space. Chapter three analyses the process of shifting the 
boundaries of accounting standard-setting in which non-financial and future- 
oriented reporting emerged as an agenda issue for the ASB in the early-1990s. 
Attention to the emergence of logics o f appropriateness helps to explain how
33 Major conferences and workshops attended in the conduct of this research were the CriticalEYE “OFR 
Summit” on 02.11.2005; the ICSA seminar series on non-financial reporting on 26.10.2005 and 06.12.2005; 
the IoD seminar “Narrative Reporting -  The Future?” on 12.12.2005; the ACCA, Tomorrow’s Company, and 
h2glenfem event “The Future of Narrative Reporting” on 28.06.2006; “The Future of Financial Reporting, 
BAA/ACCA Seminar” on 12.01.2007; and the ICAEW-FRDG Meeting “Narrative Reporting” on 
28.02.2007.
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multiple ideas of governing gave rise to die voluntary OFR as an agenda-issue for 
accounting standard-setting. Furthermore, chapter three outlines the indicators for a 
general re-positioning of the ASB and accounting standard-setting in relation to 
ideas of governing in the name of “the profession”, “the State”, and “the markets”. 
Questions of legitimacy and logics o f appropriateness are also implicit in the study 
of agenda-setting for a mandatory OFR during the British CLR between 1998 and 
2001. Chapter four on the process of realigning law, accounting, and “the State” 
illustrates the rise of non-financial and future-oriented reporting within a 
programme for reforming the international competitiveness of the British economy. 
The analysis of the mandatory OFR event helps to address the wider question how 
accounting practices connect to “the State”. This provides new insights into the 
particular role of law in overcoming a state-market dichotomy in the 
conceptualisation of accounting as an element of governance.
Chapter five pulls together the previous themes and summarises the multiple factors 
and dimensions of a “mistrust in numbers” in financial reporting change in the UK. 
It also includes a short reflection upon the variety of literatures and materials that 
provide the conceptual and empirical basis for this research and outlines the benefits 
and limits of using an interrelated body of writings on accounting and government 
in this thesis. Finally, chapter five develops the conceptual implications of a 
“mistrust in numbers” for thinking about accounting, regulation, and the 
governance of economic life at large. It proposes that the OFR represents a 
significant shift in elaborations of the roles and purposes of accounting in governing 
from a focus on neutrality and objectivity in economic governance to a focus on 
seeking to reveal the underlying complexity and subjectivity of economic reality.
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C h a p t e r  2 
MOVING ACCOUNTING INTO NEW TERRITORY
’’The income statements, cash flow, balance sheet, they all show you 
the raw economic detail and the OFR will have to now tell you what 
it all means - because accounts are getting too complicated, because 
the economy is getting complicated. ”
(Standard-setter F)
1 “Mistrust in numbers” as an issue for governing in the UK
This chapter traces the factors and events that made it possible for a category of 
non-financial and future-oriented accounting to rise and maintain momentum in 
British policy reform debates since the late 1980s. The rise and fall of similar 
proposals for extending the scope of financial reporting in the 1970s suggests that 
non-financial and future-oriented measurement and reporting practices were not 
always considered part of accounting. The findings from this chapter support the 
view that accounting categories should not be taken for granted in the study of 
regulatory reform. They show that widely shared conceptions of the roles and 
purposes of accounting in the OFR events emerged as part of a wider 
“strategisation”, “marketisation”, and “socialisation” of the language of business 
management and governance throughout the 1980s and 1990s. This chapter also 
illustrates the multiplicity of voices which were involved in creating momentum for 
ideas of non-financial and future-oriented reporting in the period preceding the 
launch of the OFR projects at the ASB and the DTI.
1.1 Rise and fall in the 1970s
A questioning of the “neutral” and “objective” nature of financial reporting 
numbers has been part of calls for financial reporting reform at least since the 
formation of the first British accounting standard setting body in 1970.1 The 
purpose of the standardisation programmes of the Accounting Standards Steering
1 For further discussion of the history of the regulation of accounting practice in the UK, see chapter three.
36
Committee (AS SC) was to overcome the use of many alternative approaches to the 
measurement and presentation of economic activities and resources in accounting 
practice (cf Stamp & Marley 1970). The possibility to produce accounting numbers 
in different ways was formally acknowledged with the publication of the Statement 
o f Standard Accounting Practice 2: Disclosure o f Accounting Policies in 1971. 
After the publication of SSAP 2, the work of the AS SC continued to focus on:
“[T]he task o f narrowing the areas o f  difference and variety in 
accounting practices and establishing objective standards o f  
financial reporting [...] ” (ASSC1975, p. 7)
The publication of the discussion paper The Corporate Report (ASSC 1975) 
marked the starting point for an intended “major review of the users, purposes and 
methods of modem financial reporting” by the British accounting institutes (ibid., p. 
7).3 It was prepared by a working party comprising eleven members, including the 
chairman and the technical director of the ICAEW, audit firm partners, financial 
managers, and one academic -  working on behalf of the ASSC over a term of eight 
months starting in October 1974. The working party set out to re-examine the 
fundamental purposes of financial reports “in the context of existing and probable 
future legal and social requirements” (ibid., para. 0.9). The project team recognised 
that the published annual reports of UK companies mainly complied with the 
minimum legal requirements for the provision of die financial statements (ibid., 
paras. 4.3-4.6). Nevertheless, it concluded that presenting “a rounded picture of 
economic activities” (ibid., para. 0.5) required “putting profit into proper 
perspective” (ibid., para. 6.7).
“The reporting ofprofit and loss and balance sheet figures only will 
be insufficient to impart a comprehensive picture o f  economic 
activities. Additional information and statements are needed which 
will assist the understanding o f financial statements and reveal more 
fully how resources have been utilised. ” (ASSC 1975, para. 6.3)
These conclusions marked “quite a radical development” for their time (Rutherford 
2007, p. 109). The call for reform was part of a fundamentally new way of looking
2 SSAP2 was superseded by Financial Reporting Standard (FRS) 18 Accounting Policies in 2000.
3 The discussion paper was produced on behalf the ASSC/ ICAEW in association with the Institute of Chartered
Accountants of Scotland (ICAS), the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Ireland (ICAI), the Association of 
Certified Accountants (ACA), the Institute of Cost and Management Accountants (ICMA), and the Chartered 
Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA).
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at the roles and purposes of financial reports in terms of their “usefulness”. For 
example, the previously dominant concept of “distributable profit” as a measure of 
business performance was rejected as the only legitimate indicator of true and fair 
view of “economic value” (ASSC 1975, paras. 4.29-4.30; Gilmore & Willmott
1992). 4 To meet the objective of “usefulness”, the corporate report inter alia 
proposed the inclusion of additional statements in the annual report on issues such 
as value added, future prospects, corporate objectives, or strategic targets (ASSC 
1975, para. 6.5). The discussion paper also encouraged descriptive and interpretive 
chairman statements on corporate activities to explain and supplement the 
information in the financial statements (ibid., para. 6.54).
Ideas of complementing financial reporting with additional statements also surfaced 
in public policy proposals for reforming company law (DTI 1973). The publication 
The Future o f Company Reports by the Department of Trade (1977a) explicitly 
referred to the suggestions from the ASSC when it proposed to introduce a 
mandatory value added-statement. However, the law reform proposals never made it 
into statute. According to other studies of these debates, this was due to a lack of 
parliamentary time before the change of Government in the 1979 general election 
(Burchell et al. 1985, p. 110; Woodward 2004; Rutherford 2007).5 In addition, the 
inflation crisis of the mid 1970s had shifted momentum in the spheres of 
professional and public accounting regulation from a focus on supplementary 
financial reports back to increased concerns with financial reporting numbers 
(Standard-setter F).6 An article in The Accountant’s Magazine considered the issue 
as follows:
4 The phrase true and fair was introduced with the Companies Act 1948 in order to focus compliance on the
spirit of the law and not merely the letter. The ways in which true and fair were interpreted seem to have 
shifted over time from the unbiased presentation of historic cost to an emphasis on concepts of economic 
value (Gilmore & Willmott 1992).
5 For a detailed discussion of the rise and fall of the value added-statement on the additional wealth created by
the company and its employees in the UK, see Burchell et al. (1985).
6 Other authors interpreted that change of focus as a response to political threats to deprive the accounting
profession of its self-regulatory privileges, if they did not react appropriately to a series of misrepresentations 
in public audited accounts (Sikka & Willmott 1995).
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“[A] good case can be made for broadening the scope o f the 
corporate reporting. There are, however, many problems to be 
overcome in the presentation o f the current corporate report, and 
consequently, there may be an equally strong case fo r priority being 
given to the improvement o f the reporting accountant’s present 
methods o f communication. ” (Tweedie 1975)
For another decade or so, reform in British financial reporting standard-setting 
remained preoccupied with ideas of “improving” economic representations in 
financial reporting numbers. The solutions proposed in these reform debates largely 
focused on changing the techniques for recognition and measurement of the 
reporting items in the financial statements. Especially the development of metrics 
for inflation accounting and profit measurement remained high on the agenda of the 
ASC before professional debates in accounting standard-setting turned their
n
attention again to the context in which financial reporting numbers were produced.
1.2 Rise and rise since the late 1980s
The first publication that picked up ideas of “improving” financial reporting in the 
UK through additional reports explaining and complementing financial statements 
was Making Corporate Reports Valuable (McMonnies 1988) by the Research 
Committee of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland (ICAS). The 
report, which later became to be regarded as a “milestone” in thinking about 
reforming financial reporting (Standard-setter F), was prepared at a time when the 
British accounting bodies engaged in a new cycle of discussions on the future of 
financial reporting and the role of the accounting profession. It was followed by a 
series of profession-led research reports and debates in which ideas of expanding 
the scope of financial reporting gained further momentum (ICAEW 1988; ICAS 
1988; McMonnies 1988; Arnold et al. 1990; Arnold et al. 1991b, 1991a). 
Eventually, ideas of supplementing the financial statements with additional 
reporting elements translated into regulatory reform projects at the British
7 Similar debates took place internationally, too. For example, the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants 
(CICA) engaged in a debate on the “future evolution” of corporate reporting at the beginning of the 1980s. 
The Stamp Report called for supplementary information in corporate reports to amplify the financial 
information provided in the financial statements (Stamp 1980). In the US, proposals for the disclosure of non- 
financial key performance indicators were published in the 1994 report Improving Business Reporting -  A 
Customer Focus: Meeting the Information Needs o f Investors and Creditor by the “Special Committee on 
Financial Reporting” of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA 1994).
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Accounting Standards Board (ASB) and during the British Company Law Review 
(CLR).8
Failure to attract wide-ranging support for the proposals in The Corporate Report 
was retrospectively interpreted to be the result of a “too academic” approach that 
departed “too radically” from perceived commercial reality (Standard-setter E). The 
suggestions to rethink the scope of financial reporting were also explicitly criticised 
for being driven by only a small group of individuals with little empirical 
foundation or research into existing reporting practice (ICAS 1976b; Stamp 1985). 
Although some companies in the UK had started to publish additional voluntary 
reports, such as value added statements (Burchell et al. 1985) or operational reviews 
including indicators of future prospects (Gifford-Gifford 1976), the wider 
accounting community remained sceptical about an expansion of corporate financial 
reporting beyond the financial statements (Tweedie 1975; ICAS 1976a; Tierney 
1976). Even the ICAS, which would become one of the strongest supporters of 
additional management commentaries a decade later, was not convinced by the 
proposals from The Corporate Report.
"The Committee would caution the accountancy profession against 
attempting to be the arbiter o f what corporate reports should 
contain other than in matters directly relating to financial 
reporting. ” (ICAS 1976a)
It seems The Corporate Report was ahead of its time. It anticipated a perspective on 
the role of business in society and ideas about managerial “best practice” that 
needed further evolution through history before it was more widely agreed in the 
later governance reform debates. The proposals for measuring and reporting 
“economic performance” in non-financial and future-oriented terms in the 1988 
study Making Corporate Reports Valuable gained acceptance much more quickly 
among accounting practitioners. They were welcomed for their “more technical” 
accounting language and “better” alignment with “economic reality” (Standard- 
setter F).
The history of the rise and fall of narrative reporting in the 1970s and the rise and 
rise of calls for additional explanatory reports in financial accounting since the late
8 Both cases are further explained in chapters three and four respectively.
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1980s supports the view that neither accounting issues nor the programmes in 
whose name they are mobilised are “simply there” by the time they begin to be 
linked in governance reform debates (cf. Young 1994). Starting from the view that 
the emergence of programmes and technologies of governing (and the links 
between them) are situational and relational (cf. Miller 1990; Rose & Miller 1992; 
Miller 2001), this chapter traces a genealogy (cf. Miller & Napier 1993) of events 
and developments that gave rise to widespread agreement on non-financial and 
future-oriented accounting as an issue for British policy-makers.
The discussion is organised in four sections. The first section briefly outlines some 
additional conceptual considerations that were necessary to frame the study of the 
complex processes of co-designing programmes and technologies of government. 
The second section outlines the rise of a category of non-financial and future- 
oriented accounting as part of a re-conceptualisation of managerial “best practice” 
during the 1980s. The findings provide the implicit background knowledge for the 
third section which discusses the links between similar theoretical-abstract ideas of 
“economic reality” and three arenas of British policy reform debates. The final part 
summarises the findings from this chapter and discusses their implications for the 
further study of accounting change in the remainder of this thesis.
2 Local and de-localised arenas of change
On the one hand, the perspective in this chapter on the time that preceded the OFR 
events at the ASB and the DTI helps to understand changes in the programmes and 
objectives of governing that guided the regulatory reform debates at the ASB in the 
early 1990s and later during the CLR. On the other hand, it helps to explain the rise 
of a widely shared view of accounting as a means for thinking about and acting 
upon business activities that were not directly captured in the financial accounts.
The idea that accounting change is reflective and constitutive at the same time 
(Hopwood 1983b; Miller 1994b) suggests that the study of accounting and 
governance should take the ways in which “new” accounting categories mobilise 
“new” programmes of policy reform and vice-versa into account. This implies 
stepping beyond a dichotomy between policy-making and organisational accounting 
measurement and reporting techniques and to view them as intrinsically linked. 
However, only a small number of studies examined the processes through which a
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specific vocabulary of organisational accounting practice mediated and shaped the 
programmatic language of high-level policy reform. These studies have looked at 
the encounters between accounting and various policy arenas, such as financial 
reporting standard-setting, industrial relations, or macroeconomic policy-making 
(Burchell et al. 1985; Miller 1991; Robson 1991; Young 1994). Although they 
provide helpful concepts for framing the study of accounting change in extra- 
organisational spaces, there has been little exploration of a process of co-designing 
programmes and technologies of government (cf. Miller & Rose 2008a). That is, 
the question of how programmes and technologies emerge in governance spaces in 
the first place has not been addressed, like the study by Burchell et al. (1985) on 
“the sudden upsurge of interest in value added” focuses on tracing apparently given 
notions of “value added” in three arenas of policy discourse. Although the 
conceptual refinement by Robson (1991) helps to explain how different arenas 
begin to express their distinct programmatic concerns in terms of value added, the 
studies do not explain how notions of accounting practices contribute to shaping 
government reform programmes.
To study the processes in which wider programmes of governing and a category of 
non-financial and future-oriented accounting co-emerged and reinforced each other, 
the analysis in this chapter takes the idea that the practices and rationales that 
happen to be labelled “accounting” emerge and transform in relation to more 
abstract ideas about the governance of economic and social life (Miller & Napier
1993) as its starting point. This leads to a focus on the “decisive” moments in which 
accounting, other bodies of knowledge, and the sphere of governance connect 
(Miller 1991). This research, therefore, rephrases the concept of the accounting 
constellation (cf. Burchell et al. 1985) and distinguishes between “local” and “de­
localised” dimensions of problematising accounting as an issue for governing 
business enterprises. As in the study by Burchell et al. (1985), the local dimension 
of problematising accounting in this research relates to a set of specific British 
policy debates which called upon non-financial and future-oriented accounting to 
“solve” their distinct problems with governing. The introduction of the voluntary 
OFR at the ASB was preceded by a series of calls for reform in the arena of 
financial reporting standard-setting since the late 1980s. Similarly, the proposals for 
a mandatory OFR during the CLR seem to have grown out of various initiatives that
42
shared concerns with macroeconomic policy-making. Both arenas shared many of 
their concerns with a third series of policy debates on corporate governance. 
Therefore, the debates in the latter arena, though not directly linked to the OFR 
events, will be briefly sketched out in this chapter, too. Each arena is characterised 
by a distinct vocabulary of governing rationales. The policy debates that have been 
summarised under the label financial reporting standard-setting focused primarily 
on the “decision usefulness” of accounting reports when problematising financial 
reporting numbers as an issue for governing. Concerns with “corporate 
accountability” aligned the debates in the corporate governance arena. Finally, 
debates on public economic policy making were understood to concentrate 
primarily on the integration of corporate activities with a “public interest”.
In contrast, the term “de-localised” in this research refers to changing descriptions 
of the role of accounting in managerial processes that appear somehow detached 
from the distinctively British policy debates. They may be grouped according to a 
generic language of managerial “best practice” in terms of strategic management, 
financial management, and corporate social responsibility (CSR). The distinction 
between local and de-localised levels allows for a more diversified view of the 
different “conditions and demands placed upon accounting and accounting reports” 
(Young 1994). The notion of a de-localised dimension of problematising accounting 
in the British reform debates takes into account the idea that much accounting 
change seems to be mobilised “in the name of quite abstract notions of its roles, 
potential and functioning” and of “highly abstract notions of managerial process” 
(Hopwood 1983a, p. 3).9 In particular, extra-organisational communities, such as 
academics, consultants, or policy-makers, often seem to assume a rather normative 
relation between organisational accounting practices and internal and external 
decision-making processes when elaborating calls for governance reform. However, 
the study of de-localised views on the role of accounting in business management is 
conceptually different from ideas of translation between local reform processes and 
a transnational level. Research on the “travel of ideas” (cf. Czamiawska & Joerges 
1996) has proposed that highly abstracted and rationalised models of managerial
9 A similar relation between abstracted notions of practice in concrete regulatory policy making processes has 
been described for accounting standard-setting in the US as “making up users” (Young 2006). 
Problematisations of the “remote and abstract” representations of the enterprise in accounting reports have 
also been discussed by Miller and O’Leary (1993) in a study of the “politics of the product” event in the US in 
the 1980s.
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practice take the form of a transnational knowledge (Meyer et al. 1997; Sahlin- 
Andersson & Engwall 2002) which gets diffused in different national or 
organisational contexts through the interventions of epistemic communities (cf. 
Haas 1992). This means that transnational organisations or professional networks 
with claims to policy-relevant knowledge in a particular domain (ibid., p. 3) come 
to act as “carriers” of management knowledge between a world-society level and 
the local (Portes 1997; Brunsson & Jacobsson 2000b; Sahlin-Andersson & Engwall 
2002; Mennicken 2008). In contrast to a transnational perspective on change, a 
notion of “de-localised arenas” in this research emphasises that “a ‘consciousness’ 
of accounting techniques and calculations” (Robson 1991, pp. 551-552) may be 
inherent in local policy discourses even without the direct involvement of 
transnational actors or ideas.
The analysis of a range of British policy documents from the arenas of financial 
reporting standard-setting, corporate governance, and public economic policy 
making suggests that the links between local and de-localised dimensions are 
largely established through joint references to a historic specific “context” or 
“economic reality” of accounting change (Hopwood 1983b; Miller & Napier 1993). 
Previous research by Young (1995) on market value accounting in the US savings 
and loan crisis already identified a particular role of references to “economic 
reality” in accounting reform. This chapter uses the term new global competition to 
summarise the perceived impacts of wider economic, social, and political 
developments on economic activities from the 1980s onwards. They include notions 
of the complex, dynamic, and often unpredictable nature of global change (Holzner 
& Holzner 2006, pp. 50 & 53) which have historically grown out of the gradual 
removal of trade barriers to capital and labour mobility since the 1950s (Kahler & 
Lake 2003, pp. 4-7). New global competition further refers to the profound changes 
in processes of production and exchange that resulted from improved technologies, 
reduced transport and communication costs, and the increasing relevance of 
intangible assets in the asset-mix of modem business operations (Hall & Soskice 
2001). These developments have also been recognised in accounting research, 
where references to increasingly global, dynamic and complex business 
environments have been acknowledged as a key element in accounting change 
throughout the 1980s (Hopwood 1989a; Bromwich 1990).
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The categorisation of discourses as local and de-localised arenas of problem 
discourses in this study was, however, not an easy task. Arenas have to be 
understood as complex categories that may embrace a number of sub-arenas and 
sub-constellations. In addition, their boundaries are in constant flux, so that any 
definition will be historically and culturally specific (Foucault 199Id; Miller & 
Power 1992) and can never be clearly compartmentalised (Miller & O’Leary 1993). 
Nevertheless, the parallels in conceptualising “economic reality” and managerial 
“best practice” in a transnational body of literature and in the British reform 
debates were striking. The categorisation of the de-localised arenas was further 
supported by a review of Anglo-American writings on the development of “best 
practices” in business management since the 1980s. This literature review also 
helped to trace a general history of the interrelations between accounting and 
managerial practice which provides the background knowledge for the more in- 
depth analysis in this and the remaining chapters of this thesis.
3 Accounting and management in the 1980s
Since the mid 1980s, an Anglo-American body of general management literature 
has treated accounting as almost synonymous with management (Miller 1998a).10 
The developments relate in particular to the rise of an economic discourse of 
management accounting since the Second World War which emphasised ideas of 
conscious planning and decision-making. As part of these encounters between 
management, economics, and accounting, the techniques for measuring and 
representing entrepreneurial activities in financial terms were increasingly seen as a 
key means for the “efficient” and “effective” management and monitoring of 
organisations (Hopwood 1992; Miller 1998a). This rationale of accounting as a 
technology of governing business enterprises according to economic principles 
has, however, been interpreted differently at different moments in time.
The remainder of this section outlines the rise of three arenas that were seen to 
constitute managerial “best practice” at times of new global competition. The 
discussion focuses on the ways they redefined conceptions of “economic reality” 
and how this became part of an increasing questioning of the role of financial
10 The term “management” has been increasingly used since the 1950s to describe the administrative process of 
planning, organising, resource allocation, directing, and controlling (Newman 1951; Newman 1953). In 
addition, studies of management were increasingly concerned with the development of a general management 
theory since World War II (Wren 1994, p. 349).
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accounting numbers as an issue for governing business enterprises since the mid 
1980s.
3.1 Strategic management
The concept of management by objectives (cf. Drucker 1955) and related notions of 
goal-setting and performance evaluation took centre stage in general management 
thought during the post-war period. Since the 1960s, they were complemented by 
notions of strategy -  originally a military concept. Managerial goal setting and 
enterprise management in the name of strategy was conceptualised as an issue of 
matching long-term objectives and action plans with the allocation of resources as a 
means for their achievement (Chandler 1962). Throughout the 1970s, the catch- 
phrase “strategic management” became widely recognised in business education, 
practice, and consultancy (Wren 1994, pp. 349 & 423). It grew into an even more 
prominent element of the management literature throughout the 1980s, when 
normative notions of strategy contributed to the development of a series of decision- 
tools for thinking about the deployment of internal organisational resources and the 
interactions with the organisation’s external environment (Dent 1990).11 Models, 
such as the concept of “competitive strategy” or the “five forces model of strategic 
positioning” (Porter 1980, 1985) suggested that planning and decision-making 
should be based on a systematic analysis of the competitive environment.12 The rise 
of concerns with strategic management throughout the 1980s was closely related to 
changing perceptions of the terms of competition in a global economy. As part of 
these changing theoretical perspectives, the role of managers was redefined in terms 
of identifying and managing strategic “opportunities” and “challenges” (cf. Collis & 
Montgomery 1995; Teece et al. 1997). A long-term perspective in business 
management looking to secure competitive advantage came to be regarded as a 
crucial success factor in times of increasingly dynamic and highly innovative 
environments (Hayes & Abernathy 1980). Since then, normative notions of 
strategic management have become part and parcel of the conceptualisation of the
11 The strategic management literature is divided into prescriptive (e.g. Ansoff 1965; Porter 1980, 1985) and 
descriptive notions of strategy (e.g. Mintzberg & McHugh 1985; Mintzberg 1987).
12 The “five forces” concept describes an industry as being influenced by five factors that impact the potential of 
a business to achieve competitive advantage over other organisations in the same industry. The concept of 
“competitive strategy” provides an analytical approach for thinking about the relative competitive advantage 
of a business within its markets in terms of three generic strategies of cost leadership, differentiation, or the 
focus on a market segment (Porter 1980).
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tasks of top managers. They are closely tied in with another debate on managing the 
financial bottom-line.
3.2 Financial management
The globalisation of capital flows and changes to the financing structure of 
businesses throughout the 1980s were further linked to calls for increased financial 
management of the firm. These proposals responded to an observed concentration 
of ownership in the hands of large institutional investors.13 Their potential to take 
action against the decisions of the board of directors led to the reinterpretation of 
the role of the so-called “markets of corporate control” in managerial decision 
making (Jensen & Ruback 1983). An undervaluation of businesses in the stock 
market was supposed to increase the risk for managers to be replaced and/or for the 
company as a whole to become subject to a so-called “hostile” takeover. In 
response, managers were urged to focus their efforts on the creation of long-term 
“shareholder-value” (cf. Rappaport 1986). The rise of a shareholder value rhetoric 
was part of a general financialisation (cf. Fligstein 1990) of Anglo-American 
business management and competition throughout that decade. From the 
perspective of financial management, the organisation came to be seen as a 
portfolio of investment projects which should be managed according to the 
principle of maximising the returns on equity. Academic endorsers of “shareholder 
value” emphasised the perceived economic benefits and efficiency gains from a 
managerial focus on market valuations. Aspirations to operationalising “shareholder 
value” in day-to-day management provided the basis for an avalanche of value- 
based management concepts from the consulting industry (Froud et al. 2000). In 
general, it was suggested that “shareholder value” became a holistic management 
approach permeating any aspect of corporate activities in order to meet the 
objective of maximising return on equity.
3.3 Corporate social responsibility
In addition to the re-definition of performance targets in terms of “shareholder 
value” and a general “strategisation” of the language of goal setting throughout the 
1980s, the economic based models of business management increasingly embraced
13 In 1998, 80% of the shares of UK companies were held by national and international institutional investors. 
For further details about institutional investors in the UK see the “Myners Review” (Myners 2001).
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ideas of corporate social responsibility (CSR). 14 Debates on the “social 
responsibilities of the businessman” (Bowen 1953) had already emerged in the field 
of industrial relations soon after WWII. During the 1960s, the question “Can 
business afford to ignore social responsibilities?” (Davis 1960) established first 
theoretical linkages between notions of CSR and a firm’s economic success. Ansoff 
(1965), for instance, already argued that the achievement of long-term corporate 
objectives required the recognition of further “social” objectives beyond the 
“economic” objectives of the business. From the 1970s onwards, ideas of a mutual 
permeability of business organisations and society began to challenge the specific 
definitions of high-level objectives in business management (Carroll 1979, 1991, 
2000; Sharp Paine 2003). Around that time, the issue gained increasing public 
attention. Western governments and top-managers began to openly recognise the 
possibility of a “social contract” that established ethical and moral norms of 
business’ conduct beyond basic economic and legal requirements (see, e.g. CBI 
Company Affairs Committee 1973, para. 22; Tweedie 1975).15 However, CSR 
related issues still remained largely separated from concerns with managing 
economic performance until the development of a stakeholder theory (cf. Freeman 
1984) in the mid-1980s. The concept proposed close links between “social 
performance” and “economic performance” which fed into a growing interest in 
operationalising CSR in business management. Moreover, the notion of 
“stakeholders” allowed for the breaking down of the abstract concept of the “social” 
into specific key relationships as an issue for managerial intervention. CSR became 
intelligible in a language that was more consistent with the emerging programmes 
of goal setting and performance management in the names of “strategy” and 
“shareholder value” (Drucker 1984; Wren 1994, p. 410). The vocabulary of a so- 
called “CSR business case” translated the management of non-shareholder relations 
into a language of risks and opportunities and long-term value-maximisation
14 A generic definition of corporate social responsibility (CSR) identifies four general levels of corporate 
responsibilities to society. They may be categorised as economic, legal, ethical, and philanthropic obligations 
(Carroll 1979,1991). Depending on local adoptions of the concept the boundaries of a general CSR category, 
however, always remain somewhat blurred (Carroll 1999). For example, British debates on CSR have been 
mainly associated with economic implications of wider accountability of businesses to society (Gray et al. 
1996; Shearer 2002), whereas a US perspective on CSR seems to emphasise its philanthropic aspects (Anon. 
2002).
15 In addition, a survey among the chairmen of the 300 largest UK-listed companies indicated their appreciation 
of the interests of employees, shareholders, and customers in decision making (ASSC 1975, paras. 4.28-4.28). 
Other commentators of the time argued that company managers considered their “social and economic 
obligations” largely in order not to “risk public disapproval of their activities” in practice (Tweedie 1975).
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(Carroll 1999). As a result, the management of stakeholder relations became 
increasingly seen to be part of the strategic and financial management of the firm.
3.4 Relevance lost and found
The three areas of rising normative notions of “best practice” in business 
management were soon linked to calls for accounting to support the 
operationalisation of interlinked notions of “strategy”, “shareholder value”, and 
“CSR” in day-to-day management practice. In times of reduced product life circles 
and advanced production and information technologies, a “strategisation” of 
accounting was perceived to be crucial for the company’s long-term success (cf. 
Simmonds 1981; Bromwich 1990).16 However, the new demands placed on 
accounting began to challenge the exclusive use of financially focussed accounting 
figures in managerial accounting (Hopwood 1985). The debates were characterised 
by a “relevance lost” rhetoric (cf. Johnson & Kaplan 1991), which gained 
momentum in the field of management accounting research and consultancy by the 
end of the 1980s.17 Johnson and Kaplan (1991, p. xii) introduced the thesis “that the 
management accounting systems in Western companies were no longer providing 
relevant information for decision making and control”. Their problematisations of 
financial accounting numbers were closely linked to perceptions of a new 
“economic reality” that affected the nature of processes of production and 
exchange. From a “relevance lost” point of view, the days of financial accounting- 
based management systems were numbered at the dawn of the “information age” 
and increasing global competition (Ezzamel et al. 1990; Johnson & Kaplan 1991, p. 
209). For example, the treatment of investments in intangible assets as cost of the 
same period according to financial reporting rules was criticised for possibly 
deterring managers from making long-term investment decisions at the expense of 
fixture profitability. Traditional accounting systems were fixrther criticised for giving 
visibility to processes of production and exchange that were no longer 
representative of the “modem” business enterprise (Johnson & Kaplan 1991, pp.2- 
3) and for concentrating only on the company itself but not on its outside markets 
and future developments (Shank & Govindarajan 1992, p. 196).
16 For a review of the strategisation of management accounting since the beginning of the 1980s, see Langfield- 
Smith (2008).
17 The book “Relevance Lost: the rise and fall of management accounting” by Johnson and Kaplan was first 
published in 1987. All of the following references refer to the reprinted edition of 1991.
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Accounting always seems to be called upon to deliver more than its practices were 
originally designed for (cf. Hopwood 1983b; Hopwood & Miller 1994). As much as 
financial accounting numbers were problematised as a means for operationalising 
emerging notions of managerial “best practice”, accounting in itself was still seen to 
be able to provide the “solution” to its own “problems”.18 The general critique that 
historical cost numbers in financial accounting were unable to give visibility to 
“economic reality” stimulated discussions on new “measures of economic value” 
for the strategic management of the firm (Johnson & Kaplan 1991; Ittner & Larcker 
1998). Research into the re-conceptualisation of management accounting in the 
name of strategy explored the possibilities for making the financial and non- 
financial drivers of long-term “competitive advantage” and “shareholder value” 
calculable (cf. Simmonds 1981; Govindarajan & Gupta 1985; Simons 1987; 
Bromwich 1990).19 Different models for alternative systems of accounting-based 
performance measurement were proposed. They supported, for example, the idea of 
a “value tree” in which top-financial measures of economic value could ideally be 
broken down into a series of further financial key performance indicators (KPIs) 
that systematically linked strategic goals from the corporate to the operational level 
(Copeland et al. 2000; Gary 2002; Weber et al. 2002). Among the numerous 
measures of “economic value” as the top-financial indicator of shareholder value 
maximisation that were proposed by the consulting industry were, for example, 
McKinsey’s economic profit (Copeland et al. 1989), Stem Steward’s economic 
value added (Stewart 1991; Stem et al. 1995), or Arthur Andersen’s shareholder 
value added (Froud et al. 2000).
Other models proposed to integrate financial and non-financial measures in order to 
present a more holistic picture of the underlying drivers of competitive advantage. 
Maybe one of the most prominent examples for an “integrated” performance 
measurement system is the Balanced Scorecard (BSC) by Kaplan and Norton 
(1992; 1993; 1996; 2000; 2004; 2006). The BSC is supposed to support the
18 The inherent optimism in the will to govern through accounting technologies goes hand in hand with the 
observation that government is a “congenitally failing operation” (Miller & Rose 1990, p. 10; 2008b), which 
implies that connections between programmes and technologies of regulation are in an “always unstable and 
incomplete” form (Hunt 1997, pp. 113-114).
19 Concerns with making the future calculable in accounting change have emerged at earlier points in history. 
One example is the rise of discounted cash flow techniques for evaluating investment opportunities in the 
1960s (Miller 1991,1998a).
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balanced measurement of financial, non-financial, backward-looking, and future- 
oriented indicators of long-term shareholder value creation (Kaplan & Norton. 
1996, p. viii). The model suggests that it is possible to capture and provide 
calculations for “soft” or intangible issues, such as relationships with customers, 
employees, and suppliers in management information systems.
Of course, the above summary of the mainly Anglo-American concepts of “best 
practice” in general management is far from being exhaustive. Nevertheless, it helps 
to redraw the multiple aspects of business activities that non-financial and future- 
oriented accounting systems were supposed to render visible when mobilised in 
policy reform debates. The next sections outline how very similar notions of “best 
practices” in terms of “strategic management”, “financial management”, and a 
“CSR business case” created possibilities for the problematisation of financial 
reporting numbers as an issue for governing business enterprises and the British 
economy in different policy debates since the late 1980s. At the same time, they 
became part of new ways of reasoning and categorising the role of accounting in 
economic governance which this research interprets as the rise of a new “de­
localised” category of non-financial and future-oriented accounting.
4 Accounting and British policy making
Ideas of a “strategisation”, “marketisation”, and “socialisastion” of business 
management also became prominent in economic governance discourses in the UK. 
It seems that changing ideas about the range of managerial activities that accounting 
could and should render visible created possibilities for rephrasing die programmes 
of governing in each of the policy arenas. However, the ways in which ideas of non- 
financial and future-oriented accounting were mobilised in three local governance 
arenas in the UK suggest that the de-localised notions of the role of accounting in 
business management did not represent a single closed category or unanimously 
agreed set of techniques. Instead, each of the policy debates in financial reporting 
standard-setting, corporate governance, and public economic policy-making put 
different emphasis on the various practices and rationales that made up a category 
of non-financial and future-oriented accounting.
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4.1 Financial reporting standard-setting
Assumptions about the multiple dimensions that constituted the “economic reality” 
of reporting entities increasingly became part of calls for a “better” representation 
of managerial activities within the financial reporting framework. They were 
accompanied by a re-definition of the concept of “usefulness” in corporate financial 
reporting that increasingly embraced the changing conceptions of “best practices” in 
the economic management of business enterprises.
The general focus on “users”, which had taken centre stage in financial reporting 
alongside a growing emphasis on “the market” as a governing rationale of standard- 
setters, has remained relatively stable in accounting standard-setting since the 
1970s.20 However, aligning the notion of “users” in accounting standard-setting 
with a focus on investors under the stewardship reporting convention and company 
law requirements has been challenged in various reform debates (ASSC 1975, para. 
4.11). Both The Corporate Report (ibid., para. 3.2) and Making Corporate Reports 
Valuable (McMonnies 1988) proposed to revisit the definitions of “users” and 
“usefulness” in financial reporting standard-setting. The Corporate Report 
suggested to widen the scope of corporate reporting in order to meet the information 
needs of investors as well as other stakeholders (ASSC 1975, paras. 6.2-6.3). These 
proposals were largely linked to a more general re-conceptualisation of the role of 
business in society and the question of how it could be accountable to a wider 
public (Rutherford 2007, p. 108). However, when the proposals from The 
Corporate Report did not translate into regulatory reform, ideas of widening the 
scope of “users” were not further pursued either. In line with the refocusing of 
financial reporting standard-setting on “improving” the financial statements, a 
notion of “users” as shareholders also occupied a central role throughout the 1980s. 
Yet, the concept of “usefulness” was more closely aligned with the emerging 
“shareholder ideology” in the increasingly capital market-oriented Anglo-Saxon 
models of corporate governance during that period (Engelen 2002; Martinez Lucio 
& MacKenzie 2004; Cooper & Robson 2006). In addition, non-shareholder 
stakeholders were increasingly portrayed as economic decision-makers whose 
interests in the company largely overlapped with those of shareholders. These
20 For a detailed discussion of the changing rationales in UK accounting standard-setting, see chapter three. On 
the growing preoccupation with supporting and protecting the interests of investors as “users” in financial 
reporting standard-setting, see also Young (2003; 2006).
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perceptions gave the high-level discussion on “users” and “usefulness” in Making 
Corporate Reports Valuable a different quality.21 In a similar way as the “relevance 
lost” debate, the discussion started from the view that the existing framework of 
financial reporting was mostly disregarded in internal decision-making.
"Management is much more concerned about the future than the 
past. From this point o f view, they almost never use their own 
published accounts when taking policy decisions (though they will 
think about the impact on the accounts o f the decisions they take). ” 
(McMonnies 1988, para. 5.38)
The ICAS-study then identified possible reasons for a “relevance lost” of financial 
reporting:
“We identified the basic shortcomings o f present-day financial 
reporting, — the adherence o f legal form rather than economic 
substance, the use o f cost rather than value, the concentration on the 
past rather than the future and the interest in “profit” rather than 
wealth” (McMonnies 1988,para. 1.18)
To remain “useful”, it was demanded that external corporate reporting catch up with 
that “reality”. Abstract conceptions of “best practices” in managerial processes were 
thereby translated into new ideas about the roles and purposes of the financial 
reporting framework. Additional narrative reporting was supposed to result in 
“enhanced” opportunities for monitoring and decision making (McMonnies 1988, 
paras. 8.6-8.16) -  enabling present and future shareholders in particular to form 
better informed views “about the future of their investment” (ibid., para. 5.37).
“The corporate report should cover the past, present and future, 
providing some continuum and so reflecting the nature o f the entity 
itself [...] the corporate report ought to provide sufficient 
quantitative and qualitative information to help those users involved 
with the entity to make assumptions/predictions about its future 
performance. ” (McMonnies 1988, para. 3.17)
The provision of additional management commentary in the annual report was 
supposed to make different aspects of managerial concerns, such as long-term 
objectives or judgements of the competitive environment, visible to external report
21 The range of users, to which Making Corporate Reports Valuable referred, was not as wide as that promoted 
by The Corporate Report (ASSC 1975), which suggested additional accountability to creditors, employees, 
analyst-advisers, business contact groups (suppliers, customers, competitors), the government, and the public 
(ASSC 1975, paras. 2.1 - 2.40). Making Corporate Reports Valuable only referred to equity investors, 
creditors, employees, and business contacts (McMonnies 1988, para. 3.6).
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users (McMonnies 1988, e.g. paras. 5.4-5.5, 7.53 and 5.41-5.44). In turn, more 
efficient and effective accounting disclosures to external market participants were 
supposed to support the achievement of “best practice” in the managerial process 
itself. The preparation of non-financial and future-oriented reports was expected to 
lead managers to develop an improved understanding of their own business and to 
build a reputation for being strategic and forward looking.
The idea that not only internal, but also external accounting reports should reflect 
“economic reality” to a wider range of users was widely welcomed by those 
involved with financial reporting in practice and regulation. The 1989 joint research 
conference Financial Reporting: the way forward by the ICAS and the ICAEW 
gathered preparers, accounting professionals, and accounting academics to discuss 
the implications of international research on the future of financial reporting in the 
UK. The discussion reiterated the role of economic decision-makers that had been 
assigned to non-shareholder stakeholders. One of the contributions to Financial 
Reporting: the way forward described the connection between non-financial and 
future-oriented reporting and the “information needs” of wider stakeholder groups 
as follows:
“[FJinancial reporting serves decision makers -  in the first instance 
investors and potential investors, but also a much wider 
constituency o f interested parties who are regarded, or regard 
themselves, as being concerned to evaluate the economic 
performance o f the company. Nowadays it is not just economic but 
wider social performance which is in question."  (Shaw 1990, p. xxi)
Other contributions focused more explicitly on the type of information that was 
considered “useful” by internal and external decision-makers. In line with the 1988 
ICAS-study (para. 5.38), a review of differences between the internal use of 
financial information by managers and their external communication concluded that 
(hitherto undisclosed) future-oriented data was highly relevant for decision makers, 
both internally and externally (Cook 1990).
“[A] well written management commentary can significantly 
enhance the usefulness o f the financial statements by providing a 
bridge between the formalised presentation in the financial 
statements and management’s insight into and strategy for its 
business. ” (Cook 1990)
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The idea that persons outside the company “should know what management 
knows” (Cook 1990) was further elaborated on in subsequent debates.22 Following 
the research conference, an Action Group was established to sustain the momentum 
that was created by the earlier reports. The group’s report The Future Shape o f  
Financial Reports outlined recommendations for practicable financial reporting 
reforms (Arnold et al. 1991a, 1991b). The debates in the financial reporting 
standard-setting arena, eventually led to calls for regulatory interventions by the 
ASB. The regulatory reform proposals also drew on the emerging ideas about 
managerial “best practice” and “economic reality” when elaborating regulatory 
interventions in non-financial and future-oriented reporting as a way to “solve” 
perceived “problems” of financial reporting 23 Although the first guidelines for the 
voluntary preparation of Operating and Financial Reviews (OFR) in the annual 
report did not mention the term “strategy” explicitly, the recommendation to cover 
future-oriented aspects in terms of reporting on the business’ competitive 
environment, its internal resources, and the risks and uncertainties of the business 
(ASB 1993, para. 12) showed strong parallels with a general language of “strategic 
management” and ideas of long-term shareholder-value creation.24 The OFR 
Statement was supposed to “improve” reporting practice on the financial position 
and results of increasingly complex businesses (ibid., p. 1) through additional 
narrative reporting elements “rather than merely numerical analysis” (ibid., para. 3). 
The standard-setting activities at the ASB eventually limited the definition of 
“users” to equity investors following the recommendations from the Dearing 
Report (ICAEW 1988) and the launch of the Statement o f Principles project25 
From the point of view of the standard-setters, however, this did not exclude the 
concept that the narrative statements that were produced under the ASB’s OFR 
regime were still “useful” for wider stakeholder groups (Standard-setter B). These 
considerations in the financial reporting reform debates were also connected to a 
growing attention to the integrity of business leaders (DTI 2001) which made
22 Allan Cook later became Technical Director of the ASB.
23 For further discussion, see chapter three.
24 The statement did not explicitly mention the term “strategy”, as this was considered by the standard setters’ 
working group to be too sensitive on information commercially and that any requirement to report on strategy 
would lead to bland statements (Standard-setter D). However, the term was later used in the revised Reporting 
Statement (ASB 2003b) and in the OFR Regulations 2005.
25 The role of formal framework criteria in the standard-setting process is further discussed in chapter three.
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notions of “corporate governance” a focal point in regulatory reforms in Western 
economies since the mid and late 1980s (Tricker 2000).26 These overlaps between 
notions of “usefulness”, “corporate accountability”, and “economic prosperity” for 
the benefit of society are further discussed in the next section.
4.2 Corporate governance
Corporate governance is difficult to single out as a separate policy arena. Its 
concerns with corporate accountability closely tie in with public economic policy 
debates and the sphere of financial reporting.27 The definitions of the term 
“corporate governance” are ambiguous due to wide national variations (Morck & 
Steiner 2005). For instance, notions of wider corporate responsibilities beyond 
shareholders and distributive justice exist traditionally in Continental Europe and 
Japan (Villiers & Boyle 2000; Chahed & Muller 2006; Luo 2007). In general terms, 
the Anglo-American corporate governance discourse has been characterised by 
economic notions of “agency” and a focus on shareholder “interests” in the system 
of corporate accountability.28 This based on rising concerns about processes of 
monitoring and control in the relation between managers and shareholders since the 
creation of the limited liability company in the mid-nineteenth century (Berle & 
Means 1968; Villiers & Boyle 2000; Davies 2003; Luo 2007). Corporate 
governance also marks the point of intersection between legal and economic theory 
on the issue of agency costs. This leads to a focus on market inefficiencies and 
imperfections and their reduction through regulatory interventions (Easterbrook & 
Fischel 1991; Grantham 1998; Kraakman et al. 2004).
26 The rise of a corporate governance talk has also been associated with some of the most prominent business 
scandals in the UK and the US, such as the UK “Guinness scandal” (1986) and “Maxwell collapse” (1991) 
and the US insider trading scandals around Ivan Boesky and others (1986).
27 The work of the Cadbury Committee on the financial reporting aspects of corporate governance and the 
ASB’s OFR project took place at the same time but did not directly intersect (Accounting professional B). The 
Committee, however, explicitly acknowledged the contribution of the ASB’s voluntary OFR guidelines in its 
final report (Cadbury Committee 1992, para. 4.53).
28 From the perspective of economic theory, agency problems arise from the separation of ownership and 
controls in cases where markets are not fully efficient. As a result, shareholders are considered unable to fully 
observe the efforts by managers to act in the interest of the owners (moral hazard problem). In line with the 
economics-based perspective on agency-relationships, traditional legal theory emphasises a special role for 
equity investors as bearers of a residual risk that reserves them particular control rights (Willets, 1997; 
Grantham, 1998). That is, they are considered to hold a share in an always uncertain capital surplus that 
remains after any contractual obligations to pay other stakeholders, such as debt providers, suppliers, or 
employees, have been served (Grantham, 1998). Accordingly, company law has been described as a 
mechanism for reducing the costs arising from inefficiencies in the markets of corporate control by a system 
of directors’ duties and legal enforcement mechanisms (Berle & Means 1968; Easterbrook & Fischel 1991; 
Grantham 1998; Kraakman et al. 2004). For a critique of a shareholder orientation in company law, see e.g. 
Engelen (2002).
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The more recent rise in worldwide political interest in corporate governance in 
particular relates to expectations about the economic implications of corporate 
governance systems and corporate accountability mechanisms for business and 
society (cf. OECD 2004). According to the OECD (2004) “[c]orporate governance 
is one key element in improving economic efficiency and growth as well as 
enhancing investor confidence” through a set of relationships, rules, and measures 
that help companies achieve their objectives. The idea that a focus on long-term 
shareholder-value maximisation in managerial processes correlates with the 
maximisation of overall social wealth was also part of an increasing interest in 
“promoting high standards of corporate governance” outside the legal framework in 
the UK in the early 1990s (FRC 2008). In May 1991, the Financial Reporting 
Council (FRC) created a committee on “The Financial Aspects of Corporate 
Governance” in cooperation with the London Stock Exchange (LSE) and the 
accounting profession.29 The work of the so-called “Cadbury Committee” started 
from a perceived lack of public trust in the corporate system in general after a series 
of accounting and auditing scandals in the 1980s and the early 1990s (Davies 
2003).30 Accordingly, the aim of the project was to develop approaches for 
increasing the accountability of directors and to “contribute positively to the 
promotion of good corporate governance as a whole” (Cadbury Committee 1992, 
para. 1.2).
The results of the Cadbury review were published in a final report and a Code of 
Best Practice in December 1992. The documents included calls for accounting 
change to “solve” the perceived problems with financial reporting numbers as an 
issue for corporate governance. The Cadbury Report (1992) portrayed the focus on 
financial reporting numbers in external corporate reporting as particularly 
problematic in the operationalisation of a shareholder-value ethos. On that point, the 
Cadbury Committee shared many of the concerns of the financial reporting 
standard-setting arena. The framework for financial reporting which existed then, 
was doubted to provide the information that was necessary to monitor and control
29 The FRC, which also oversees the work of the ASB, has been formally responsible for the voluntary corporate 
governance framework in the UK (FRC 2008).
30 The most prominent scandals include the UK “Guinness scandal” (1986) and the “Maxwell collapse” (1991); 
US insider trading scandals involving Ivan Boesky and others (1986). For further discussion of their impact 
on trust in professional experts, see chapter three.
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how directors ran a business and how they could be held accountable for their 
actions. The use of “creative accounting” techniques by managers was seen as 
obfuscating shareholder-value calculations and to create obstacles to the monitoring 
and control of corporate activities by external parties. Nevertheless, the reports 
emphasised “improvements” in the financial reporting regime as a way for 
enhancing corporate accountability in the relationship between boards of directors 
and shareholders in the UK.31 The Cadbury Committee suggested that accounting 
reports should provide additional non-financial and future-oriented information 
beyond the financial accounts. This was aimed at ensuring balance of “good” and 
“bad” news in external disclosures and was also supposed to contribute to an 
“understandable assessment” of the past, present and future position of the company 
(Cadbury Committee 1992, para. 4.50).
“ What is required o f financial reporting is that it should be honest 
and that it should present a balanced picture o f the state o f  the 
company’s affairs. ” (Cadbury Committee 1992, para. 3.6)
“Balance requires that setbacks should be dealt with as well as 
successes, while the need fo r the report to be readily understood 
emphasises that words are as important as figures. “ (Cadbury 
Committee 1992, para. 4.50)
Notions of non-financial and future-oriented accounting also created possibilities 
for re-defining the nature of the tripartite relationship between the members of the 
board, shareholders, and auditors in discharging, monitoring, and controlling 
corporate accountability (ibid., para. 1,6). The emphasis on increasing the 
accountability of directors in their long-term “shareholder value” orientation to 
shareholders by means of non-financial and future-oriented reporting also included 
ideas about how to meet the information needs of wider stakeholder groups.
‘‘What shareholders (and others) needfrom the report and accounts 
is a coherent narrative, supported by the figures, o f the company’s 
performance and prospects. “ (Cadbury Committee 1992, para.
4.50)
31 The term “corporate accountability” generally describes the degree of transparency in corporate activities and 
the responsiveness to external concerns through financial reporting and other transparency mechanisms (Luo 
2007, p. 129).
32 Similar shifts in the definitions of the responsibilities, rights and duties of the members of an economic 
community have been observed in other jurisdictions. For example, Miller & O’Leary (1993) observed a re­
orientation of accountability relations from a focus on capital markets to the relation between customers and 
products within changing perceptions of economic citizenship in the US in the 1980s.
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Overall, the review of the Cadbury Committee suggested that improving the 
financial aspects of the system of corporate governance had implications beyond 
direct agency relationships. This linked the debates on additional narrative 
disclosures more explicitly to concerns with economic governance in the sphere of 
public policy making:
“The country’s economy depends on the drive and efficiency o f its 
companies. Thus the effectiveness with which their boards discharge 
their responsibilities determines Britain’s competitive position. They 
must be free to drive their companies forward, but exercise that 
freedom within a framework o f effective accountability. This is the 
essence o f any system o f good corporate governance. ” (Cadbury 
Committee 1992, para. 1.1)
“An open approach to the disclosure o f information contributes to 
the efficient working o f the market economy [...]. ” (Cadbury 
Committee 1992, para. 3.6)
Later reviews of corporate governance in the UK (Greenbury 1995; Hampel 1998; 
Turnbull 1999) continued to emphasise the role of additional narrative disclosures 
in overcoming “problems” in the agency relationship between shareholders and 
managers. As mentioned before, the calls for wide ranging corporate governance 
reforms in the Cadbury and later the Hampel review were also linked to public 
economic policy concerns with securing a wider public interest (Shaw 1989). The 
Ministerial speech on the launch of the CLR (Beckett 1998) explicitly referred to 
the corporate governance reviews by the Hampel (1998), Greenbury (1995), and 
Cadbury (1992) Committees. The next section focuses more explicitly on the 
mobilisation of a category of non-financial and future-oriented accounting in public 
economic policy reform debates.
4.3 Public economic policy making
“Questions o f accounting measurement and reporting touch the 
public interest very deeply (Shaw 1989)
As laid out before, UK public policy makers in the 1970s had already engaged in 
debates about the public interest role of large corporations. The Bullock Report 
(Department of Trade 1977b) stressed that socially responsible companies which 
took account of their employees were a core element of a democratic society. 
However, these earlier public policy debates on the role of business in society had 
remained largely disconnected from concerns with macroeconomic performance.
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This changed significantly throughout the 1990s. Ideas of “stakeholding” and a role 
for economic and political institutions in supporting a system of social citizenship in 
“the modem welfare state” gained increasing attention around the mid 1990s 
(Hutton 1995; Anon. 1996).3334 Public policy research shifted attention to exploring 
possible ways for operationalising “careful economic management and institutions 
that fostered co-operation and commitment” in order to achieve “successful 
capitalism” that did not constrain competition and flexibility (Hutton 1995, p. 17). 
For example, the Royal Society for the encouragement of Arts, Manufactures & 
Commerce (RSA) launched the Tomorrow's Company Inquiry in January 1993 to 
explore the role of business in society. The outcome of the research into the views 
of UK business leaders was a series of public policy recommendations, which were 
published in an interim report (RSA 1994) and in the final report Tomorrow's 
Company: the role o f business in a changing world (RSA 1995). They largely 
mirrored theoretical abstract notions about managerial “best practices” in times of 
new global competition. The work of the RSA among others referred to “evidence 
[...] for a strong correlation between issues concerning people, including 
relationships, and sustainable business success” (ibid., p. 6). In line with ideas of a 
CSR business case, both reports emphasised ideas of an “inclusive approach” to 
internal management.
“In tomorrow's company, priority needs to be given to optimising 
the company's performance in all its relationships [...] Directors 
and investors alike need to improve their understanding o f what the 
most important measures are for a particular business, and how 
each is linked to sustainable financial performance." (RSA 1994, p.
19)
In addition, the public policy debates called for managerial attention to the 
definition of its purposes and values in a “success model” that took account of 
wider stakeholder relationships (RSA 1995). In line with the “relevance lost” and 
“found” debates, internal and external accounting systems were assigned a 
particular role in operationalising the “inclusive approach”. The RSA suggested that
33 Ideas of a “stakeholder society” in the early days of the New Labour project (cf. Anon. 1996) were later toned 
down (Burkitt 2006, Regulator B). By the time the CLR was launched, the language of public economic 
policy making was more closely aligned with ideas of a “business case” for CSR.
34 This research finds explicit references to individuals, such as the economist John Kay or the philosopher 
Charles Handy. (Beckett 1998). Further secondary sources suggest that the New Labour Movement followed 
Hutton’s (1995) proposals in The State We’re In, when considering “stakeholding” in its public policies 
(Anon. 1996; Burkitt 2006; Howard 2006).
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managers should translate the key drivers of long-term success into appropriate 
financial and non-financial performance measures (RSA 1995, pp. 8-9 & 29). These 
calls for change were supported by a critique of the then existing system of financial 
reporting.
"By itself, financial performance does not gauge the overall health 
o f the business. It neither defines competitive performance, nor 
measures the broader value created through product quality, speed 
o f response and service. Companies which rely solely on financial 
measures o f success are exposing their shareholders to unnecessary 
risk and denying themselves the opportunity to improve returns. ”
(RSA 1994, p. 20)
"To act inclusively UK companies need to go beyond the limitations 
o f traditional accountancy. They need new criteria, new measures 
and a new language o f success. ” (RSA 1995, p. 12)
The idea that accounting systems were already able to provide “inclusive” measures 
of business performance was reflected in the explicit critique on the “ignorance of 
world standards” in the UK (RSA 1995, p. 1). Existing accounting measurement 
and reporting practice in the UK was perceived to lag behind new “best practice” in 
business management. Consequently, the RSA called for the introduction of 
“established” BSC-type performance measurement systems (ibid., p. 13) or other 
models, such as “McKinsey’s Value Based Management system” (ibid., p. 7). The 
view was also expressed that accounting played a particular role in the 
“socialisation” of corporate activities.
"Tomorrow’s Company will produce annual reports containing 
clear statements about its purpose and values, its definitions o f  
success, and its key relationships — with customers, suppliers, 
providers o f capital, employees and the community — as well as 
relevant disclosure o f its progress. ” (RSA 1995, p. 13)
The recommendations of the RSA were later picked up by other public policy think 
tanks and by Government. In 1995, the Institute of Public Policy Research (ippr) set 
up the “Commission on Public Policy & British Business”. Its 1997 report 
Promoting Prosperity: a business agenda for Britain integrated ideas of long-term 
“stakeholder-” and “shareholder value” with the objective of fostering economic 
prosperity.
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“The UK’s economy would be sounder i f  more companies followed 
best practice in dealing with customers, investors, employees, 
suppliers -  all those groups that have a common interest in the 
company’s performance — and i f  more companies operated with a 
far-sighted business ethos.”(Commission on Public Policy and 
British Business 1997, pp. 3-4)
In order to overcome a general “lack of trust” in the corporate system, the 
Commission on Public Policy and British Business (1997, pp. 96-100) 
recommended a sustainable reform of the existing regulatory frameworks. The 
“solution” was supposed to be provided by a “light” and co-operative approach to 
regulatory reform that largely focused on a clarification of directors’ legal duties 
and otherwise relied on external accounting reports as mechanisms for monitoring 
and enforcement. The issue of an “inclusive” company reporting was more 
explicitly followed up by the report Sooner, Sharper, Simpler by the Centre for 
Tomorrow’s Company (1998).35 The report outlined a “vision of the future of 
reporting” which also left its mark on the later work of the Company Law Review 
Steering Group (Regulator A). Similar thoughts about public policy reform and a 
central role of accounting and reporting for achieving abstract concepts of 
managerial “best practice”, eventually emerged in the company law reform debates 
at the DTI (Beckett 1998; DTI 1998b, para 3.7).
“Our companies find  themselves in an increasingly competitive, 
globalised marketplace. [...] Successful firms, whether large or 
small, are those in which the Board, the shareholders and the 
employees have a common purpose because they each know that 
their long term wealth, health and happiness depend on the long 
term stability, growth and prosperity o f their company. [...]Their 
leaders have a clear vision that inspires the whole company to 
exceed their customers' expectations. [...] Such companies also 
work with all their employees to unlock the fu ll potential o f  each.
[...] Modem companies work too in vibrant supply chains, actively 
helping their suppliers to improve performance, anticipating and 
contributing to innovation at all stages o f the chain, not just their 
own. [...JAnd the modem company is open with its investors, 
building on their expertise, particularly in relation to investment 
decisions. ” (Beckett 1998)
35 The Centre for Tomorrow’s Company was set up as an independent think tank following the RSA inquiry -  in 
the same year. The organisation gained further influence on the CLR through the membership of its then 
Chairman in the CLRSG and the participation of its Director in the Consultative Committee (CLRSG 1999a, 
annex A) and in Working Group G on “Accounting, Reporting and Disclosure”.
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The Government drew explicitly on the idea of an “inclusive approach” to business 
management and annual disclosure as outlined by the ippr and further elaborated in 
the work of Tomorrow’s Company (Beckett 1998; DTI 1998b, para 3.7). The 
encouragement to report on strategic objectives, relationships and non-financial 
performance measures came to be seen as a “solution” to perceived problems with 
governing the economy at large that would allow operationalising the various 
objectives of public economic policy making without compromising one for the 
other (Beckett 1997b).
5 Co-emergence of programmes and technologies
“Accounting practitioners may invoke ideas o f what is common 
sense, but that ‘common sense ’ has a history o f formation and what 
is accepted today as obvious was not always so. ” (Power 1997, p. 
xii)
The findings from this chapter support the view that programmes and technologies 
of governance co-emerged in processes of problematising financial reporting 
numbers as an issue of governing. Ideas about a new category of non-financial and 
future-oriented accounting arose from a variety of policy debates that took place in 
different forums prior to the OFR projects at the ASB and during the CLR. Their 
analysis illustrate how new models of organisational reality established new objects 
for accounting measurement and reporting. The actors in these governance spaces 
came to agree that decision-making on the basis of financial reporting numbers 
constituted a “problem” of economic governance in the UK. At the same time, they 
increasingly shared the view that accounting should and could provide measures of 
non-financial and future-oriented aspects of business management. These new ways 
of reasoning and categorising accounting created possibilities for new courses of 
action (cf. Hacking 1986). The view that non-financial and future-oriented 
measurement and reporting was part of the accounting category provided policy 
makers with new ways of thinking about the scope of activities that should and 
could be made governable “at a distance” through die calculative practices of 
accounting. At the same time, the emergence of a category of non-financial and 
future-oriented accounting bolsters the view that accounting change reflects and at 
the same time constitutes the organisational and political environments in which it 
emerges (cf. Burchell et al. 1980; Hopwood 1983b; Covaleski & Dirsmith 1986, 
1987; Hopwood & Miller 1994). Each of the policy arenas mobilised the emerging
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accounting category in the name of a distinct language of governing. From the 
perspective of accounting standard-setting, non-financial and future-oriented 
measurement and reporting was expected to increase the “usefulness” of annual 
reporting in a market setting. In turn, “usefulness” in financial reporting was 
increasingly seen in terms of a future-oriented, strategic perspective. That is, the 
provision of additional narrative statements in the annual report was understood to 
“better” reflect the “economic reality” of business enterprises than the financial 
statements alone. Similarly, corporate governance discourses drew on narrative 
reports as a means to realise “enhanced” corporate accountability. In line with ideas 
of managing for long-term shareholder-value, the concept “corporate 
accountability” was rephrased to embrace the consideration of a long-term 
perspective in managerial decision making. Finally, the language of public 
economic policy making explicitly embraced ideas of CSR in its programmes for 
enhancing economic competitiveness in the name of a “public interest”. Here, the 
policy debates mainly drew on accounting as a means for shaping the economic and 
social relations of the firm in socially responsible terms. Simultaneously, the 
preparation of non-financial and future-oriented reports was expected to help 
operationalising the objective of securing the international competitiveness of the 
British economy at large.
The analysis of the multiple bodies of knowledge and programmatic aspirations that 
have come to intersect in a category of non-financial and future-oriented accounting 
since the mid 1980s also helped to explain different facets of a “common 
knowledge” about the roles and purposes of accounting in governing economic 
activities. The findings from this chapter illustrate that accounting categories may 
be made up of a variety of practices and rationales that allow for their translatability 
into “solutions” for different governance “problems”. The mobilisation of 
accounting in local governance reform programmes reinforced different aspects of a 
de-localised category of non-financial and future-oriented accounting in business 
management.36 For example, the policy reform proposals in the arena of financial 
reporting standard-setting placed greater weight on the role of new ways of 
measuring and reporting the non-financial and future-oriented aspects performance
36 On the idea that the meanings that get attached to accounting practices through language outline an expected 
“performative” element of accounting representations, see Miller and Rose (1990) and Rose and Miller 
(1992).
64
in terms of “shareholder value”. The corporate governance debates were mostly 
concerned with discharging accountability on the consideration of long-term 
objectives and strategic plans through narrative reporting. Finally, the reform 
debates in the arena of public economic policy making emphasised more explicitly 
the idea of a CSR business case when calling for the widespread implementation of 
non-financial and future-oriented measurement and reporting practices in business 
management and corporate reporting.
The findings on the different meanings that have been assigned to a category of 
non-financial and future-oriented accounting in the governance of economic life 
provide the background knowledge for the study of the agenda-setting processes for 
a voluntary and a mandatory OFR in the remainder of this thesis. Although the 
notion of eventalisation in this thesis suggests that a category of non-financial and 
future-oriented reporting always remains fluid and relational, the findings from this 
chapter seem to indicate a widely shared and largely unquestioned view of the 
interrelations between accounting, “strategic management”, “shareholder value” 
and “CSR” across the different arenas of policy making. These findings may be 
interpreted as part of a process of institutionalisation that establish new 
unquestioned “truths” about “die proper government of economic and social life” 
(Miller 1994b).37 This view seems to be supported by the widespread rise of non- 
financial and future-oriented accounting as an issue for governing in the UK and 
internationally in the last two decades (e.g. EC 2003b; IASB 2008).38 The next 
chapters, therefore, start from a situation where non-financial and future-oriented 
measurement and reporting are widely recognised as part of the accounting category 
and rarely questioned in regulatory reform debates. This allows for a shift from the 
analytical focus from the category of non-financial and future-oriented accounting 
to the links that form between programmes and technologies of governing.
37 Changing perceptions of the legitimate ways of reasoning and categorising accounting have also emerged 
outside the national British context at a world-society or world-polity level (cf. Boli & Thomas 1997; Meyer et 
al. 1997; Drori et al. 2003). This seems supported by the growing engagement of transnational organisations 
in the standardisation and regulation of additional management commentary as part of the financial reporting 
framework (EC 2003b; IASB 2005,2008).
38 Even strong contestation and problematisation of the mandatory OFR to be a “regulatory burden” and its 
ultimate abolition by the Government in 2005 (DTI 2005) could not undermine an apparently widely shared 
view that financial accounting could and should expand beyond the reporting in the financial statements (see, 
e.g. Eaglesham & Burgess 2005; Friends of the Earth 2005; Grant 2005; Phillips 2005; Tilley 2005). 
Following large public protest, most of the original OFR provisions were eventually re-introduced into law 
with the requirement for medium to large companies to prepare an “enhanced” Business Review in the New 
Companies Act 2006.
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C h a p t e r  3
SHIFTING THE BOUNDARIES OF 
ACCOUNTING STANDARD-SETTING
“[Standard-setters] can be radical as long as we don't say we are. ”
(Standard-setter F)
1 Narrative reporting as an agenda-issue for the ASB
This chapter explores the process through which the “unusual” was made possible 
in the agenda-setting process at the British Accounting Standards Board (ASB). The 
publication of the Statement: Operating and Financial Review in 1993, significantly 
extended the scope of activities of the accounting standard-setter in the UK. The 
OFR Statement provided the first non-mandatory guidance for voluntary reporting 
by business management on the underlying financial and non-financial drivers of 
the operating performance and financial position of their company. The multiple 
ideas of governing that came to intersect in the regulatory space (cf. Hancher & 
Moran 1989b) for a voluntary OFR suggest that the process of agenda setting at the 
ASB in the early 1990s was part of a wider reconfiguration of the accounting 
regulatory world, in which the reference points for “getting accounting right” in the 
name of “the profession”, “the market”, and “the public interest” were realigned.
The first explicit proposals to expand the activities of the ASB to non-financial and 
future-oriented reporting surfaced in the early 1990s, when the British Financial 
Reporting Council (FRC) opened a high-level debate about The State o f Financial 
Reporting (FRC 1991)/ The report included the explicit recommendation by the 
Chairman of the FRC, Sir Ron Dealing, to consider the regulation of narrative 
reporting as a way to “interpret” the financial reporting figures:
1 The FRC is the independent UK regulator which is responsible for “promoting confidence in corporate 
governance and reporting”. As part of its work, the FRC among others oversees the work of the ASB and 
appoints its members (FRC 2008).
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“I  should like to see greater recognition that the figures, which form  
the essence o f accounts, need to be supported by commentaries 
which interpret them [...] there would be benefit from debate 
leading to a consensus on the characteristics o f excellence in such 
statements, and more widely in the [annual] report as a whole. ”
(FRC 1991, para. 22)
These concerns with “the responsibilities of directors in preparing reports and 
accounts” (FRC 1991, para. 4) raised questions about possibilities for a more 
structured provision of management commentary on the underlying drivers of the 
operational performance and financial position of the business. Following the high- 
level debate at the FRC, The ASB’s Future Work Programme (ASB 1991) proposed 
to introduce a document similar to the US and Canadian MD&A, but by means of 
non-mandatory guidance in a statement of best practice.2 The Board’s agreement to 
take the project on the agenda of the ASB marked a first step towards shifting the 
boundaries of UK accounting standard-setting. It moved the scope of standard- 
setting activities beyond their traditional focus on questions of recognition, 
measurement, and presentation in the financial statements. It also brought concerns 
with additional disclosures in the annual report other than in the annual accounts 
closer to the “core” of financial reporting regulation; thereby blurring the 
boundaries between financial reporting and other forms of narrative statements, 
such as the statutory Directors’ Report, or the voluntary Chairman’s Statement.3
This chapter analyses the circumstances under which a wide range of reform actors 
agreed on the voluntary OFR as an “appropriate” agenda-issue for the ASB in the 
early 1990s. Building on the findings from the previous chapter, the analysis of the 
agenda-setting process for a voluntary OFR takes a situation as its starting point 
where the idea that additional narrative statements should and could provide 
insights into an “economic reality” of businesses remained relatively unquestioned. 
The statements by the ASB and the public responses to the Discussion Paper: 
Operating and Financial Review (ASB 1992) suggest that the inclusion of the OFR 
in the regulatory agenda of the ASB was not a question of whether company 
directors should report additional information on the underlying drivers of current
2 For further discussion of the regulatory frameworks for MD&A disclosures in the USA and in Canada, see
chapter one.
3 By the time of the OFR project, the annual accounts in the UK formally consisted of the Balance Sheet and the
Profit and Loss Account. The requirement to prepare a Cash Flows Statement was introduced in 1996 via 
amendment to FRS 1.
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and future performance. Instead, the question was how the provision of non- 
financial and future-oriented narratives in financial reporting should and could be 
regulated.
To address the question how the regulatory mandate of the ASB was extended 
beyond the traditional boundaries of accounting standard-setting, the analysis takes 
the historic specific complexes of actors and ideas that made up the regulatory 
authority of the ASB in the voluntary OFR event into account (cf. Miller 1990; 
Miller & Rose 1990; Foucault 1991b; Rose & Miller 1992; Miller & Rose 2008b). 
This shifts the analytical focus beyond the administrative boundaries of the ASB 
and focuses attention on the ways in which a variety of actors debated the roles and 
responsibilities of the standard-setter in dealing with a particular accounting issue. 
Like MacDonald and Richardson (2004), this chapter draws on the concept of 
regulatory space to emphasise the processes of constructing the identity of a private 
regulatory body in the interactions with other actors and demands in order to 
overcome uncertainty about the legitimacy of its standards and guidelines. 
However, the study in this chapter does not attempt to define the relative “powers” 
and “interests” of individual reform actors (cf. Hancher & Moran 1989b), but takes 
a wider, macro-level perspective on the emergence and interplay of different 
programmatic ideas of governing in the process of agenda-setting (cf. Miller & 
Rose 1990; Foucault 1991a). On the one hand, this lays out that regulatory change 
takes place in politically contradicting environments. On the other hand, it shifts the 
focus of the study to the emergence of links between programmes and technologies 
of government in the construction of a regulatory mandate.
Furthermore, the analysis of the process in which various actors came to agree on 
the OFR as an “appropriate” agenda issue for the ASB takes as its basis the idea that 
an overarching rationality of “getting the accounting ‘right’” (Young 1994, p. 86) 
provides a general mandate for regulatory intervention by accounting standard- 
setters. What counts as “right” accounting is, however, mediated in the situational 
and relational networks of a specific regulatory space. That is, versions of “right” 
accounting may change in relation to the accounting issues, actors, and ideas that
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come to intersect at a certain moment in time (cf. Young 1994; Young 1995).4 The 
notion of logics o f appropriateness (cf March & Olsen 1989) in this research helps 
to describe the expectations about the role and responsibility of a standard-setter in 
dealing with a particular accounting issue. These expectations surface in the 
historically and spatially programmatic language of accounting reform (cf. Foucault 
199Id). For example, existing studies of the activities (and inactivities) of the US 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) have found that the Concepts 
Statements (often referred to as the FASB Conceptual Framework) provided the 
more specific reference points for considering a particular accounting issue. 
Accordingly, the emergence of reform programmes in financial reporting regulation 
in the US has been closely tied to claims to financial reporting quality criteria, such 
as relevance, reliability, and representational faithfulness (Young 1994, 1995, 1996, 
2003). In principle, these findings are transferable to the agenda setting process at 
the ASB. A similar “programme for encouraging improved accounting standards” 
(ICAEW 1969) has also characterised the accounting standard-setting agendas in 
the UK since the introduction of the first British standard setting-body in 1970 
(Rutherford 2007). However, the findings from the study of the OFR event suggest 
that logics o f appropriateness may relate to more ideas of governing than only 
technical financial reporting quality criteria. The analysis of the British reform 
debates demonstrates the co-emergence of multiple complementary but also 
competing “technical”, “professional”, and “international” logics o f  
appropriateness. They have been classified according to the wider ideas of 
governing to which the reform debates at the ASB referred when constructing the 
development of the voluntary OFR guidelines as an “appropriate” agenda issue. A 
focus on “international” logics o f appropriateness involves the consideration of 
cross-border influences on ideas about the “legitimacy” of national accounting 
standard-setting programmes. This has been missing in previous evaluations of 
accounting standard setting-processes in a national regulatory space (Young 1994, 
1995, 1996). In these studies, the construction of regulatory issues and legitimacy at 
the FASB appeared as a more self-referential process within national boundaries of 
thought. A notion of “professional” logics o f  appropriateness stresses the
4 The idea that accounting may be mobilised in the name of different programmatic aspirations at different stages 
of the regulatory process has been illustrated in a study of the “savings and loan crisis” in the 1980s in the US 
(Young 1995).
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historically grown path dependencies in conceptualisations of the role and 
responsibility of accounting standard-setters. These may vary considerably in 
different institutional environments. For example, the accounting bodies in the US 
were historically state-founded and state-accredited. As a result, they did not 
achieve the same “elite” image and impact on professional conduct as the self­
formed and self-regulated UK accounting bodies throughout their history (Lee 
1995). However, it seems that no research has been conducted on the ways a 
professional self-image emerges in accounting standard-setting processes and 
manages the expectations of a wide range of accounting and “non-accounting” 
actors in financial reporting standard-setting.5
The remainder of this chapter outlines the construction of a regulatory mandate for 
the ASB to intervene in non-financial and future-oriented reporting. The discussion 
is organised in four parts. The next part introduces the key developments during the 
voluntary OFR project at the ASB between 1991 and 1993. Starting with a short 
review of the history of self-regulation of accounting practice in the UK, the second 
section traces the various ideas of governing in the name of “the profession”, “the 
State”, and “the market” that defined the position of the ASB by the time it took the 
OFR project on its agenda. The third section discusses the emergence and interplay 
of more specific logics o f appropriateness that allowed a wide range of reform 
actors to agree on the voluntary OFR as an agenda-issue for the ASB. The final part 
summarises the findings from this study and sets forth their implications for 
conceptualising the inherent programmatic elements of policy reform in national 
accounting standard-setting.
2 The voluntary OFR project
“A constructive solution requires the co-operation o f three parties; 
standard setters, users and preparers. ” (Cook 1990).
The standard-setting process at the ASB facilitates a close internal and public 
dialogue with key stakeholders whilst being open to comments from other 
interested parties. The development of an Accounting Standard or an ASB
5 The terms “accounting” and “non-accounting” professionals are carefully used in the British context, where 
professionally trained accountants may retain membership with the professional bodies even if they move into 
“non-accounting” careers, such as business management The absence of a business education system in the 
UK up to the 1970s, for instance, reinforced a mutual influence of accounting and business practice, because 
professional accounting qualifications were common among those who pursued a career in general 
management (Matthews et al. 1998).
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Statement generally begins with the Board’s decision to include an issue in its work 
programme (ASB 2007b). The management of the project is then delegated to one 
of the internal project directors who work under the supervision of the Chairman 
and the Technical Director of the ASB. An additional panel of ad hoc consultants 
with representatives from accounting firms, preparers, users, and academia supports 
the identification of “issues” and “solutions” that will be taken before the Board for 
further discussion. In the next step, a Discussion Paper is prepared and issued, 
inviting the views of the interested public on the proposed new or revised 
regulation. The views expressed in the public comments, further direct enquiries 
and field-tests normally inform the preparation of an Exposure Draft (ED). The ED 
is published for further public comment before the Board reaches a final conclusion 
and publishes an Accounting Standard or an Accounting Statement (ASB 2007b).6
The procedures during the OFR project followed a similar approach. The only 
difference was that it did not call for the additional publication of an ED in the 
development of the voluntary guidance (ASB 1993). The internal work on the OFR 
Statement formally began in 1991 with the appointment of a Project Director who 
worked closely with the Chairman and the Technical Director of the ASB 
(Standard-setter D). In addition to a series of Board meetings, input from the “main 
players” in regulatory decision making at the ASB -  finance directors, big 
accounting firms, and analysts -  was generally sought through regular personal 
meetings “every two or three months” (Standard-setter F). The ASB also conducted 
a series of non-public consultations with representatives of the business community, 
who the ASB considered as one of the most important allies for ensuring success of 
the OFR project (Standard-setter E). These meetings were regarded as very helpful 
to secure support from analysts and the 100 Group of Finance Directors before the 
publication of the first discussion paper:
“And in a way we knew we were going to win before we published,
because we got people on site first. ” (Standard-setter F)
Further personal consultations with business representatives took place after the 
publication of the discussion paper. A small working group of finance directors
6 In contrast to Accounting Standards, ASB Statements do not cover mandatory accounting requirements, but 
either explain the ASB’s principles and procedures or aim at developing “best practice” in reporting outside 
the statutory annual accounts (ASB 2007a).
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from the 100 Group was set up and met about four to five times to discuss the 
details of the OFR Statement. The group identified possible practical problems and 
developed a set of “suitable solutions” (Standard-setter D). The OFR project 
manager was also involved in a research project by the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants of Scotland (ICAS) on the views of preparers and users of the 
proposed OFR in 1993 (Weetman et al. 1994). The study included an analysis of the 
written submissions to the Discussion Paper and 20 additional interviews with 
professional investors, including brokers and institutional investors. The aim was to 
redress the “imbalance” of user and preparer submissions to the Discussion Paper 
and to represent a more “user-focused” perspective on OFR reporting (ibid.).
The additional behind the scene work at the ASB prior to and after the publication 
of the discussion paper may explain the largely positive responses to the OFR 
proposals in the public consultation. Overall, the 102 analysed response letters 
welcomed the proposals for a voluntary OFR Statement and rarely questioned the 
role and responsibility of the ASB in engaging with accounting issues beyond the 
financial statements (Table 1).
Welcome Concerned Reject Other or
OFR about OFR OFR no explicit
Category of respondent proposal proposal proposal comment Total
Accounting profession 8 1 o n q(accounting firms) V IS
Accounting profession K 1 n n(professional associations) u u IS VS
Preparers
(company Finance Directors 38 5 8 6 57
and professional associations)
Trade organisations 9 0 0 0 9
Mixed user / c n 1 1 7preparer organisations o u f
Users (incl. professional and A 1 o n Rrepresentative associations) *T VS VS
Law profession 2 0 0 1 3
Individuals 2 0 0 1 3
Other 3 0 0 0 3
Total
76 8 9 9 102
74% 8% 9% 9% 1 0 0 %
Table 1: Responses to the Discussion Paper: Operating and Financial Review (ASB 1992)
A majority of 76 out of 102 (74%) respondents generally welcomed the proposals 
for a voluntary OFR. They included explicit support from eight out of nine (88%) 
accounting firms, from 38 out of 57 (66%) potential preparers of OFRs (including
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finance directors and their professional associations), and from five out of the six 
professional organisations that had submitted a response letter. Even though they 
did not entirely reject the OFR proposals, eight (8%) of the total response letters 
expressed severe concerns about the proposed Statement. They supported additional 
reporting in an OFR in principle but questioned the proposed responsibility of the 
ASB for regulating disclosure outside the financial statements. For example, the 
Chartered Association of Certified Accountants (ACCA) generally welcomed 
additional commentary on underlying corporate performance, but strongly criticised 
the ASB for prioritising work on the OFR over the other accounting issues from its 
original 1991 Work Programme, such as off-balance finance, goodwill, or 
consolidation. In addition, the ACCA expressed doubts about the effectiveness of 
the proposed voluntary OFR and called for formal legal backing:
“This is a disappointing draft. As the proposals are not mandatory it 
is difficult to see how they will be implemented given the broad and 
discretionary framework that the discussion draft proposes. ” (ACCA 
letter to the ASB, 16 July 1992)
The accounting firm Touche Ross & Co argued that the additional disclosures did 
“not fall within the scope of accounting standards” and should be dealt with by the 
FRC as part of its work on corporate governance.7 The response from the Group of 
Scottish Finance Directors questioned the need for additional reporting and 
commentary from the point of view of directors, pointing out that this was already 
sufficiently covered by other channels of communication.8 Finally, one preparer and 
one professional investor argued that reliance on market forces was sufficient and 
that no further regulatory intervention by the ASB was needed.9 Only nine (9%) of 
the respondents explicitly rejected the proposals in the Discussion Paper. They were 
mostly received from potential preparers of OFRs. One of the preparer-companies, 
for example, explicitly questioned the general ability of accounting and additional 
narrative statements to reflect the dynamics of business as, according to them, more 
reporting would open the potential for “hiding” rather than “revealing” information 
about the business.
7 Touche Ross & Co letter to the ASB, 8 July 1992.
8 The Group of Scottish Finance Directors letter to the ASB, 15 July 1992.
9Boustead pic letter to the ASB, 22 July 1992; S.G. Warburg Group Management Ltd. letter to the ASB, 13 
August 1992.
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In the light of the numerous positive responses and the comparatively few points of 
criticism, the ASB issued the Statement: Operating and Financial Review in 1993. 
This marked a durable shift in the scope of accounting standard-setting in the UK. 
The issue of non-financial and future-oriented reporting has stayed on the agenda of 
the ASB to date and may be one of its proudest contributions to financial reporting 
regulation and practice (Standard-setters C, D, E, and F). A “routine update” 
(Metcalf 2002) of the 1993 OFR Statement took place in 2002. The revised OFR 
statement included the explicit recommendation to identify financial as well as non- 
financial “key performance indicators” including reporting on environmental and 
social issues (ASB 2003a). Its publication in January 2003 coincided with emerging 
proposals for a mandatory OFR from the Company Law Review Steering Group, 
which will be further discussed in the next chapter (Metcalf 2002). Despite the 
repeal of the OFR Regulations shortly after their enactment in 2005, the ASB still 
provides non-binding voluntary guidance for reporting in the mandatory Business 
Review according to the new Companies Act 2006 in the Reporting Statement: 
Operating and Financial Review (ASB 2006).
The discussion in the next section highlights the various programmatic aspirations 
that have come into play in defining the roles and purposes of the accounting 
standard-setter in the OFR event. Placing the work of the ASB in the early 1990s in 
a wider historic and political context helps to shed light on the conditions of 
possibility for the expansion of the scope of the regulatory mandate of the ASB.
3 Ideas of governing in UK accounting standard-setting
The general “need [of accounting standard-setters] for a public legitimacy and 
rationale for action” (Burchell et al. 1980, p. 10) has been attributed to their “uneasy 
[position] between the accounting profession and the state” (Young 1994).10 This is 
believed to pose a dilemma for the production of accounting standards as they can 
neither rely on claims to “professional expertise” and “independence”, nor on a 
democratic mandate as sources of authority (Hopwood 1983a, p. 84). Similarly, the 
members of the OFR Working Group at the ASB interpreted the early 1990s as a 
particularly challenging time (Standard-setters D, E, and F). Although the ASB was
10 Other studies have suggested that pressures for accounting change may also arise through further interventions 
by general media, academia, or strong individual personalities (Burchell et al. 1980; Sikka & Willmott 1995; 
Rutherford 2007, pp. 8-12).
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recognised by the Companies Act 1989 as the responsible standard-setting body, the 
accounting standards themselves were not authorised by parliamentary approval 
(Baldwin & McCrudden 1987). To be effective, they needed to be in line with the 
programmes of those who sought to govern through accounting standards and also 
needed to be accepted by those who were supposed to be governed:
ASB knew that its objective o f improving financial reporting needed 
more than the statutory backing for accounting standards: it needed 
a commitment from all sides o f the financial community to work fo r  
such an improvement and to support the standard setting process. ” 
(Standard-setter E)
The remainder of this section reviews the rise and realignment of interconnected 
rationales of governing that shaped the history and identity of accounting standard- 
setting in the UK in relation to a series of national and international developments. 
The broad distinction between ideas of governing in the name of “the profession”, 
“the State”, and “the market”, helps to structure the multiple demands that were 
placed on the regulation of accounting practice before and after the creation of the 
ASB in 1990.
3.1 The rise of “professional” self-regulation
Ideas of self-regulation by the accounting bodies traditionally played a central role 
in the regulation of the technical procedures of accounting and auditing in the UK. 
They have been characterised by general notions of “independence” and “expertise” 
that were supposed to legitimise the practice recommendations of the accounting 
bodies (Robson et al. 1994). However, claims to self-regulation have been caught 
up in political, economic, and social changes throughout the 20th century. These 
encounters between “the profession”, “the State”, and “the market” brought about 
various shifts in the rationales that guided standardisation projects in accounting.
The first accounting institutes in Great Britain were established as self-formed 
professional organisations in the second half of the 19th century. They were granted 
royal permission for self-regulation of membership and conduct (Lee 1995).11 Until
11 The first Scottish institutes were formed in 1853 and 1867. They merged into the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in Scotland (ICAS) in 1951. The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales 
(ICAEW) was formed in 1880 following the merger of four provincial societies with the Society of 
Accountants in England. The Institute of Chartered Accountants in Ireland (ICAI) was established in 1888 
(Edwards 1989, p. 277).
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about the middle of the 20th century, the system of professional self-regulation 
provided the main mode of control in the market for accountancy services in 
Britain. This system was characterised by a generally informal, cooperative and 
discrete regulatory culture. The members of the chartered institutes were able to 
build a professional reputation and social standing on the basis of claims to 
knowledge in the areas of accounting, auditing, tax, as well as legal and business 
issues. Notions of “professionalism” were also carried into practice through a 
system of training and education for the members of the accounting bodies (ibid.). 
Accordingly, the regulatory authority of the accounting bodies largely arose from 
public trust in expert elites and their close and informal networks of control and 
communication (Baggott 1989; Lee 1995).12
Throughout the history of the chartered accounting bodies however, the roles and 
self-regulatory powers of the accountancy profession in the UK were always at least 
loosely tied to a public interest rationale (Hopwood 1983a).13 From early on, 
accountants based their professional identity on claims to a “social contract” 
between their occupation and the wider public. This meant that the services of the 
members of the accounting bodies were traditionally linked to ideas of supporting 
processes of corporate accountability for the benefit of society at large (Robson et 
al. 1994). A more explicit alignment between the system of professional self- 
regulation and public policies and regulations developed around the beginning of 
the 20 century. By that time, the formal ties between accounting practice and 
company law began to grow closer (Hopwood 1983a).14 Statutory accounting and 
reporting requirements in the Companies Consolidation Act 1908 and the 
Companies Act 1929 introduced a minimum level of recording and reporting 
(Noguchi & Edwards 2004), including the presentation of an audited balance sheet 
and the publication of a profit and loss account (Edwards 1989, pp. 128-130).15 The 
relative stability of these arrangements between “the profession” and “the State” has 
been identified as one of the key reasons for there being little explicit engagement
12 For further discussion of the role of self-regulation in British regimes of governing throughout the 20th 
Century see, e.g. Baggott (1989), Baldwin et al. (1998b), or Ogus (1998).
13 For a critical perspective on the public interest implications in the formation of the profession see, e.g. 
Willmott(1986).
14 For further discussion of the interrelations between accounting and law, see chapter four.
15 Basic publicity requirements to file annual accounts with the Registrar of Companies had already been 
introduced by the Joint Stock Companies Act 1844 (DTI 1998b).
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by “the accounting profession” in standard-setting activities until the 1940s (Lee 
1995) and for little regulatory control of accounting practice in company law 
(Edwards 1989, pp. 126-127).
A major shift in the relation between accounting and “the State” occurred in the 
1940s, when a notion of “professionalism” was questioned in the light of the 
presumed public interest-role of accounting (Napier & Noke 1992). Early 
accounting scandals in the 1930s and 1940s had called into question a general 
reliance on professional elites, who were trusted to serve the “public interest” by 
guaranteeing competent services (Lee 1995).16 The ICAEW responded to the 
criticism with the publication of a series of Recommendations on Accounting 
Principles from 1942 onwards (ICAEW 2009). In addition, the introduction of the 
Companies Act 1947 and the Companies Act 1948 formally ended the prior liberal 
rationale in accounting regulation (Noguchi & Edwards 2004). The new legislation 
significantly expanded statutory disclosure provisions and audit requirements 
(Edwards 1989, p. 209).17 At the time, the shift towards regulatory formalisation in 
company law was, however, still largely supported by the accounting bodies. They 
interpreted statutory regulation of accounting practice as a way to complement their 
efforts to secure and expand the scope of their responsibilities (Robson et al. 1994; 
Noguchi & Edwards 2004).
3.2 Self-regulation in the name of “the public” and “the market”
Throughout the 1970s, the status quo between “the profession” and “the State” in 
the accounting regulatory regime in the UK fundamentally changed. Another series 
of accounting scandals in the 1960s had called into question the extent to which the 
various accounting institutes could reliably provide accounting information that met
1 Rthe demands and expectations of various constituents (Rutherford 2007pp. 2-8). 
The accounting bodies followed the public critique with proposals for greater
16 The Royal Mail Steam Packet case of 1931, in which the issuance of false accounts was supported by the 
company’s auditor, was one of the most prominent cases that caused corporate accountability concerns and 
eventually led to increased reporting requirements in the Companies Act 1948 (Patient 1992).
17 For instance, specific headings for disclosure in the balance sheet and the profit and loss account were 
specified. The audit requirement was expanded to cover the profit and loss account. Formal responsibility for 
conducting an audit was located with the members of the professional institutes (Edwards 1989, p. 209).
18 Three of the most prominent accounting scandals of the time were the collapse of Rolls Razor Limited in 
1964, the takeover of Associated Electrical Industries Limited (AEI) by General Electric Company (GEC) in 
1967, and the failed Pergamon-Leasco takeover in 1969 (Rutherford 2007, pp. 2-8).
78
standardisation of accounting practice in the system of professional self-regulation 
in an attempt to regain public trust and to silence public calls for stricter legislation 
(Rutherford 2007, pp. 12-13).19
The ICAEW (1969) Statement o f Intent on Accounting Standards in the 1970s set 
out a programme for developing a set of standards for more consistent financial 
reporting in the UK. This included proposals for replacing the system of non­
binding and non-standardised guidelines which existed then and which had, until 
then, been issued by the individual British professional accounting institutes with a 
regime of jointly devised standards (Blake & Lunt 2001, pp. 1-2).20 Eventually, the 
Accounting Standards Steering Committee (ASSC) was created in 1970 as the first 
professional standard-setting organisation in the UK (Rutherford 2007). Following 
amendments to the constitution of the ASSC in 1976, the name of the standard-
91setting body was changed to Accounting Standards Committee (ASC). Under the 
new system, standard-setting remained under exclusive control of the UK 
accounting bodies and without official recognition by Government (Turley 1992; 
Zeff 2007b). Nevertheless, programmatic ideals of acting in the name of “the State” 
and “the markets” increasingly influenced the activities of the standard-setter.
Around the time of the creation of the ASC, definitions of the roles and purposes of 
financial reporting began to shift away from a traditional stewardship-perspective 
towards an emphasis on die “users” and “usefulness” of financial accounts for 
economic decision-making in a capital market setting (Hopwood et al. 1990, p. 76). 
Although ideas of financial reporting as a means of disclosing “relevant and 
efficient information for investor decision-making” had already accompanied the 
accounting reforms in the 1940s (Noguchi & Edwards 2004), the rise of a neo- 
liberal paradigm in British policy thought further strengthened aspirations to define 
the subjects and objects of governance in economic terms (Robson et al. 1994). The 
emphasis on autonomy and decision-making in economic governance also brought
19 Rutherford (2007, p. 13) highlights that the Government itself did not explicitly suggest intervening in 
professional conduct by means of legislation. Yet the profession felt that even the possibility that Government 
could change its views already created sufficient pressure for a greater degree of standardisation in the system 
of professional self-regulation.
20 Enforcement of the standards was supposed to be based on a comply or explain approach in the statements 
themselves or if they failed to do so in the audit report (Rutherford 2007, p. 41).
21 The 1976 amendments allocated greater responsibility for the initial drafting of standards to the ASC itself, 
lessening the role of the individual professional bodies (Rutherford 2007, p. 120).
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the focus on the “functioning” of capital markets in line with the public interest-role 
of accounting standard-setting (Willmott et al. 1993; Robson et al. 1994; Cooper & 
Robson 2006). That is, the system of professional self-regulation was expected to 
support “the efficient working of the commercial sector” (Rutherford 2007, p. 13).
The internationalisation of national accounting practice was another important 
influence on UK accounting standard-setting after the 1970s. This was brought 
about by the increasing economic interaction between the UK and the US (ibid., p. 
17) as well as the accession of the UK to the European Union. The former denotes 
some form of awareness of international developments in accounting regulation 
prior to explicit transnational harmonisation projects or active cross-country 
cooperation on financial reporting reform (Hopwood 1989a).22
“Accounting has never been a purely national phenomenon. [...] 
both its techniques and the significances that are in part created by 
them have a history o f  penetrating national boundaries, moving 
along the pathways established by commerce and patterns o f  
political influence. ” (Hopwood 1989b, p. 1)
The British accession to the European Community in 1972 was a turning point for 
the British accounting institutes and the relatively high degree of national autarchy 
they had enjoyed (Napier & Noke 1992).23 The supra-national standardisation 
projects of the European Commission (EC) emphasised a more legalistic approach 
to accounting regulation, which was typical of Continental Europe. This approach 
also included formal restrictions on the scope of activity undertaken by UK 
standard-setters (Bromwich & Hopwood 1992). The transposition of requirements 
for the form and content of company accounts from the Fourth (EEC 1978) and 
Seventh (EEC 1983) European Company Law Directives into UK legislation, for 
example, increased the influence of statutory provisions in the regulation of 
accounting practice.24
22 Examples of international intellectual influences that were independent from the explicit standardisation and 
harmonisation projects by transnational regulators and standard-setters include the attention paid to the 
Conceptual Framework project at the FASB since the 1970s by British accounting standard-setters (Tweedie 
& Whittington 1990) or direct references to Canadian and British developments in the US Jenkins Committee 
report on “Improving Business Reporting” (AICPA 1994, appendix IV).
23 For a discussion of the “Europeanisation” of national governance following the deliberate decisions of nation 
states to participate in the creation of an integrated European market, see Fligstein and Merand (2002).
24 For further discussion on the changing interrelations between law and accounting in the UK see chapter four.
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3.3 A new system for accounting standard setting at the ASB
The re-positioning of accounting standard-setting at the intersection of three ideas 
of governing -professional standards, a public interest, and growing concerns with 
user-needs in a capital market-setting -  was accompanied by a decline in public 
trust in the self-regulatory system of the accounting profession. A series of widely 
publicised scandals in the mid 1980s, such as the “Guinness scandal” (1986) and 
the US insider trading scandals involving Ivan Boesky and others (1986), had 
exposed the members of the accounting profession to even greater public scrutiny. 
Around the same time, businesses, the Stock Exchange, and even accounting firms 
in the UK began to strongly question the role, authority, and ability of the ASC to 
develop “acceptable” standards for financial reporting. Standard-setting was a 
particular target of their criticism (Hopwood et al. 1990; Turley 1992). Standards at 
the ASC had to be passed and endorsed by each of the six UK accounting institutes 
(Zeff 2007b). This was criticised as a complex and time consuming process 
(Standard-setter F). The exclusive control the profession had over accounting 
practice was further targeted by the competition policies of the Thatcher 
Government. Those policies were aimed at opening up the professional networks of 
the accounting profession and business leaders (Lee 1995; Worcester 2002).
The Dearing Committee was established in 1987 by the Consultative Committee of 
Accountancy Bodies (CCAB) to address perceived structural problems of standard 
setting and to find ways to restore trust in accounting standards (Turley 1992).25 
The Dearing Report (ICAEW 1988) proposed a new system for accounting 
standard-setting which demanded broader formal commitment from preparers, 
users, and auditors of financial statements. These proposals were further developed 
in the Guidelines fo r  Financial Reporting Standards (Solomons 1989). Following 
the recommendations in these reports, the Companies Act 1989 introduced 
substantial changes to UK accounting standard setting. Within the new system, the 
development of accounting-standards became a joint responsibility for the 
accounting bodies, large accounting firms, industry, the financial community, and 
the Government (Turley 1992). In 1990, the Companies Act recognised the ASB as 
the only formally independent accounting standard setting-body in the UK in
25 The CCAB was formed in 1974 as a forum for regular exchange between the accounting bodies that were 
involved in the work of the ASSC (Rutherford 2007, p. 35).
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1990.26 The ASB itself was created as a private company limited by guarantee and 
funded by the accounting institutes, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), 
the London Stock Exchange and the banking community (Turley 1992). The first 
members of the Board included a Chairman and a Technical Director, both working 
full-time and with a strong accounting background. The ASB was further made up 
of seven part-time members; three from large accounting firms, two from industry, 
one from the financial community, and one from a regulatory agency (ibid.). The 
FRC was established as a state-accredited umbrella body to supervise and oversee 
the preparation and enforcement of financial reporting standards. Its members came 
from the business and the accounting community (Lee 1995).
The new framework for accounting standard-setting in the UK was supposed to 
ensure the standards held authority with the business and the public (Bromwich & 
Hopwood 1992) even though the standards themselves were not legally binding
97(FRC 1991). At the same time, the membership and sponsorship structure of the 
ASB was meant to make the standard-setting process more transparent by formally 
positioning the work of the ASB between public interest controls and direct 
accountability to its sponsors (Davies 2003, p. 51). The structure was devised to 
overcome problems with low credibility and legitimacy of exclusively profession 
led standards (Hopwood et al. 1990; Turley 1992) and to rebuild trust in the 
adequacy of accounting standards to serve “public interests” (Rutherford 2007). 
Nevertheless, the ASB’s lack of formal hierarchical authority to enforce reporting 
standards has been taken as creating a “need” for securing wide-ranging support 
from those stakeholders who have the potential to question the legitimacy of the 
standards (Brunsson & Jacobsson 2000a, p. 2). In addition, a series of acute 
business failures, such as the spectacular “Maxwell collapse” in 1991 (DTI 2001), 
continued to put in question the legitimacy of the British system for accounting 
standard-setting at just the time that the OFR project was being launched.
‘To govern, one could say, is to be condemned to seek authority for  
one’s authority. ” (Rose 1999, p. 27)
26 Section 256 CA1985.
27 The position of the ASB was further strengthened in the new governance arrangement as the courts tended to 
interpret compliance with the legal “true and fair” requirement in line with the adherence to “professional” 
standards (Davies 2003, p. 543). However, there is no so called “statutory rebuttable presumption” that 
accounting standards should be followed in any case (FRC 1991).
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This short review of the various ideas of governing which have come into play in 
accounting standard-setting suggests viewing the ASB’s “uneasy position” in the 
context of wider historical, social and international developments. The reference 
points for accounting standard setting since the formation of the ASSC in 1970 have 
been provided by various ideas of governing. They include programmes of 
governing in the name of “the profession” and a “public interest” as well as ideals 
of “efficiency and effectiveness” in a market setting. These programmes have been 
realigned over time -  driven by a series of national and transnational developments, 
and a general decline of public “trust” in the system of self-regulation by the 
accounting profession. The next section outlines how these wider ideas of 
governing became connected to ideas of non-financial and future-oriented 
accounting in the agenda-setting process for a voluntary OFR at the ASB. 
Furthermore, the next section illustrates how these links were strengthened and 
legitimised in the processes in which a set of interrelated logics o f appropriateness 
co-emerged and at times challenged each other in the regulatory reform debates.
4 Mediating “appropriateness” in the agenda-setting process
The study of the OFR event at the ASB suggests that agreement on voluntary non- 
financial and future-oriented reporting as an agenda-issue for the ASB was made 
possible by the interplay of three perspectives on the role and responsibility of the 
ASB in dealing with non-financial and future-oriented reporting: “Technical” logics 
o f appropriateness were characterised by a perceived responsibility to ensure 
“quality” in financial reporting practice. Secondly, theories of the relative position 
of the OFR project in relation to regulatory developments in the USA and Canada 
emerged as “international” logics o f  appropriateness. Finally, a “professional” 
dimension of logics o f  appropriateness was defined by a professional self- 
consciousness that was shared by the various actors in the accounting standard- 
setting process. The emergence of each of these logics o f appropriateness and their 
points of congruence and disagreement in the agenda-setting debates are outlined in 
the following paragraph.
4.1 Technical logics of appropriateness
Studies of accounting standard-setting in the US have concluded that references to 
the diversity in accounting practice are a key element in the processes of 
constructing “accounting problems” and “solutions” in the agenda-setting process at
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the FASB. In these cases, “problems” with accounting practice related to a general 
expectation that published accounts should meet a set of technical quality criteria, 
such as comparability, consistency, relevance, or reliability, which had been 
formally outlined in the FASB Conceptual Framework (Young 1994).28 References 
to institutionalised quality criteria in the rhetoric of accounting standard-setting 
have supported a technical “myth of accounting objectivity” in the standard-setting 
process and provided the basis for authority and acceptance for new accounting 
regulations (Young 2003). The different formal institutional arrangements in the US 
and the UK may arguably limit the transferability of these findings regarding the 
role of conceptual framework criteria in facilitating “appropriateness” in agenda- 
setting to the specific situation at the ASB. The Conceptual Framework project in 
the US has a much longer history than the UK Statement o f Principles. It was 
launched in 1973, the same year the FASB started work. The first o f seven 
Statements o f Financial Accounting Concepts (SFAC) was issued in 1978 (Gore 
1992). In contrast, the ASB did not issue the first official Statement o f Principles for  
Financial Reporting (ASB 1999) in the UK until 1999. Until that date, the “true and 
fair” requirement for financial reporting provided the only formal boundaries for 
British standard-setters. This left more room for judgement in the preparation of 
financial accounts and supported a principles-based approach to UK accounting 
standard-setting (Parker 1989; Kirk 2001).29 Nevertheless, similar ideas of financial 
reporting “quality” have played a central role in the process of accounting standard- 
setting in the UK since the 1970s. There was an increasing interest in the 
development of “systematic principles” to address “problems” with financial 
reporting practice around the same time as the conceptual framework debates 
emerged in the US (Tweedie & Whittington 1990). The development of a 
framework of principles against which accounting standards could be judged was 
part of the programmes for “strengthening” accounting standards in the newly 
created system of financial reporting standard setting at the ASB (FRC 1991). The
28 The first FASB Concept Statement as of 1978 dealt with the Objectives o f Financial Reporting by Business 
Enterprises. FASB Concept Statements No. 2-6 (including the Concept Statements Qualitative 
Characteristics o f Accounting Information and Recognition and Measurement in Financial Statements o f  
Business Enterprises) were issued by 1985. The most recent Concept Statement No. 7 Using Cash Flow 
Information and Present Value in Accounting Measurements was issued in the year 2000 (www.fasb.org).
29 The principles-based approach in the UK contrast a more rules-based US-approach that -  in the absence of a 
authoritative definition of “true and fair” -  required conformity with generally accepted accounting principles 
(GAAP) (Parker 1989; Kirk 2001).
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ASB developed a set of informal criteria at an early stage. They were based on the 
recommendations for more formalisation of framework principles in the Dearing 
Report (ICAEW 1988). This guided the internal work of the ASB until the official 
publication of the Statement o f Principles (ASB 2009) and also influenced 
conceptualisations of “quality” in the OFR project.
The debates about voluntary OFR guidelines were based on the perception that the 
financial statements failed to sufficiently represent “relevant” economic matters. 
This failure was believed to make it difficult to operationalise a “decision- 
usefiilness” criterion in financial reporting (ASB 1992, para. 7). In line with the 
earlier arguments put forward by the professional accounting bodies with respect to 
expanding the scope financial reporting (cf. chapter two), the project team at the 
ASB identified a divergence between the reporting practice of listed UK companies 
and emerging notions of “best practice” in financial reporting. This was viewed as a 
general “weakness of UK reporting at the time” (Standard-setter D). This view was 
shared by the members of the Board, who recognised an increasing complexity of 
corporate activities as a limitation to representing underlying “economic reality” in 
the financial statements alone (Standard-setter F). Accordingly, the inclusion of the 
OFR on the regulatory agenda of the ASB was constructed as a regulatory 
“solution” that was supposed to contribute to “improving” financial reporting in two 
ways: The introduction of the voluntary OFR Statement was supposed to “enhance” 
the “quality” of information in the financial reporting package at large by 
complementing and explaining the information provided in the financial accounts. 
Secondly, by linking the OFR Statement to financial reporting quality criteria, 
perceived inconsistencies within current narrative reporting practice were to be 
eliminated and a framework for being candid about “good news” as well as “bad 
news” was to be provided (Standard-setters D and F).
"The Accounting Standards Board (ASB) is o f the firm opinion that 
the quality o f financial reporting o f  major companies in the United 
Kingdom would be enhanced by the inclusion in annual reports o f  
an Operating and Financial Review (OFR) in which management 
might take the opportunity to discuss in a structured way some o f the 
main factors underlying the performance and financial position 
portrayed in the financial statements. ” (ASB 1992, para 1)
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The ASB saw its responsibility in the OFR project in relation to its role in ensuring 
the provision of “improved” information to capital markets (Standard-setter E). 
Reliance on market forces was considered insufficient to guarantee a balanced 
presentation of the underlying “economic reality” of the business in voluntary 
statements (Standard-setters D and F). In relation to that idea, the debates at the 
ASB criticised the practice of voluntary narrative reporting used at the time for its 
presumed tendency to favour “fair weather” reporting. In addition, existing 
voluntary reports such as the Chairman’s report, were criticised for a lack of 
balance and quality in the disclosure of information on the underlying non-financial 
factors that may affect the future of the business (Standard-setter D and F).
“You don't often understand the true story behind them, the 
numbers, and in those days, the sort o f narratives that you got in 
Chairmen's reports were very biased and one-sided. [...] certainly at 
that time, we felt that there was scope for considerable improvement 
in the quality o f information. ” (Standard-setter D)
The introduction of voluntary guidelines for non-financial and future-oriented 
reporting was expected to help promote “best practice” in business management and 
reporting (Standard-setters D and F).
“What we 're after is management going behind the numbers and 
helping people understand their business.” (ASB Chairman in 
Financial Times 30.04.1992, p. 22)
The alignment of voluntary reporting practice with the guidelines in the proposed 
OFR Statement was supposed to provide “a way of clearing a path through a rather 
difficult, complex set of accounts, and telling you what’s going to happen” 
(Standard-setter F). The objective of giving greater visibility to the underlying 
drivers of financial reporting numbers was further associated with the more general 
idea of meeting “the objective of financial statements as stated in the ASB’s draft 
Statement of Principles” (ASB 1992, para. 2). This included a distinction between 
an overarching objective of financial statements to provide “useful” information to 
investors for economic decision-making and traditional stewardship purposes and 
more specific quality standards, including the principles of relevance, reliability, 
comparability, and understandability (ASB 1999). The deliberate decision of the 
OFR project team to link its further work on the OFR Statement with the emerging 
Statement o f Principles (Standard-setter D) was aimed at creating greater
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consistency between the project and the overall objective of the ASB to ensure high 
standards of quality in financial reporting for the benefit of current and future 
shareholders (ASB 1993, para. 3; Weetman et al. 1994).30
Despite the emphasis on financial reporting quality criteria in the publications of the 
ASB and the personal statements of the members of the working group, there were 
only few explicit references to financial reporting quality criteria in the public 
responses. For example, only six (8%) of the 77 respondents who welcomed die 
introduction of the OFR Statement also mentioned specific financial reporting 
quality criteria.31 This suggests that the proposed links between the OFR and 
technical quality criteria had remained relatively unquestioned. Nevertheless, the 
proposals for voluntary OFR guidelines were not readily accepted. They were 
challenged by the participants in regulatory space based on concerns with 
developments in the US and expectations about historically grown conventions in 
UK accounting standard-setting. The emergence and interplay of these 
“international” and “professional” logics o f  appropriateness in the process of 
agenda-setting for a voluntary OFR is further discussed in the remainder of this 
section.
4.2 International logics of appropriateness
The ASB’s internal work on the OFR Statement formally began in 1991 with an 
analysis of existing MD&A requirements in the US and Canada by the Project 
Director (Standard-setter D). This was supposed to provide a starting point for the 
development of a regulatory framework by the ASB that would help meet the 
objective of “enhanced” market communication through accounting standard- 
setting. Accordingly, the existing North American regulatory regimes not only 
inspired the drafting of the British OFR (ibid.), but elements from the MD&A were 
also included in the initial OFR discussion paper (ASB 1992, para. 22).
30 The internal use of the informal framework prior to the official publication of the Statement o f Principles in 
1999 was supposed to overcome a perceived lack of consistency and comparability of emerging financial 
reporting practices which was seen to “contradict the principle of standardisation” (Tweedie & Whittington 
1990, p. 87).
31 The comment letters were submitted by Coopers & Lybrand, BAT Industries pic, Royal Dutch / Shell Group 
of Companies, Unilever pic, Ranks Hovis McDougall pic, Institute of Investment Management and Research 
(today CFA Institute).
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“It sounded a sensible thing to put in. A lot o f the detailed points [in 
the OFR Discussion Paper] were very similar to what the US and 
the Canadians were asking for. ” (Standard-setter D)
The similar programmatic aspirations to “the market” and to “improving” market 
communication inherent in the North American requirements for additional 
narrative management commentary may explain the initial appeal of the MD&A as 
a role model for the British standard-setting debates (Sahlin-Andersson 1996; 
Sevon 1996).32 This interpretation is supported by a set of positive responses to the 
1992 Discussion Paper welcoming a cross-border perspective in the development of 
a regulatory framework for narrative reporting in the UK. Six submissions explicitly 
welcomed a move towards the US approach as a step towards greater international 
harmonisation of accounting standards which they thought would increasingly 
benefit international businesses.33 Other respondents to the public consultation, such 
as the ACC A, viewed a move towards the US regime as a way to integrate an 
already “more workable” and “specifically drafted” approach (ACCA letter to the 
ASB, 16 July 1992). Interestingly, the exemplary role of the North American 
frameworks was limited to the observation that requirements for narrative reporting 
had been introduced at all. Apart from that, the debates in the OFR regulatory space 
strongly criticised the institutional design of the MD&A regimes and particularly 
questioned the “effectiveness” of the US approach. “Legalistic”, “coercive”, 
“boilerplate”, and “burdensome” were some of the adjectives used in comment 
letters and by the ASB to criticise the US regime in action. Potential preparers of 
OFRs, including finance directors and their representative organisations, were 
particularly vocal in criticising the MD&A regime for its inflexible format and 
compliance-based approach to supplementary reporting.34 Seven of the response 
letters, which otherwise welcomed a general move to greater consistency in 
international reporting, expressed concern that a similar approach in the UK would
32 Sahlin-Andersson (1996) proposes a role for joint reference systems in the intra-organisational travel of ideas. 
Similarly, Sevon (1996) talks about “thought worlds” of organisations within the same “activity field”. Joint 
references to a shareholder paradigm in the UK and North America may also explain why the Discussion 
Paper did not refer to other narrative reporting regimes, such as the German Lagebericht, which had grown 
out of a stakeholder paradigm in corporate accountability (Engelen 2002).
33 They include letters from the Investor Relations Society, the Chartered Institute of Management Accountants 
(CIMA), the Chartered Association of Certified Accountants (ACCA), British Gas pic, English China Clays 
pic, and Willis Corroon Group pic.
34 They include, for example, the replies from BAT Industries pic; Standard Platforms Holdings pic; Titon
Holdings pic.
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result in mechanistic and “bland” reports which would fail to give more insight into 
the “economic reality” of companies.35
The ASB project manager also reviewed the general status quo of compliance in the 
US. After additional internal consultation with members of the 100 Group of 
Finance Directors on their experience with MD&As under the regime of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the ASB eventually decided to adopt 
only “sensible” parts of the North American mles (Standard-setters D and F). The 
OFR regime in the UK was supposed to deliberately depart from the “prescriptive” 
tone of the American regulations (ibid.).
“We were trying to get away from the US approach, which was very 
much [...] a long list o f things you had to put in and it didn't really 
say why you were doing it [...] Looking at a lot o f MD&As at the 
time, they were just disjointed paragraphs [...] But there wasn't any 
sort o f coherent story behind the numbers. ” (Standard-setter D)
“We were very scared [the OFR] would become a boilerplate 
document. You know, like the MD&A - with the lawyers all over it. ” 
(Standard-setter F)
“We wanted not to get the list o f things they need to talk about but to 
say what is the sort o f main message behind what's happened last 
year and explain that in sufficient detail. [...] what we wanted was 
management to tell their story. [...] to give the whole picture.” 
(Standard-setter D)
The debate centred on the conflict between technical and international points of 
reference in the construction of “appropriateness” for the voluntary OFR project. 
The actors in the OFR regulatory space agreed that meeting the objective of 
ensuring “quality” in OFR reporting in order to “improve” financial reporting 
overall would require a departure from the idea of international harmonisation. The 
decision in favour of a voluntary Statement was seen as an opportunity to gradually 
raise awareness and acceptance for the new type of statement (Standard-setter F). 
There was a general view at the ASB that standard setters should give companies
35 Comments explicitly criticising the US MD&A regime as a model for the UK were for instance received from 
Cadbury Schweppes pic, Medeva pic, Ranks Hovis McDougall pic, SmithKline Beecham pic, the 
Confederation of British Industry (CBI), the Institute of Directors (IoD) and the Scottish and the Midlands 
groups of finance directors.
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“room to breathe”, and that they should encourage experimentation in voluntary 
reporting instead of “rushing in with new standards” (Cook 1990).36
“[W]e thought: Well rather than lose it, let’s try and get best 
practice to force it through. So that’s why we did it as a [...] 
Statement [...]. So we just put that out as best practice and it caught 
on. ” (Standard-setter F)
The explicit departure from the North American MD&A model seems to contradict 
the view that regulatory design often mirrors other regulatory arrangements by 
imitating rules and institutions from countries with great economic and political 
power (Hancher & Moran 1989b, p. 160f).37 The next section further analyses the 
turning point at which positive references to the MD&A regimes in North America 
gave way to severe criticism. It outlines the debates in which the international 
points of reference were compared and contrasted with a professional self-image of 
accounting standard-setting in the UK.
4.3 Professional logics of appropriateness
A perceived discrepancy between the role of the accounting profession in 
accounting reform in the US and the UK made it possible for the actors in the OFR 
regulatory space to agree on a deliberate departure from the institutional structure of 
the North American model. The “professional” self-image of accountancy in the 
UK has traditionally been characterised by a language of neutrality and 
independence in the self-regulation of accounting practice (Cooper et al. 1994). 
“Professionalism” was also linked to an “entrepreneurial” mentality in the 
development of accounting practice (Robson et al. 1994, p. 530). Although the 
standard-setting process at the ASB was no longer exclusively controlled by the 
accounting bodies, similar perceptions of “professional independence” and “thought 
leadership” were maintained in the language outlining the role of the ASB in taking 
regulatory action in the area of non-financial and future-oriented reporting. The 
connection of the proposed OFR regime with points of reference relating to
36 The final OFR Statement also included an “escape clause” for commercially sensitive information in the final 
OFR Statement (ASB 1993). Its insertion into the guidelines took account of a particular concern about 
questions of confidentiality that finance directors and the Law Society had voiced in both the public an the 
internal consultations (Weetman et al. 1994; Standard-setter D).
37 This also seems to contrast a theory of institutional isomorphism according to which organisations in dynamic 
and uncertain environments (DiMaggio & Powell 1983) will copy the structure of other seemingly 
“successful” organisations with similar organisational forms and within similar external conditions (Hannan & 
Freeman 1977).
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conventional aspects of standard-setting by the British accounting profession was 
seen to be more in line with the emerging technical focus on the “quality” of UK 
financial reporting. The historic trajectories of accounting standard-setting in a 
system of self-regulation by the accounting bodies was also seen to conflict with the 
North American approach to regulating disclosure in the MD&A. In addition to the 
criticism of the MD&A regime for not meeting technical quality criteria if 
implemented in the UK context, the reform debates at the ASB further questioned 
the general compatibility of the US regime in regulating financial reporting and 
additional disclosures with UK traditions.
Under US legislation, the SEC, a US Government agency, has authority over the 
regulation of disclosures by listed companies. The SEC in turn delegates most 
responsibilities to the FASB. (Bromwich & Hopwood 1992; Lee 1995). Within that 
system, the responsibilities of the FASB were limited to the standardisation of 
financial reports, whereas responsibility for other mandatory disclosures, such as 
the MD&A, remains with the SEC. Individual states also regulate accounting 
practices by means of legislation (Lee 1995). Under this “top-down” approach to 
accounting regulation, Congress retains its right to intervene. This constitutes a 
political influence on the regulation of accounting practice (ibid.). The allocation of 
responsibility for the regulation of the MD&A regime with the SEC and the limited 
scope for flexibility in the preparation of the filings was seen to conflict with the 
assumption that the historic mission of UK accounting standard-setters was the 
provision of “thought leadership” in a regulatory system emphasising a cooperative 
relationship between the standard-setter and business (Baggott 1989; Mitchell 
1989). Maintaining an aura of “innovation” and meeting ideas of governing in the 
name of “the profession” was considered to be a more important factor in 
establishing widespread acceptance for the proposed OFR regime in the UK than 
following the path of international harmonisation.
5 The re-positioning of accounting standard-setting
The findings from this chapter help trace the more elusive ideas of “the art of the 
possible” (Standard-setter F) in accounting change. The study of the conditions und 
which non-financial and future-oriented accounting issues could emerge and 
become established on the agenda of national accounting standard-setters in the 
voluntary OFR event helps to explain “unusual” accounting change. The OFR event
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illustrates that shifting the boundaries of accounting standard-setting beyond a mere 
“tinkering with existing practices and financial statements” (Young 1994, p. 85) can 
become possible when there is an interplay of multiple and complementary but also 
competing logics o f appropriateness. Technical, international, and professional 
ideas of governing provided the reference points which allowed regulatory 
intervention by the ASB in non-financial and future-oriented reporting to be seen as 
a way to get accounting “right”. The findings from this chapter have wider 
implications for the study of logics o f  appropriateness in regulatory space. The 
OFR event shows that multiple ideas of governing may relate to each other in 
different ways. The shift in references to ideas of international harmonisation in the 
OFR event from the initially positive to the negative shows that what counts as 
“appropriate” in relation to a specific accounting issue may shift during the agenda- 
setting process as different logics come to complement and contradict each other.
The expansion of the regulatory mandate of the ASB into the field of non-financial 
and future-oriented reporting further supports the view that accounting standard- 
setters fulfil a wider role in the governance of economic life than being mere 
arbiters of technical knowledge of financial reporting. The “mistrust in numbers” in 
the voluntary OFR event at the ASB seems to be part of a more general re­
positioning of the British system of accounting standard-setting. This move 
happened at the intersection of ideas of governing through accounting standards in 
the name of “the profession”, “the State” and “the market”. This has created 
possibilities for the role and identity of the ASB to go beyond questions of 
recognition, measurement, and presentation in the financial statements. This study, 
therefore, suggests the need to understand the position of British accounting 
standard-setting at the ASB as part of a complex web of ideas of governing. In the 
case of the agenda-setting process for a voluntary OFR this consisted of four 
elements which may also apply to other instances of accounting standard-setting at 
the ASB or other national standard-setters. First, there has been a growing 
formalisation of public interest-rationales in the work of the national standard-setter 
through direct sponsorship from of the Government and indirect effects from 
national and European regulations. Second, although the accounting profession no 
longer has exclusive control over the standard-setting process at the ASB, the role 
and identity of the British standard-setter remains closely tied to ideas of
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“independence”, “expertise”, and “thought leadership” that roots in the history of 
professional self-regulation in the UK. Third, the emergence of regulatory issues on 
the agenda of the ASB is closely related to demands to enhance the “efficiency and 
effectiveness” of financial reporting in a capital market setting. Finally, the 
standard-setting process at the ASB has been characterised by a growing 
responsiveness to international developments in accounting standard-setting and 
regulation. The final point in particular seems to have taken centre stage in more 
recent debates regarding the role and position of national accounting standard- 
setters. The ASB faces ongoing pressures to establish its role and legitimacy under 
the increasing influence of the International Accounting Standards Committee 
(IASC), the impact of transnational regulation from the EU (Camfferman & Zeff 
2007, p. 408), and the growing relevance of other national GAAP in the global 
business of UK companies and accounting firms (Rutherford 2007, p. 17).
The next chapter focuses in more detail on the rising emphasis on a public interest- 
rationale of non-financial and future-oriented reporting during the British Company 
Law Review (CLR). It also examines links between programmes and technologies 
in regulatory space and links them to the study of regulatory reform which happens 
in the direct realm of “the State”.
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C h a p t e r  4
REALIGNING LAW, ACCOUNTING, AND “THE STATE”
“A fundamental consideration in examining the extent to which 
statutory requirements should extend into new areas is: to whom, in 
a modem economy, should the directors be accountable and in what 
respects? ”
(CLRSG 1999a, para. 6.31)
1 Narrative reporting as an issue for economic governance
This chapter discusses the rise of non-financial and future-oriented reporting as an 
agenda-issue for statutory regulation at a time when British political culture 
increasingly emphasised ideas of co-goveming the economy in public-private 
partnership. The originality of this study lies in the emphasis placed on the role of 
law in mediating and structuring the “the interrelations between accounting and the 
state” (Miller 1990). This chapter shows that the British Company Law Review 
(CLR) was characterised by a close alignment between company law and “the 
economy”. This assigned law a role in the framing of extra-legal “arenas for 
controversy” in which a wide range of non-state actors was expected to 
continuously contest and agree the alignment of corporate activities with the high- 
level public policy objectives of “the State”.
What is interesting about the introduction of the mandatory OFR as part of the 
British law review are the profound regulatory interventions in economic life that 
were taken in the name of “the State”. The proposals for a mandatory OFR co­
emerged with calls for the expansion of the overall scope of company law beyond 
the exclusive focus on shareholders. Mandatory non-financial and future-oriented 
reporting was expected to enable markets and society to monitor and enforce 
compliance with a proposed set of “inclusive” directors’ duties that required 
managerial attention to the impact of stakeholder relations, environmental, and
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social matters on long-term shareholder value.1 The combination of law and 
accounting in the new governance regime sought to turn a public policy programme 
of international macroeconomic competitiveness into practice, but without 
compromising the ideas of entrepreneurial freedom and decision-making. The 
introduction of the mandatory OFR together with the codification of “inclusive” 
directors’ duties in company law seems to challenge the idea that accounting plays a 
particular role in the operationalisation of decentralised regimes of economic 
governance that are only loosely associated with “the State” (Miller 1990; Miller & 
Rose 1990; Miller 1991; Miller & Power 1992; Rose & Miller 1992). This is 
consistent with writings on the rise of a new regulatory state in Britain and Europe 
(cf. Majone 1994; Moran 2001). They argue that a withdrawal of central 
Government from direct interventions in the economy since the 1970s has shifted 
responsibility for the regulation of economic life to private regulatory agencies and 
modes of self-regulation (Moran 2003, p. 5). Nevertheless, these studies also 
observed increases in state-initiated regimes of governing despite a strong emphasis 
on “the market” in neo-liberal policies. This has been interpreted as one of the great 
“paradoxes” of the new regulatory state in Britain (Ayres & Braithwaite 1992; 
Majone 1994; Moran 2000,2001; Jordana & Levi-Faur 2004).
This chapter draws on the idea that the rise in public regimes of governing appears 
less “paradoxical” if we understand that laws and markets do not represent 
opposing ends of a regulatory spectrum but are interconnected and sometimes 
overlapping representations of different modes of governing in dispersed and 
complex networks (cf. Ayres & Braithwaite 1992). This is linked to the view that 
the problems and tactics of government may, at the same time, be centralised 
around references to “the State” and widely dispersed in governance networks that 
are external to the bureaucracies of central Government (Foucault 1991b). Although 
the related body of literature does not view “the State” as a unitary agent with a 
centralised power monopoly (cf. Skocpol 1985; Rose & Miller 1992; Hall 1993; 
Hunt 1997; Moran 2003), these writings do not entirely obviate a role for a 
centralised notion of “the State” in the making and shaping of otherwise 
decentralised regimes of governing (cf. Curtis 1995; Miller & Rose 1995).
1 The “inclusive” directors’ duties have been implemented in section 172 (1) of the New Companies Act 2006. 
For details, see appendix 4 in this thesis.
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References to an overarching public authority of “the State” have been interpreted 
to maintain a focus on achieving a higher good for society (Foucault 1991b; Rose & 
Miller 1992; Hunt 1994, p. 54; Rose 1999, p. 141; Murray Li 2007, pp. 4-5).
“In many cases the state has become regulator o f  last resort, 
operating indirectly through new forms o f control [...] which have 
the appearance o f being apolitical ” (Power 1994, p. 13)
This includes expectations about the role of “the neoliberal State”: Economic 
management has remained one of the taken for granted tasks of national 
Governments even within a language of “deregulation” and “privatisation” (Dean 
1999, p. 16). “The State” is at least expected to preserve a basic degree of public 
order and to provide the infrastructures that enable “the markets” to contribute to 
national economic prosperity and societal welfare (Rose & Miller 1992, p. 139; 
Dean 1999, pp. 11-12; Rose 1999; Grossman et al. 2008). In the UK, notions of 
neoliberal governance particularly refer to an era after the general election victory 
of the Conservative Party in 1979 that became known as “Thatcherism”. 
Throughout the 1980s, British political culture largely shifted its vocabulary away 
from ideas of public ownership and direct economic management by the 
“interventionist state” to ideological aspirations to “the markets” and “civil society”. 
They were supposed to provide indirect modes of intervening in the conduct of 
private organisations. At the same time, this was expected to ensure that the 
activities of business organisations contributed to macroeconomic growth and 
competitiveness (Rose 1999, p. 17; Pierre & Peters 2000, p. 55).
The rise of accounting in largely decentralised regimes of governing in the last 
quarter of the 20th century has been closely linked to the neoliberal vocabulary of 
“choice” and “entrepreneurship” (Miller 1991; Miller & Power 1992; Miller & 
O’Leary 1993; Hopwood et al. 1994; Miller & Power 1995; cf. Miller & Rose 
2008a).2 Studies of neoliberal regimes of governing assign accounting a particular 
role in creating possibilities for regulatory interventions that retain space for 
managerial discretion and autonomy (Miller 1991). However, studies of the
2 Despite the central role of calculative practices in neoliberal regimes of governing, the connections between 
accounting and rationales of macroeconomic management share a relatively long history in the UK (Gilmore 
& Willmott 1992, p. 162). Accounting has been mobilised in the name of a range of “higher ends” of 
economic government, such as increased efficiency, improved decision making, economic growth and 
competitiveness, or enhanced responsibility and accountability (Miller & O'Leary 1987; Miller 1991; Miller 
1994b; Miller 2001).
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interrelations between accounting and dispersed modes of governing by “the State” 
have still paid insufficient attention to the role of law in linking public policy 
programmes and the calculative practices of accounting. Studies of the 
interrelations between law and accounting in economic governance have mainly 
focused on ways in which the calculative practices of accounting create possibilities 
for intervention at the local level in the name of high-level policy objectives. These 
debates have largely focused on the ways in which “extra-legal forms of knowledge 
and expertise”, such as accounting, constitute the operation of laws in practice 
(Miller & Power 1992, p. 242). Law itself was assigned a relatively “static” role in 
formally outlining, ordering, and inscribing the objects and means of government. 
Besides that recognition of a role for law in securing “public rights to corporate 
knowledge” (ibid., p. 233), in specifying and clarifying the use of certain 
accounting techniques (Miller 1990), or in promoting specific calculative practices 
in the name of Government (Miller 1991), there has been little explicit attention to 
law in mediating and structuring the interrelations between accounting and a notion 
of “the State” in contemporary regimes of governing. Previous studies on 
“accounting innovation beyond the enterprise”, for instance, only discussed the role 
of legislation as a means for coercing the use of specific calculative techniques, 
such as discounted cash-flow (DCF) in the investment decisions of nationalised 
industries (Miller 1991). Other studies on the interrelations between law and 
accounting have largely focused on professional struggles (cf. Abbott 1988) over 
territorial claims between law and accounting as two distinct bodies of expertise 
that search for professional closure (Hopwood 1983a; Richardson 1988; Sugarman 
1995; Walker 2004; Cooper & Robson 2006). From their point of view, the relation 
between law and accounting in advanced liberal societies has been characterised by 
competition and interdependence between the two bodies of knowledge (Miller & 
Power 1992).
The lack of studies of the role of law in linking accounting to “the State” is, 
however, surprising. In particular, given the many points of intersection between 
accounting and company law since the creation of the joint stock company in the 
19th century (Gilmore & Willmott 1992; Napier & Noke 1992).3 To address the
3 The Joint Stock Companies Act 1844 introduced the incorporated company as a separate legal entity. It was 
followed by the Limited Liability Act 1855. For further discussion of the intersections between law and 
accounting in the UK Companies Acts since the beginning of the 20th century, see chapter three.
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question of the role of law in the making and shaping of regulatory regimes in 
which a centralised notion of “the State” links to the decentralised practices of 
accounting, this study draws on a theoretical perspective on “law in action” (Hunt 
1993, 1994, 1997), and reframes it in terms of a study of “law in the making”. This 
requires viewing law as a “lived experience” (Hunt 1993) that is constituted by, and 
at the same time itself constitutes a range of social relations among state and/or non­
state actors, issues, and ideas (Hunt 1997, p. 104) instead of being a representation 
of “monolithic state power” (Hunt 1992).4
The remainder of this chapter outlines the interplay of law and accounting in the 
agenda-setting stage of the British CLR between 1998 and 2001. The first part 
illustrates the rise of ideas of co-goveming the economy in public-private 
partnership around the mid 1990s and its implications for a close alignment of the 
spheres of lawmaking and macro-economic management. The second part presents 
the debates on the expansion of the scope of company law in the name of the high- 
level objective of “improving” the competitiveness of the British economy. The 
third part outlines the rise of the OFR as an agenda issue for legal reform in the 
close interplay of aspirations to “the State” and “the market” that were inherent in 
the debates on “inclusive” directors’ duties. This chapter concludes with an 
interpretation of the shifting role of law in mediating and structuring the links 
between accounting and “the State” within a political culture that emphasises ideas 
of public-private partnership.
2 Company law reform in public-private partnership
By the mid-1990s, and according to a range of metrics, the British economy was 
largely underperforming in comparison to other Western countries (RSA 1994, pp. 
8-9). The UK had the lowest real-term Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the 
Western economies. It was the only EU country with a trade deficit in 
merchandised goods and came last of all Western countries in product development 
(RSA 1994, pp. 8-9). During that time, general ideas of “growth” and 
“competitiveness” continued to provide the underlying theme in the language of 
macroeconomic policy making and governance reforms (Miller & Rose 1990; 
Miller 1991; Miller & O’Leary 1993; Dean 1999). In order to achieve these
4 Hunt defines law as the “the historically specific production of regulatory devices that mediate between state 
and civil society and between state and individual” (Hunt 1994, pp. 54-55).
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objectives, a series of public policy reports in the mid 1990s called for reforms to 
modernise and renew British institutions in a way that would “improve” the 
economic position of the UK (DTI 1994, 1995; RSA 1995; Commission on Public 
Policy and British Business 1997).5
2.1 Ideas of co-governing the economy
Almost two decades of Conservative Government had left their mark on perceptions 
of the “appropriate” degree of public intervention in economic matters (Hall 1993), 
the 1990s were also a time of transformation: However, the strong market ethos of 
the old “Thatcherism” in public policy debates was increasingly challenged by ideas 
of co-goveming the economy in public-private partnership (Moran 2003).
“We believe that the agenda o f market liberalisation has largely run 
its course. More than that, it has cleared an arena in which 
government must now consult and work with the business 
community to improve corporate and national economic 
performance. ” (Commission on Public Policy and British Business 
1997, p. 3)
Signs of political change also emerged in the “New Labour” election manifesto 
which supported a programme of modernising the relation between business and 
Government as a key element in promoting global competitiveness of the UK 
economy (Labour Party 1997b; Rickford 2002):
“The vision is one o f national renewal, a country with drive, 
purpose and energy. A Britain equipped to prosper in a global 
economy o f technological change [...]. We see healthy profits as an 
essential motor o f a dynamic market economy, and believe they 
depend on quality products, innovative entrepreneurs and skilled 
employees. We will build a new partnership with business to 
improve the competitiveness o f British industry fo r  the 21st century, 
leading to faster growth. ” (Labour Party 1997b)
Under the newly elected Labour Government, the Department of Trade and 
Industry (DTI) announced a consultation on the state of UK competitiveness in June 
1997 to follow up on the issue of “improving” the competitive position of the 
British economy (Beckett 1997c). A month later, the Competitiveness Summit
5 The Department of Trade and Industry’s (DTT) White Paper Competitiveness: Helping Business to Win (DTT 
1994), followed by Competitiveness: forging ahead (DTI 1995), was the first survey of the UK’s competitive 
position under the John Major government.
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brought together Government and the business community to sketch out the 
intended cooperative relationship in dealing with the economic problems:
‘‘Our task is to identify [...] a way in which both the Government 
and the business community have clearly identified and agreed roles 
and responsibility. A way in which the dynamics o f market forces 
are used - not surrendered to, not opposed, but used - to deliver the 
results we all want. ” (Beckett 1997a)
Besides the explicit recognition of a role for “the market” in governing economic 
life, the Government concluded that the provision of regulatory incentives and the 
removal of obstacles for a long-term orientation in business management were a 
possible area for public action: 6 As part of these developments, law was 
increasingly seen as a mechanism for intervention in economic activity that was in 
line with an overarching policy objective of “enhancing” the international 
competitiveness of British business and the economy at large.
“The general framework o f commercial law and regulation at local 
and national Government level also impact hugely on business. [...] 
the right framework is essential fo r  business competitiveness.” 
(Beckett 1997a)
“There is no doubt that company law is an area where the 
Government's role is paramount. We set the rules by which every 
company must operate - how companies are to structure themselves; 
the proper duties o f directors; the rights and the obligations o f  
shareholders; what rules are necessary to protect creditors; and 
what companies must do to communicate with their shareholders.
[...] The issues on which I  have touched are part o f the good 
governance practices which the modem company needs to develop.
Boards, shareholders, employees and others each have their role to 
play in this. The roles differ, but it is essential to get them right. ” 
(Beckett 1998)
A ministerial speech at the Annual Conference of the Confederation of British 
Industry (CBI) in November 1997 reiterated the case for reforming company law in 
the name of international economic competitiveness, making the alignment of law 
and “the economy” the starting point for the development of further reform 
programmes (Beckett 1997b).
6 To explain the rise of regulatory initiatives and reform, Hunt (1993) proposes a “desire to regulate”, whereas 
Rose and Miller (1992, p. 191) refer to a “will to govern” that drives authorities to constantly engage in policy 
reforms that seek to “improve” social and economic conditions.
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2.2 The law reform programme
The British Government eventually launched a root and branch reform of the 
framework of core company law in March 1998 and placed it under the supervision 
of the DTI. This was a major step in the history of the UK Companies Acts. Since 
the beginning of the 20th century, company law had only been subject to partial 
review about every twenty years -  often as a piecemeal response to business 
scandals (DTI 1998b; Rickford 2002).7 In contrast, the CLR aimed for a complete 
realignment between company law and economic activity in the UK which implied 
a role for company law in achieving macroeconomic success and competitiveness:
“Company law lies at the heart o f  our economy. Although technical 
and often left to be handled by specialists, it provides the legal basis 
fo r  all companies and is fundamental to our national 
competitiveness. ” (DTI 1998b, p. i)
Hence, from the point of view of Government, UK company law was “part of the 
nation’s basic [economic] infrastructure” (Beckett 1998). The fundamental review 
of the company law framework was, therefore, seen as a way to act upon the 
fundamental structure of corporate relationships in a way that would have a 
“positive” impact on the international competiveness British economy (ibid.).8
“I  want the review to [...] deliver a framework which promotes 
consistency, predictability and transparency; which underpins high 
standards o f company behaviour and corporate governance; and 
which above all enhances the competitiveness o f British business in 
a new millennium. ” (Beckett 1998)
The development of explicit proposals for the law reform started from the 
identification of “problems” within the system of company law, which existed then. 
The company law framework was seen as an “outdated” relict of Victorian times 
which subsequent piecemeal amendments had made hard to implement in “the 
modem age” (Beckett 1998; DTI 1998b, paras. 1.1-1.2; Rickford 2002). By the start 
of the CLR in 1998, the sources of British company law were widely dispersed in a
7 Major amendments to the Companies Act took place in 1908,1929 and 1948 (DTI 1998b, para. 2.5). The last
major review was conducted in 1960-62 by the Company Law Committee (Jenkins Committee 1962). The 
recommendations were, however, never fully implemented as the regulatory policy focus shifted to 
incorporating Directive requirements of the European Commission (EC) into primary UK law (Rickford 
2002).
8 The law reform was also seen as a way to encourage incorporation in the UK rather than elsewhere in an
international context (Beckett 1998; DTI 1998b, paras. 4.1-4.7).
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complex patchwork, of contractual relationships, legislation, common law 
principles, and rules issued by regulatory bodies with a legal mandate, such as the 
ASB (Davies 2003, p. 45). The main piece of legislation was the Companies Act 
1985. Quasi-legal “soft laws”, such as the Combined Code on Corporate 
Governance (Hampel 1998), and entirely voluntary self-regulatory frameworks at 
the level of professions, industries, or individual firms complemented the overall set 
of formally inscribed regulatory frameworks (Davies 2003, chapter 14).9 Moreover, 
market forces in the so called “markets for corporate control” were seen as another 
authority that governed the behaviour of UK companies (Khemani & Shapiro 
1993). However, this system was seen to be “seriously out of date” by the start of 
the CLR (DTI 1998b, p. i). On a more general level, the calls for legal reform 
assumed that there was a “mismatch” between the underlying philosophy of the 
framework of company law and “the real modem needs of incorporated businesses” 
(Rickford 2002). Law was seen to have “failed, in both its substantive and its 
transparency mles, to reflect sound perceptions of the real sources of value and 
performance in the modem economy” (ibid.).10
“For all these reasons, the government has decided that the time is 
now right fo r a thorough review o f core company law. The stripping 
out o f obsolescent and over-complex provisions and the repair o f  
defective ones will not be easy or straightforward. But we need clear 
and simplified arrangements which, starting from first principles, 
better capture the balance o f obligations, protections and 
responsibilities which are required to underpin the modem 
marketplace [...]. ” (DTI 1998b, para. 3.8)
The Government’s proposals were widely welcomed in the public responses to the 
first consultation document Modem Company Law: For a Competitive Economy. 
By 30 June 1998, the DTI received response letters from 156 individuals and 
organisations. 65 (42%) explicitly welcomed the law review. The agreement was 
founded on the general principle of the law review that “company law should reflect
9 Davies (2003, p. 323) uses the term “soft law” with reference to the “comply or explain” approach in the
corporate governance obligations under the Listing Rules. It limits compliance with the Combined Code to a 
disclosure obligation on the extent to which a company has complied with the individual requirements and on 
reasons for non-compliance. The “comply or explain” principle, therefore, allows for full compliance with the 
Listing Rules even if none of the recommendations from the Combined Code are followed, as long as the 
company explains this to its shareholders in the annual report.
10 The problematisations of Company Law in relation to economic reality resemble the debates on the “relevance 
lost” (cf. Johnson & Kaplan 1991) of financial reporting numbers as means of business management that have 
been outlined in chapter two of this thesis.
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the reality of the modem corporate economy” that was carried forward throughout 
the remainder of the CLR (CLRSG 2001, para. 9). Only two responses explicitly 
rejected the CLR (DTI 1998a, para. 2.1).11
2.3 Co-legislation
The idea that law and “economic reality” should and could be closely aligned in 
regimes of governing in public-private partnership was also reflected in the formal 
organisational arrangements of the CLR that introduced an approach to lawmaking 
that has been described as “co-legislation” (Rickford 2002). After the launch of the 
law review in March 1998, the DTI delegated the task of developing the specific 
reform proposals to “distinguished” experts with “in-depth practical knowledge of 
the implications of policy proposals” and “the necessary authority and credibility to 
control the review” (Rickford 2002). An “independent” Company Law Review 
Steering Group (CLRSG), consisting of senior lawyers, academics, business 
representatives, and accountants, was created by the DTI over the summer of 
1998.12 The CLRSG was led by an externally appointed project director and chaired 
by a DTI official (DTI 1998b, para. 7.2).13 Its task was to oversee the review and to 
develop a set of “factual” and practicable, but non-binding law reform proposals for 
the Government to take before Parliament (Rickford 2002). The DTI also 
established a so called Consultative Committee with the mission to balance the 
views of the Steering Group with those of external “key groups”, including the Law 
Society, the CBI, the Trades Union Congress (TUC), the professional accountancy 
bodies, and other Government departments (DTI 1998b, para. 7.3). Additional 
working groups were formed around issues such as “corporate governance” and 
“disclosure and financial reporting” (ibid., para. 7.6). Each working group was 
chaired by a member of the CLRSG, who provided initial input to the working 
group and reported back to the Steering Group. The Project Director was a member 
of all working groups. The CLR also followed a general preference for public 
“notice and comment” procedures over closed consultations (cf. OECD 2002). The 
CLRSG invited public comments to a series of consultative documents with the
11 The DTI classified 24 of the comment letters as “non substantial” (DTI 1998a).
12 The role and authority of experts in governance (Miller & Rose 1990; Hunt 1994; Baldwin & Cave 1999) and 
their roles as “carriers of knowledge” in processes of institutional change (Jepperson & Meyer 1991, p. 226) 
are not ftirther discussed within the scope of this research.
13 For a full list of members of the CLR-groups and other participants in the review, see Annex A of The 
Strategic Framework (CLRSG 1999a).
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stated objective to ensure “wide support not simply from business and industry but 
also in the community at large” (DTI 1998b, para. 1.3). In addition, the group 
engaged in direct dialogue with the “key groups” and commissioned independent 
research projects on some areas of debate. However, the members of the CLRSG 
and the DTI retained some authority over the views that were advanced in the 
internal and public debates. The direct impact o f public consultations on the work of 
the CLRSG was, for example, limited by the group’s decision to weigh the 
responses according to perceived merit, soundness of reasoning, and status of the 
submitting body (CLRSG 2000a; Rickford 2002).
The remainder of this chapter outlines the more specific processes of 
problematising company law and accounting that took place during the agenda- 
setting debates at the CLRSG. The perceived discrepancy between the company law 
framework and “economic reality” opened the CLR to wider debates on a possible 
expansion of the scope of activities and relationships that should be subjected to 
regulation by “the State”. The discussion is based on archive materials, published 
texts, and personal interviews with key members of the CLRSG.
3 The codification of “inclusive” directors’ duties
On the question of how a “better” alignment between company law and “economic 
reality” could be achieved, the law review turned its attention to the more specific 
field of directors’ legal duties. The CLRSG established a case for legal reform on 
the grounds that the existing definitions of directors’ duties in common law and 
statute had “failed” to foster economic prosperity. Fiduciary duties of loyalty and 
good faith to act in the interest of the company and the duty of skill and care had 
developed outside the Companies Acts as common law principles. They were 
interpreted as being owed to “the company”, but company law had remained 
imprecise in specifying the interests of “the company” (Davies 2003, p. 371). The 
Companies Act included an ambiguous duty of directors to pay attention to “the 
interest of the company’s employees in general, as well as the interests of its 
members” that left enforcement of employees’ interests to legal action by 
shareholders.14
14 Section 309 CAl 985.
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3.1 The case for legal reform
The formulation of directors’ legal duties was considered to be too dispersed and 
unclear and to result in inefficiency and substantial compliance-costs to businesses 
(DTI 1998b, paras. 3.1-3.3). Furthermore, current legislation was deemed 
insufficient to provide a focus on the long-term in managerial decision making and 
to counterbalance market pressures for short-term shareholder wealth maximisation 
(CLRSG 1999a, para. 5.1.17).15 The views of the CLRSG were supported by a 
study commissioned by the Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission 
(1999) which concluded that directors found it difficult to understand their legal 
obligations. The CLRSG, consequently, proposed to unify and clarify directors’ 
duties in primary legislation. Additional surveys of company directors by the 
Institute of Directors (IoD) and by the Law Commissions suggested widespread 
support for the proposals (CLRSG 1999b, para. 7.5): 61% of the surveyed 836 
directors welcomed die clarification of the existing common law duties in a codified 
statement (Deakin & Hughes 1999).
However, the definition and interpretation of legal constraints on directors’ powers 
had always posed a particular challenge for company law reformers throughout the 
20th century (DTI 1998b). It was understood that the definition of the “objectives in 
accordance with which companies should be run, and correspondingly the range 
and priority of interests that company law should seek to further” had major 
implications for the fundamental scope of influence of the legal framework on 
corporate activities (Parkinson 2002). The DTI, therefore, invited a high-level 
“philosophical” debate on “first principles” and the scope of company law as a 
whole. The question was, to whom explicitly directors’ duties should be owed in 
order to promote “high standards of company behaviour and corporate governance” 
(ibid., para. 5.1)?
15 The market for corporate control was deemed ineffective for disciplining directors towards a focus on long­
term economic competitiveness (cf. Davies 2003, p. 326), because the possibility to become subject to a 
hostile takeover created pressures on directors for short-term profit oriented decision making (CLRSG 1999a, 
para. 5.1.17).
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“A wider issue fo r the review is whether directors ’ duty to act in the 
interests o f their company should be interpreted as meaning simply 
that they should act in the interests o f the shareholders, or whether 
they should also take account o f other interests, such as those o f 
employees, creditors, the environment, and the wider community. ”
(DTI 1998b,para. 3.7)16
The arguments presented by the DTI further elaborated on the views from a series 
of earlier public policy publications that had promoted a broader approach to 
managing stakeholder relationships and social and environmental responsibilities as 
a way to “improve” Britain’s economic position (Hutton 1995; RSA 1995; 
Commission on Public Policy and British Business 1997; Tomorrow's Company
1 n
1998). The Government added an emphasis on the possible role of company law 
in facilitating the management of wider business relationships and in promoting a 
focus on the long-term:
“[CJompanies need to have an inclusive approach to their 
customers, products, people. Government has a role to play in 
setting decent standards [...] ” (Beckett 1998)
Similarly, the members of the CLRSG came to agree that competitiveness and 
efficient wealth creation in a modem economy were best achieved through the 
harmonious cooperation of all internal and external stakeholders and the recognition 
of wider community interests (CLRSG 1999a, para. 5.1.17). Since a broader 
stakeholder perspective was not reflected in the present framework of company law, 
the DTI and the CLRSG suggested evaluating to which degree the overall scope of 
company law could be shifted from the traditional “monist” focus on shareholder- 
interest to a more “pluralist” approach (DTI 1998b, para. 3.7; CLRSG 1999a, paras. 
5.1.12-13).
16 The question how to define the scope of directors’ duties and accountability mechanisms was and maybe still 
is one of the greatest controversies in the making of centralised regulatory frameworks. Up until now, 
different conceptions of the duties of directors continue to exist in the national corporate governance systems. 
The question whether non-financial strategic objectives are equivalent (cf. Blair 1995; Kelly & Parkinson 
2000; Gamble & Kelly 2001; Williamson 2003) or subordinate (cf. Easterbrook & Fischel 1991; Willetts 
1997; Grantham 1998; Scott 2003; Kraakman et al. 2004) to financial goals fuels ongoing conceptual debates 
about a pluralist vs. shareholder-focused conception of the business.
17 For a detailed discussion of the proposals in these reports, see chapter two.
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“The principal arguments which are advanced fo r  change are that 
the present scheme o f the law fails to adequately recognise that 
businesses normally best generate wealth where participants 
operate harmoniously as teams and that managers should recognise 
the wider interests o f the community in their activities. ” (CLRSG 
1999a, para. 5.1.9)
The CLRSG, therefore, proposed to combine the codification of directors’ legal 
duties with changes to the fundamental shareholder principle in company law. This 
was supposed to “point the way to a more performance-based, progressive and 
’holistic' managerial approach, to the benefit of the whole British economy” 
(CLRSG 1999b, para. 7.33).
3.2 Contesting the scope of company law
The public responses to the first consultation document of the CLRSG Modem 
Company Law for a Competitive Economy: The Strategic Framework (CLRSG 
1999a) rarely questioned that considering wider stakeholder relations was already 
“reality” in business management.18 However, controversial debates arose in the 
public consultations and among the members of the CLRSG out of the question of 
directors’ duties and to whom they ultimately owed their legal duties. Diverging 
views on the role of “the State” vs. “the market” in regulating economic activities 
materialised in a deep disagreement about the degree of specification of directors’ 
duties in statute. On one side were the supporters of fundamental reform who 
argued that a “pluralist” basis for company law would better reflect the growing 
impact of wider stakeholder groups, the environment, and society at large on 
corporate performance (cf. Blair 1995; Carroll 1999; Kelly & Parkinson 2000; 
Gamble & Kelly 2001; Williamson 2003). They argued that statutory recognition of 
the “business case” (DTI 1998a, para 14.3) and of a general “license to operate” that 
was granted by society at large (CLRSG 1999b, paras. 7.5 & 7.15) would raise 
awareness for the commercial relevance of actively managing wider stakeholder 
relationships in a capital market setting. On the other side, the opponents of a 
pluralist approach argued that the traditional focus on the legal relationships 
between the company and its shareholders in company law already provided 
sufficient legal underpinnings as the play of forces in otherwise “free markets” 
already ensured that a “business case” for socially and ecologically responsible
18 26 (17%) of the 156 submissions explicitly commented on the idea to expand the scope of directors’ legal 
duties.
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behaviour would be taken into account (DTI 1998a, para. 14.2; CLRSG 1999b, 
para. 7.4).19
“[A]ccountability to shareholders was currently clear and this was 
fundamental to the operation o f the free market in a competitive 
economy. A dilution or dispersion o f this accountability would risk 
making Britain less attractive to foreign capital and British 
companies less competitive. “ (CLRSG 1999b, para. 7.4)
The CLRSG concluded that the majority of opinion was against the stakeholder 
model (CLRSG 1999b, para. 7.14; Davies 2003, p. 292) and eventually decided to 
discontinue the debates on a pluralist approach in late summer 1999 (CLRSG 
2000b; Parkinson 2002). Although the group recognised a “theoretical superiority” 
of the pluralist approach, the members were aware of possible practical limitations. 
The members of the CLRSG were able to agree on the point that a stakeholder 
approach to company law might result in counterproductive conflicts of interest, 
over-litigation, or no enforcement at all (CLRSG 2000a, para. 3.5; Parkinson 2002, 
Regulator B). This was seen to risk diluting the focus of directors in business 
management and to complicate enforcement (Parkinson 2002; Rickford 2002). The 
group further pointed at practical difficulties to draft a “one fits all” pluralist duty in 
statute (CLRSG 2000b, paras. 3.24-3.31).
However, the decision against a pluralist approach in company law was far from 
unanimous. It resulted in strong opposition from environmental and development 
groups such as Friends of the Earth, Oxfam, and Traidcraft Exchange, and even led 
to the resignation of the former head of social and environmental policy at The 
Body Shop from the CLRSG (Cowe 1999).
19 Any additional requirements for the protection of employees or the environment were suggested to be 
regulated in separate legislation and not in the Companies Act (DTI 1998a, para 13.3). The proposals to 
maintain the scope of company law as it was, were mainly advanced by representatives from the legal 
profession. They explicitly rejected a mandatory OFR on the grounds that it was not an issue for company law 
to regulate corporate behaviour in areas that may be better left to separate employment, health and safety, and 
environmental laws. In its response to Completing the Framework, the Law Society of England and Wales 
explicitly requested to “keep lawyers out of accounting”, rejecting the creation of responsibility of the legal 
profession for practices that they perceived a part of the professional territory of accountants (letter from the 
Law Society, 28.07.2000).
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“Enlightened business will find  it hard to forgive the government for  
its cold feet about stakeholder rights. I f  their company law review 
backs o ff fundamental reform it will miss the opportunity to put 
business on a 21st-century footing. Worse, they will confirm the 
damaging impression that business responsibility goes no further 
than making a profit - a lie which is doing enormous damage to 
people, the environment and communities around the world.” 
(Roddick 2000)
Despite the continued controversy over the “scope”, the remaining members of the 
CLRSG refused to consider the stakeholder issue. They stated that “none of the 
responses suggested a practicable means of dealing with the crucial question of how 
such a duty could be enforced” (CLRSG 2000a, para. 3.5). At the same time, the 
group was aware that a widely shared consensus on the question of “scope” was 
important for the “success” of the law review:
"I wanted to reform British company law, and i f  we couldn't solve 
this problem, this stakeholder problem, we weren't going to get 
legislation at all. It would just be lost. And all the work that we put 
in would be lost. ” (Regulator B)
In order “to overcome the tensions” (Regulator B), the review group opted for a so 
called “enlightened shareholder value” approach (CLRSG 1999a, para. 5.1.11). The 
concept was already included in earlier consultations as a possible middle way for 
approaching the high-level question of “scope” (DTI 1998b, para. 3.7). The 
proposed approach was supposed to continue the existing arrangement under which 
only shareholders could take legal action against directors in case of a breach of 
their legal duties. However, these statutory duties were supposed to be expanded by 
the explicit requirement for directors to take into account a company’s long-term 
relationships with internal and external parties, as well as the community and the 
environment when managing for shareholder-value (CLRSG 1999a, para. 5.1.17).
“It may be asked whether this proposal overall is an “enlightened 
shareholder value” or a “pluralist” one. The overall objective 
should be pluralist in the sense that companies should be run in a 
way which maximises overall competitiveness and wealth and 
welfare fo r  all. ” (CLRSG 2000b, para. 2.21)
At a later time, the CLRSG only referred to the term “inclusive” directors’ duties, 
although technically not different from the “enlightened shareholder value” 
proposal. The change in language was supposed to signal the consensus that had
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been found between the supporters of a shareholder vs. a stakeholder approach 
within the CLRSG (Regulator A).
“[W]hat was extraordinary was the extent to which the different 
camps were actually carried in the same direction by this basic sort 
o f enlightened shareholder value/inclusive logic [ ...]” (Regulator A)
Indeed, even strong proponents and opponents of the pluralist model, such as the 
TUC and the CBI eventually welcomed the inclusive approach to “act as a restraint 
on the seemingly relentless maximisation of shareholder value” (Brown & Peel 
2001, Regulator A).
The next section of this chapter illustrates how the widespread agreement to 
introduce an “inclusive” set of directors’ legal duties into the Companies Act was 
made possible by debates on law reform in the area of company reporting. Among 
other things, these debates were dealt with the role of published accounting reports 
in creating accountability for directors and shareholders vis-a-vis the wider public 
(CLRSG 1999a, para. 5.1.44).
4 The mandatory OFR
Since the proposals for “inclusive” directors’ duties implied that formal litigation 
rights in case of breach of duties would be reserved to shareholders only, the 
CLRSG had to design a balanced monitoring and enforcement regime with few 
constraints on managerial decision making, while at the same time honouring the 
directors’ responsibility vis-a-vis a wider group of stakeholders.
“The way to square that circle was to have public accountability 
through published reporting fo r  the wider range o f  constituents, 
whilst maintaining the focus within the field  o f  corporate 
governance [...] with shareholder-value fo r  the board. ” (Regulator
B)
The general idea that a combined regime of law and accounting might help “solve” 
the “problem” of international competitiveness of the British economy led to a 
series of further debates. First, there was a general discussion about public 
accountability as a means of linking questions of lawmaking to questions of market- 
based enforcement in extra-legal spaces. Second, the discussions fed into the more 
specific debates in which the reform actors agreed on the mandatory OFR as an 
agenda issue for the CLR.
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4.1 Ideas of extra-legal accounting-based enforcement
The view that the behaviour of investors and managers could be aligned with the 
high-level objectives of the CLR by means of “extra-legal [...] disciplines”, 
including corporate financial reporting, had surfaced early in the law reform debates 
(Regulator B). Although none of the initial seven Working Groups of the CLRSG 
explicitly dealt with accounting and reporting, a general focus on the principle of 
transparency and accountability had accompanied the law reform debates since the 
launch of the CLR.20
“So I  would like companies to think more deeply about how they can 
be transparent and accountable to all those with an interest in their 
business. One way may be for companies to look at improving how 
they communicate with all those groups in all kinds o f ways - 
including in the annual report. (Beckett 1998)
The CLRSG took the issue further in its internal debates on possible ways to 
enforce an “enlightened” or “inclusive” shareholder value approach in practice. The 
group made a first step towards linking law and accounting in the proposed 
“inclusive” approach to company law when it developed the idea that “public 
sanction” was “implicit in the notion of public accountability” (Regulator B). The 
argument was that not only directors, but also capital markets were constrained by 
public views about “appropriate” corporate behaviour. Shareholders were expected 
to pass that pressure on to directors (ibid.).
“Enhanced reporting obligations operating within a structure o f  
enlightened shareholder value have the capacity in principle to 
achieve the objectives o f a more pluralist approach, by ensuring that 
it is in the self-interest o f members that such pressures should be 
satisfied. Effective reporting might also [...] reduce short-term 
pressures by shareholders on directors” (CLRSG 1999a, paras. 
5.1.44-5.1.47).
“[T] here's a great deal o f de-facto accountability o f shareholders in 
that sense through the political system and the financial press, and 
so forth. And there's also now much higher level o f recognition than 
there used to be by institutional investors o f the need to ensure that 
companies do satisfy these constituencies, because otherwise their 
business will go wrong. ” (Regulator B)
20 For further discussion on the rise of transparency in governance, see Hood and Heald (2006).
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“[I]t will work through, because the directors are accountable to 
the shareholders and the shareholders will be influenced as to 
what's in their best interest by the pressures from outside. I f  the 
shareholders are accountable to the public [...] they've got in that 
sense a pluralist obligation ” (Regulator B)
These debates drew on the idea that accounting reports provided a possible vehicle 
for giving visibility to and acting upon the various areas of business management. 
In addition, the group emphasised that the published information for shareholders 
might also be of interest to non-shareholder stakeholders and society at large.21
“We have already noted that in practice the fact that a company’s 
accounts and reports must be published enables the public at large 
to evaluate its performance and bring pressure to bear on the 
company as a whole, both members and directors, so as to satisfy 
relational and wider social interests. “(CLRSG 1999a, para. 5.1.44)
In a next step, the CLRSG considered possible implications of “accounting and 
reporting issues” for the law review project. A focus on non-financial and future- 
oriented reporting in company law was proposed as a possible way to make new 
areas of business management governable in the name of the high-level public- 
policy ideas of macroeconomic management by “the State”. Company law was 
assigned a role in formally outlining the types of information that would 
demonstrate how far directors had considered their “inclusive” duties in the running 
of the company. Furthermore, the publication of that information in the annual 
report was expected to subject directors’ decision-making to interventions by “the 
markets” and society. The CLRSG recognised that businesses already voluntarily 
responded to growing demands for new forms of qualitative and future-oriented 
reporting (CLRSG 1999a, para. 5.1.47) but identified a “problem” of missing 
checks and a lack of enforcement of voluntary reports (ibid., para. 6.30).
“The extent o f non statutory reporting suggests that there is a 
market need or a wider demand fo r  financial and non-financial 
information on companies which the existing statutory requirements 
fa il to reflect. ” (CLRSG 1999a, para. 6.30)
21 A similar rhetoric on the welfare-effects of accounting for wider groups in society had surfaced previously in 
British debates on the role of accounting in public policy in the 1970s. They were accompanied by discussions 
about the widening groups of legitimate users of financial accounts (ASSC 1975; Department of Trade 1977a, 
1977b; Burchell et al. 1985; Hopwood et al. 1994). During the Thatcher/Regan era in the UK and the US in 
the 1980s, these stakeholder debates in corporate governance and corporate reporting were largely 
marginalised in public policy discourses and the role of directors to serve the interests of shareholders was 
reinforced (Tricker 2000).
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Initially, the review group was undecided about whether or not to take further steps 
towards the introduction of requirements for non-financial and future-oriented 
reporting in company law:
“This does not necessarily point to a need for increased statutory 
requirements. The growths o f non-statutory reporting could be said 
simply to demonstrate that companies are responding flexibly to the 
demands from interested groups, a response which should be left to 
develop. [...] On the other hand voluntary reporting implies an 
inequality o f  information as between companies and, perhaps, the 
disclosure only o f information which shows a company in a positive 
light. Is it fa ir that companies which provide such information 
should be placed at a possible competitive advantage?” (CLRSG 
1999a, para. 6.30)
According to the internal meeting minutes, the CLRSG doubted the quality, 
comparability, and usefulness of existing voluntary reports for which they blamed a 
tendency for “fair weather” reporting under voluntary regimes (CLRSG 1999a, 
para. 6.31). Additional transparency provisions were expected to help “reveal” the 
“real sources of value and performance in the modem economy” (Rickford 2002, p. 
11).
“[T]here’s nothing new or rocket science about this. Anybody with 
any sense, who is trying to assess the merits o f an investment in a 
company needs to look at the things that matter fo r  its future. And, 
so far as they were concerned, it was just obvious that the existing 
structure o f corporate reporting was defective. It wasn't in itself 
leading to properly informed markets. ” (Regulator B)
The translation of non-financial and future-oriented accounting into a possible issue 
for legal intervention was linked to a perceived “mismatch” between “the real 
modem needs of incorporated businesses” and the underlying philosophy of the 
British framework for corporate accountability (Rickford 2002).22 The CLRSG 
assumed that the “right” balance of good and bad news and a long-term focus could 
only be achieved through the disciplinary effects of additional mandatory reporting 
requirements. The proposed mandatory version of the OFR was expected to bridge 
the gap between the current status quo of financial reporting practice and the 
presumed additional information needs of markets and other stakeholders (CLRSG
22 The reform proposals also suggest a strong believe in the “usefulness” of disclosures and information 
provision for capital markets which seems to be in line with the predominance of an abstract and unquestioned 
notion of “the user” in financial reporting regulation (Young 2006).
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2000b, para. 2.22) by providing “a discussion and analysis of the performance of 
the business and the main trends and factors underlying the results and financial 
position and likely to affect performance in the future” (ibid., para. 5.79). As in the 
earlier agenda-setting debates at the ASB, the CLRSG also used the argument that 
additional narrative reporting had the potential to overcome perceived “limitations” 
of the then existing financial reporting framework. The discussions emphasised the 
possible benefits of statutory inscription to ensure companies informed 
“effectively” on “a wide range of relationships and resources, which are of vital 
significance to the success of modem business” (CLRSG 2000a, para. 3.4). 
“Improvements” in corporate reporting were also directly linked to the high-level 
objective of the CLR. Additional mandatory reporting on non-financial and future- 
oriented issues was seen as a way of reconciling the multiple aspects of the CLR 
that defined “the overall objective of wealth generation and competitiveness for the 
benefit of all” (CLRSG 2000b, para. 7) in terms of shareholder value, sustainable 
stakeholder engagement, and social and environmental responsibility (CLRSG 
1999b, para. 7.33). In addition, a codified OFR requirement was also expected to 
have an educational effect on directors and to stimulate the connection between 
internal management information and control-systems and a focus on long-term 
business performance (CLRSG 2001, para. 3.34). Statutory reporting provisions 
were expected to trigger voluntary changes to internal management practice which 
would “secure that companies are operated to achieve their proper purposes” 
(CLRSG 1999a, para. 5.1.50)
4.2 Contesting the scope of mandatory reporting
“We believe that the time has come to require larger companies [...] 
to provide an OFR, which will cover the qualitative, or “soft”, or 
intangible, and forward looking information which the modem 
market and modem business decision making requires, converting 
the practice o f the best run companies into a requirement fo r  all. ” 
(CLRSG 2000b, para. 5.71)
Although the members of the CLRSG supported the view that a legal base for 
additional reporting was an integral part of a regulatory framework promoting the 
objectives of the CLR (CLRSG 2000a, para. 3.9), the members of the group were 
also aware that:
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“[T]his was one major piece o f interventionist regulation: a new 
report. ” (Regulator B)
The CLRSG, therefore, introduced a new internal working group on “Accounting, 
Reporting and Disclosure” (CLRSG 1999a, paras. 6.1 and 9.4, and annex I) to 
explore the possible scope, purpose, and stakeholder aspects of financial reporting 
in company law. The Accounting Working Group later formed a sub-group on 
qualitative reporting and the OFR to deal with the more specific issues of 
mandatory OFR reporting.23 The Working Group wanted to model the intended 
“enhanced” mandatory reporting regime on the structure and terminology of the 
existing voluntary Statement: Operating and Financial Review (ASB 1993) as it 
believed this would reduce initial uncertainties about a new statutory report among 
preparers and users (CLRSG 2000b, paras. 5.74-5.77 & 5.79). The Working Group 
assumed that the voluntary OFR Statement would provide a framework on which 
businesses and the accounting profession had at least agreed in the early 1990s 
(Regulators A and B).
"That was very important politically. [...] To be able to say: ‘Well 
this is an adoption with modifications o f  a concept that is tried and 
tested, and accepted as best practice by the ASB ’ [...] which was at 
that stage probably the most prestigious accounting regulator in the 
world. ” (Regulator B)
Among others, the accounting and reporting Working Group held a seminar on the 
proposed new regime for company reporting on 5th of June, 2000 24 The aim was to 
secure widespread support for a reform of statutory financial reporting requirements 
and to identify the biggest areas of agreement and disagreement. The main issues 
arising from the CLRSG’s proposals in Developing the Framework were related to 
questions about the “information needs” of accounts users or the “right” balance 
between rules, standards, and best practice.
“[Ojbviously a lot o f work was going on under the surface. 
Consulting and aligning. Trying to find  out what would satisfy the 
maximum number o f constituencies. ” (Regulator B)
23 For a list of members of the sub-group, see CLRSG (2000b), annex A.
24 Participants included inter alia representatives from the ASB, the UK accounting bodies and audit firms, the 
CBI and individual companies, Amnesty International and other NGOs, and academia. The seminar was 
chaired by the Director of Tomorrow’s Company, a non-profit think-tank which promoted the “inclusive” 
approach through its work.
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The CLRSG also commissioned a study on the practical impacts of the proposed 
mandatory OFR regime by the Industrial Society (2001). Between November 2000 
and February 2001, five public companies -  British Airways Pic, British 
Telecommunications Pic, Clydesdale Bank Pic, Great Universal Stores Pic, and 
ITNET Pic -  prepared trial OFRs. Their experiences were reviewed with support 
from the four audit firms Ernst & Young, Grand Thornton, KPMG, and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (ibid.). According to the internal meeting minutes, the 
OFR Working Group concluded from the “test run” that the implementation of the 
new OFR framework had been unproblematic and would only result in marginal 
additional costs to business. The pilot study suggested that users and preparers of 
OFRs could equally benefit from “a superior assessment of company performance”, 
an “enhanced reporting and reviewing process”, the provision of “additional value 
for stakeholders”, an enhancement of corporate reputation, and “better 
comparability between firms” (ibid.).
The efforts of the CLRSG and its Working Groups to establish widespread 
awareness of and empirical evidence for the benefits of a statutory requirement for 
OFR-type reporting in various additional forums may have contributed to the 
mainly positive reactions in the later consultations. Of the 450 responses to the 
consultation document Developing the Framework (CLRSG 2000b), 86 (19%) 
referred to the proposed introduction of a mandatory OFR. About 60 (70%) out of 
the 86 responses to the OFR proposals generally supported the proposals. The 
public responses did however diverge on the question of whether a mandatory OFR 
should prescribe specific reporting items and how much flexibility directors should 
have to define the scope of reporting.25 Respondents from non-profit organisations 
including Amnesty International, Friends of the Earth, the Royal Society for the 
Protection of Birds, Traidcraft Exchange, and the WWF, called for more mandatory 
items, such as environmental and social performance 26 By contrast, representative 
bodies with closer links to company directors, such as the IoD, the 100 Group of
25 Particularly detailed comments on the mandatory OFR were made by three out of 15 responses from the 
accounting organisations (ASB, ACCA, ICAEW), one out of five from the investing community, four out of 
ten non-profit organisations (Centre for Tomorrow’s Company, Traidcraft Exchange, UK Shareholders’ 
Association, WWF), and two out of twelve preparers (BBC, Camelot Group pic). The CBI, the Environmental 
Industries Commission (EIC), and the TUC also contributed extended comment letters to the OFR discussion.
26 With references to their main field of activity, these organisations asked to further prescribe reporting on 
issues such as human rights (Amnesty International), environmental performance and policies (Royal Society 
for the Protection of Birds, Traidcraft Exchange), and other non-financial issues.
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Finance Directors, Business in the Community, and the CBI, rejected a mandatory 
approach. On the one hand, the business community largely “felt that the voluntary 
code was working very well” and therefore preferred to maintain and encourage a 
voluntary approach to OFR type reporting.27 On the other hand, the critical 
responses expressed particular concern with the encouragement of “increasingly 
sterile” content or the possible disclosure of confidential and commercially sensitive 
information (CLRSG 1999b, para. 7.32). The legal profession expressed similar 
concerns. The Law Society of England and Wales along with another law firm 
suggested that a mandatory OFR would create an additional regulatory burden on 
business instead of providing UK firms with an international competitive 
advantage. Overall, those who rejected further statutory regulation of OFR reporting 
suggested encouraging greater flexibility for reporting practice to develop outside 
law and relying on market pressures to promote “good practice” in non-financial 
reporting (ibid., para. 7.32).
4.3 A new framework for UK company law
Following the consultations on the possible relationship between prescription and 
flexibility in legal reform, the members of the OFR Working Group reached the 
conclusion that:
“[MJarkets and society are best served by frameworks o f law which 
are very clear and simplistic about the obligation in principles but 
un-prescriptive about the detail o f how you do it" (Regulator A)
The proposed mandatory OFR reporting regime would mediate the relationship 
between the “inclusive” directors’ duties in statute and market-based enforcement 
mechanisms for the benefit of the British economy at large.
27 CBI representative at The Operating and Financial Review Summit, London 2005.
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"We argue that the overall objective o f wealth generation and 
competitiveness for the benefit o f all can best be achieved through 
the twin components of:
- an "inclusive” approach to directors’ duties which requires 
directQrs to have regard to all the relationships on which the 
company depends and to the long, as well as the short- term 
implications o f their actions, with a view to achieving company 
success fo r  the benefit o f shareholders as a whole; and
- wider public accountability: this is to be achieved principally 
through improved company reporting, which fo r  public and very 
large private companies will require the publication o f a broad 
operating and financial review which explains the company’s 
performance, strategy and relationships (eg with employees, 
customer and suppliers as well as the wider community). ” (CLRSG 
2000b, para. 7)
The Final Report (CLRSG 2001) to the Government suggested a mixed approach to 
reporting which would include a list of mandatory items that had to be covered in 
any case. There would also be a list of items required to be disclosed “to the extent 
that they apply to matters which the directors judge material” (ibid., 8.49).28 The 
underlying idea was that “some form of mandatory requirement [was] needed”. The 
argument was based on the observation that compliance with the voluntary OFR 
guidelines was “patchy” -  in particular among companies outside the FTSE 100 
(ibid., para. 3.36, Standard-setters B and C). The “materiality threshold” was 
proposed as a means of reducing the regulatory burden and maintaining flexibility 
vis-a-vis business. It was also meant to overcome the risk of so called “boilerplate 
reporting” that was associated with a system considered too legalistic (CLRSG 
2000b, para. 2.20). For both types of reporting items, the CLRSG suggested 
inscribing broad headlines only in statute while delegating the development of a 
more detailed standard outlining the content of an OFR to a standard-setting body 
with recognised responsibility for OFR reporting (CLRSG 2000a, para. 12.43) -  
namely the ASB (CLRSG 2001, para. 8.49). In addition, The Final Report proposed 
strengthening the role of auditors in the proposed framework by introducing a 
mandatory process review (ibid., paras. 8.58 - 8.63).29 The Final Report (CLRSG
28 A distinction between mandatory and discretionary items had already been proposed by the Investor Relations 
Society in the first ASB consultation on the OFR Statement (Investor Relations Society letter to ASB, 12 
August 1992).
29 The DTI initially followed the recommendations from the CLRSG for a process review of the OFR. A 
proposed new paragraph 235 (3A) would require auditors to give an opinion on whether directors have 
prepared the OFR after “due and careful enquiry”, and whether the information given in the OFR was 
consistent with the annual accounts and other matters that have come to the auditor’s attention. The audit 
review requirement was, however, replaced with a limited requirement for auditors to check on consistency
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2001) also recommended the codification of inclusive directors’ duties in statute 
(CLRSG 2001, para. 3.8), based on the consensus that had been reached on the 
“inclusive” approach.
The Government responded to the recommendations in July 2002 in the White 
Paper Modernising Company Law (DTI 2002). The White Paper welcomed the 
proposed “inclusive” approach to a codification of directors’ common law duties 
(ibid., part n, para. 3.3). The Government agreed that:
“[T]he basic goal fo r  directors should be the success o f the 
company in the collective best interests o f shareholders, but that 
directors should also recognise, as the circumstances require, the 
company’s need to foster relationships with its employees, customers 
and suppliers, its need to maintain its business reputation, and its 
need to consider the company’s impact on the community and the 
working environment” (DTI2002, part II, para. 3.3).
The Government also agreed “that companies should provide more qualitative and 
forward looking reporting” and welcomed the OFR as a new accountability 
mechanism that would give shareholders and other stakeholders “the information 
they require” (DTI 2002, para. 4.31-4.31). In addition, the White Paper explicitly 
emphasised the role of OFR reporting in promoting sustainability and corporate 
social responsibility:
“A reporting requirement in these terms would also be a major 
benefit for a wider cross-section o f a company’s stakeholders. The 
new requirement to report, fo r  example, on material environmental 
issues would be a major contribution to both corporate social 
responsibility and sustainable development initiatives. The 
Government has long recognised, and promoted, the business case 
fo r  these and sees the OFR as the opportunity fo r  directors to 
demonstrate their response to this business case. ” (DTI 2002, part 
II, para. 4.32)
In the end, the DTI even decided to prioritise the introduction of the OFR for listed 
companies over the other company law reform proposals (DTI 2004a).30 The OFR 
regulations were brought before Parliament in January 2005 (HMSO 2005) and
with the company’s accounts when conducting the statutory audit as part of a series of last-minute changes to 
the OFR Regulations in October 2004 (DTI 2004b).
30 The development of a Companies Bill was halted after the publication of the White Paper to incorporate 
forthcoming regulations from the European Commission (EC) and to consider the implications of the Enron 
and WorldCom failures (Hewitt 2003).
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passed by the House of Commons in the following months (HOC 2005).31 The OFR 
Regulations followed the proposals by the CLRSG to cross the boundaries between 
law and standards and to involve self-regulatory bodies in the development of 
reporting standards (Rickford 2002). A new section 256A to the 1985 Companies 
Act expanded the statutory recognition of accounting standards1 to OFR standards 
so that compliance with the reporting standard automatically constituted compliance 
with the law (DTI 2004a).1 In November 2004, the ASB presented a draft standard 
Reporting Exposure Draft (RED) 1: Operating and Financial Review, which 
provided more detailed guidance for the preparation of an OFR in compliance with 
company law (ASB 2004). The final Reporting Standard 1: Operating and 
Financial Review (ASB 2005) was issued in May 2005.
Although the OFR Regulations were suddenly abolished in November 2005 (DTI
2005), section 417 of the new Companies Act 2006 contains the requirement for an 
“enhanced Business Review” which covers most of the statutory requirements of 
the previous OFR regime.32 In contrast to the initial mandatory OFR regime, the 
provisions do not demand reporting on business goals and strategies. And unlike in 
the statutory OFR, the current regime for non-financial and future-oriented 
reporting is not supported by a formally recognised accounting standard. The 
ASB’s current Reporting Statement: Operating and Financial Review 2006 (ASB
2006) provides only non-binding voluntary guidelines.
5 The role of law in connecting accounting to “the State”
The study of the rise of the mandatory OFR during the British law review suggests 
a particular role for law in mediating and structuring the link between accounting 
and “the State” in otherwise widely dispersed governance networks. Previous 
studies of the interrelations between accounting and macroeconomic programmes of 
governing by “the State” have already identified a role for law in framing the 
collection of “regulatory knowledge” in regimes of governing “at a distance” (cf. 
Miller 1990, 1991; Miller & Power 1992). Similarly, the role of law in the 
mandatory OFR event was to give formal visibility to regulatory arrangements 
which had previously been widely dispersed in society. These included the
31 The Companies Act 1985 (OFR) Repeal Regulations 2005.
32 The New Companies Act 2006 also implements the proposed system of “inclusive” directors’ duties in section 
172(1).
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framework of directors’ duties in common law and the “best practice” guidelines for 
voluntary OFR reporting.33
What is remarkable about the role of law in this case is that the CLR overcame the 
dichotomy between “state” and “non-state” in the relations between law and 
accounting in economic government. To begin with, the desire to unite and 
globalise existing but less formalised regulatory regimes in statute were different 
from ideas of a “static” inscription of widely dispersed regimes of governing 
already in existence. In addition, they did not refer to “the State” as regulator of last 
resort providing closure to societal processes contesting the general role of business 
in society. Finally, the wish to create a centralising and ordering role for statutory 
provisions during the CLR were far from a notion of “law and order” implying 
strict judicial penalties and a gravitation of regulatory powers towards “the State” 
(Hunt 1993).34
This study, therefore, supports and further analyses a view of law as a “lived 
experience” which is constituted by and at the same time constitutes a range of 
social relations (Hunt 1997, p. 104). The agenda setting processes during the CLR 
illustrate a situation in which both the lawmaking processes and the proposed 
legislation were assigned a role in framing “controlled arenas for controversy”, 
where a wide range of actors could interact. During the lawmaking process, the 
introduction of the formally “independent” CLRSG and its working groups 
operationalised inherent aspirations to “co-legislation” (cf. Rickford 2002) in 
public-private partnership. This outlined a regulatory space (cf. Hancher & Moran 
1989b) in which public and private actors could contest and agree on the scope and 
content of legal inscriptions. The idea of acting in the name of “the State” kept a 
focus on the high-level objectives of Government among the reform actors who 
came to agree on the law reform programme. The proposed legislation was also 
assigned a “spacing capacity”. In that capacity, law was supposed to frame market- 
based enforcement mechanisms for the operationalisation of ideas of “co-
33 Similarly, Hunt (1993, p. 308) points at processes of “unification, concentration, condensation, and 
globalisation” in the making of state-law.
34 Cf. Miller’s (1990) description of the role of accounting in late-17th century France in the creation of a system 
of inquiry that would allow the King to govern his territory. Here, the codification of accounting rules in law 
followed a programme of making corporate activities knowledgeable to the central organs of “the State” and 
to allow for direct interventions.
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governing” the economy in public-private partnership. The introduction of the
“inclusive” directors’ duties and a mandatory OFR in statute was expected to
outline the range of legitimate participants as well as their terms of debate for
continuous contest over the economic, social, and environmental activities of
British companies in extra-legal spaces. From the point of view of the CLRSG,
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company law was supposed to provide “the infrastructure which enables people to 
collaborate in productive business relationships, generating the wealth on which the 
whole community depends” (CLRSG 2001, para. 3). This links to a more general 
view of regulation as “processes of material and discursive construction” which 
make possible and facilitate “certain forms of social relations while discouraging 
and disadvantaging others” (Hunt 1993, p. 325). The construction of “stakeholders” 
as actors with a legitimate role in monitoring and challenging the activities of 
business enterprises on the basis of published non-financial and future-oriented 
information in the proposed combined regime of law and accounting, therefore, 
illustrates earlier theories about the role of law in framing regulatory authority of 
local and dispersed centres of calculation and empower them to act in the name of 
“the State” (Rose & Miller 1992):
“[L]aw constitutes or participates in the construction o f  a terrain or 
field  within which social relations are generated, reproduced, 
disputed and struggled over, the most important implication being 
that within such a field  [...] the legal discourses in play both place 
limits o f possibility on social action and impose specific forms o f 
discursive possibility. ” (Hunt 1992, pp. 31-32)
Overall, this chapter finds that the CLR was a unique event in which the 
conceptualisations of law changed significantly. The observation that rules-based, 
principles-based, and market-based modes of governing permeated each other in the 
agenda-setting process supports Hunt’s (1993) criticism of viewing company law as 
an autonomous and clearly demarcated system. In this case, the close links between 
law and accounting during the agenda-setting process for a mandatory OFR seem to 
be part of a wider alignment between law and “the economy”. The rise of 
programmes of “co-legislating” and “co-goveming” suggests that laws and markets 
were no longer seen as opposing ends of a regulatory spectrum as suggested in the 
“liberalisation” and “de-regulation” rhetoric of the Thatcher era (Moran 2003, p. 5). 
Instead, the market-ethos of the 1980s seems to have been replaced during the CLR 
by a mix of interventionist and market-focused rationales which give rise to “new”
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programmes of co-goveming the economy in public-private partnership. This leads 
to the conclusion that aspirations to “the State” and “the market” not only co­
existed but re-enforced each other in the agenda-setting process for a combined 
regime of legal and accounting provisions.
The next chapter outlines the implications of the findings from this and the previous 
chapters for the changing role of accounting in government which emerged 
alongside a “mistrust in numbers” in accounting reform in the UK starting in the 
late 1980s.
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C h a p t e r  5
RETHINKING ACCOUNTING, REGULATION,
AND ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE
“When there is a radical transformation o f ideas [...] whatever 
made the transformation possible leaves its mark on subsequent 
reasoning. ”
(Hacking 1991, p. 184)
1 Accounting and the economy
The growth of accounting numbers as “a form of economic intelligence” (Hopwood 
et al. 1990, p. 76) has been linked to a more general “pursuit of objectivity” (cf. 
Porter 1995) in the ways social and economic life is governed. This, in turn, is 
linked to the increasing influence of a financial mentality in many spheres of social 
and economic activity in the last decades of the 20th century (cf. Fligstein 1987; 
1990). Researchers in this field have argued that the central role of accounting in 
governing social and economic life derived largely from the expectation that 
accounting numbers represented an objectified reality which reduced the 
complexity of economic reality (Miller 1990; Rose 1999, pp. 204-205; Miller
2001). These numbers have been described as the outcome of a process of 
classification and quantification in which the diverse objects and activities that 
constituted the business organisation were rendered countable, comparable, and 
could be aggregated in monetary terms (Power 2004). The process of quantification 
and monetarisation has been held to create consistency between highly aggregated 
accounting numbers and economic decision models. This argument is based on the 
view that the figures provided by accounting practices were independent of the 
subjective judgements and political interests of those who produced them, or were 
at least perceived to be (Lee 1995; Porter 1995; Miller 2001). Consequently, 
economic decision-making on the basis of accounting numbers has been depicted as 
a technical act which was distanced from both the experience, status, or knowledge
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of the persons who made the economic decisions, and from the actions that they 
empowered or constrained (Robson 1992; Rose 1999, pp. 198 & 208).
This translatability between accounting practices and actions carried out in the 
name of concepts derived in large part from economics has been examined in 
previous studies, and used to explain the appeal of accounting numbers as a generic 
reference-point for addressing various questions of governance (Miller 1998b). The 
link between the calculative practices of accounting and economic decision-models 
allowed accounting to be viewed as a form of mobile knowledge that created 
possibilities for distant centres of power to act upon remote locales (cf. Miller 1990; 
Miller & Rose 1990; Hopwood 1992; Robson 1992). It also helped explain how, 
within neoliberal regimes of governing accounting could contribute to the aligning 
of individual and organisational activities with economic ideals of efficiency and 
effectiveness, without direct intervention being required (Miller 2001).1
This thesis has suggested that these arguments about the roles of accounting in 
economic governance need to be supplemented by an analysis of those moments 
when the ‘objectivity’ of accounting is destabilised. It has been argued above that 
the Operating and Financial Review (OFR) was indicative of a series of 
destabilising moments in which the neutrality and objectivity which has typically 
been associated with accounting numbers was called into question. These 
destabilising moments have been called a “mistrust in numbers”, even if accounting 
numbers have been supplemented rather than abandoned in the process. It has been 
suggested that the rise of this “mistrust in numbers” during the last two decades of 
the 20th century was made possible by increasing concerns with “transparency” in 
elaborations of the means and ends of seeking to govern economic life. The 
“mistrust in numbers”, which has been analysed in this research, was also 
characterised by a growing distrust in those who were responsible for the 
production of accounting numbers. These doubts about financial reporting were 
translated into calls for accounting to operationalise an abstract ideal of 
“transparency” in economic governance. As a transparency mechanism, accounting 
was expected to reveal the underlying complexity and subjectivity of economic
1 The transformation of governance in the name of a financial mentality and neoliberal ideals has, for instance, 
also been observed in the spheres of healthcare and in programmes of public management reform in the UK 
(Rose & Miller 1992; Kurunmaki 2008; Miller et al. 2008).
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reality by representing a wide range of social activities and practices in more than 
aggregate financial values.
Although the “mistrust in numbers” that has been observed in the OFR events 
unsettled the ways in which the fundamental role of accounting numbers in 
economic governance has been typically defined, it did not suggest their 
abandonment. Nor did it propose a retreat from viewing accounting as a means for 
making complex objects and processes comparable and calculable. As this study 
shows, claims regarding the representation of economic reality in accounting were 
not questioned during the OFR events, despite the question of how far financial 
reporting numbers represented a “factual knowledge” of economic relations and 
activities (Porter 1995, pp. 50-51; Young 1995; Miller 2001). This is consistent 
with the notion of “trust in numbers” (cf. Porter 1995) which recognised that 
accounting representations of the objects, processes, and relationships that 
constitute economic life never unambiguously matched economic reality (Robson 
1992).
The remainder of this chapter looks at the implications that the study of the OFR 
events in the UK has for thinking about accounting, regulation, and economic 
governance. The discussion is organised in three major parts. Section two that 
follows summarises the key questions that guided the empirical analysis in this 
thesis. That section also reiterates the key empirical findings from the analysis of 
the rise of a category of non-financial and future-oriented reporting in UK policy 
debates during the 1980s and the 1990s, the extension of the boundaries of 
accounting-standard setting at the British Accounting Standards Board (ASB), and 
the interplay of law and accounting during the British Company Law Review 
(CLR). In section three, the focus is on the concepts and methods that have been 
used in addressing the destabilising moments of a “mistrust in numbers”. They are 
reviewed in three stages which reflect upon the conceptual approaches that have 
been used to study multiple aspects of change in accounting, regulation, and 
government. The third section also briefly discusses the combination of a case study 
design with ideas of genealogy and eventalisation, and outlines the benefits of 
collecting the empirical data for this study from archives as well as through 
interviews. In section four of this chapter, a number of suggestions are put forward 
concerning the interlinking of accounting, regulation, and rationales for the
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governing of economic life. The section further elaborates the proposal that the 
OFR event illustrated a significant rethinking of accounting as a technology of 
transparency which is expected to provide a means of revealing an underlying 
complexity and subjectivity of economic reality. The observation of close links 
between non-financial and future-oriented accounting and ideas of governing 
economic life according to a high-level ideal of “transparency” also has wider 
implications for thinking about the role of accounting as an element of regulation by 
revelation. The section ends with a discussion of the possible implications of the 
OFR for rethinking economic governance as a mode of co-goveming that 
intrinsically links the regulatory powers of “the State” and “the market”.
2 The OFR events in the UK
This research has been concerned with three interrelated questions directed at 
analysing the destabilising moments of a “mistrust in numbers” that challenged 
conventional conceptualisations of accounting in government. They aimed to 
explain the problematisations of financial reporting numbers as an issue for 
governing and their translation into regulatory reform projects in the last two 
decades of the 20th century. First, there was the question of how a “mistrust in 
numbers” gave rise to a new category of non-financial and future-oriented 
accounting. The second question was how it changed perceptions concerning the 
roles of accounting in economic governance. Third, this thesis addressed the 
question of the linkages that could be discerned between these destabilising 
moments in the sphere of financial reporting, and wider concepts of how economic 
life should be governed. These questions were addressed empirically through the 
study of the emergence of the OFR as a regulatory issue for financial reporting 
standard-setting and company law in the UK in the 1990s. The voluntary and the 
mandatory OFR in the UK were selected as case studies for this research because 
the ASB was the first national standard-setter which published guidelines for 
voluntary statements by directors on the operating and financial position of the 
business, its future objectives, and plans for successfully achieving them. The UK 
was also the first jurisdiction to propose a statutory requirement for the presentation 
of an OFR in the annual report of companies. Similar regulatory frameworks have 
since emerged in other countries, too, and have become an issue for transnational
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regulators and standard-setters, such as the European Union (EU) or the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB).
Chapters two, three, and four of this thesis each offered insights into the 
destabilising moments, during which conventional ideas about accounting and 
economic governance were called into question. The analysis in chapter two 
showed how the process of moving accounting into new territory became closely 
enmeshed in re-conceptualisations of the broader means and ends associated with 
the governing of British companies in discussions concerning financial reporting 
standard-setting, corporate governance, and public economic policy making. It 
identified the multiple and changing perceptions of economic reality in business 
management which had contributed to viewing accounting practice also as non- 
financial and future-oriented. The discussion in chapter two showed that the global 
economic, technical, and political developments of the 1980s and 1990s strongly 
influenced a new way of thinking about the governance of British companies in 
increasingly global and dynamic competitive environments. These developments 
drew on ideas of “strategic management”, “financial management”, and “social and 
environmental responsibility” in discourses of managerial “best practice” and of the 
more general role of business in society. Chapter two also showed that the shifting 
expectations about managerial “best practice” led to a marked questioning of the 
relevance of financial reporting numbers in economic decision making. The 
perceived discrepancy between the processes and objects captured in the financial 
statements and those that were seen to make up the “reality” of managerial 
decision-making constituted an important empirical factor in the rising demand for 
new measurement and reporting practices that were expected to capture financial as 
well as non-financial factors. Chapter two concluded that the emergence of new 
ideas about the programmes and technologies economic life in the UK was an 
indicator for a wider “strategisation”, “marketisation”, and “socialisation” of the 
language of management and governance throughout the last two decades of the 
20th century.
Chapters three and four focused more explicitly on the rise of regulatory reform 
proposals in the arenas of accounting standard-setting and company law. They 
explained how a “mistrust in numbers” gave rise to demands for regulating non- 
financial and future-oriented reporting as part of the financial reporting framework.
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Chapter three studied the introduction of guidelines for voluntary OFR reporting by 
the ASB in 1993. The chapter traced the programmatic objectives which led to the 
OFR becoming an agenda issue for the ASB. The analysis explained the expansion 
of the mandate of the UK standard-setter beyond a traditional focus on the financial 
statements. It showed that in order for the ASB to be able to intervene in the 
preparation of supplementary narratives, it would have to meet more expectations 
than just those related to the alignment of the proposed guidelines with technical 
quality criteria. In the process of shifting the boundaries of accounting standard- 
setting in the UK, the ASB was also required to demonstrate it was able to continue 
conventions of thought leadership, hitherto attributed to professional standard- 
setting in the UK, and to show awareness of international regulatory developments 
in the US and Canada. This led to a situation in which multiple ideas of governing 
placed different -  partly complementary, partly competing -  demands on the role 
and mandate of the ASB in dealing with the standardisation of OFR reporting. 
Chapter three concluded that the expansion of the regulatory agenda of the ASB 
into the field of non-financial and future-oriented reporting was part of a wider 
reconfiguration of ideas on governing which played out in standardisation projects 
in accounting. By the time the OFR project was launched in the early 1990s, UK 
accounting standard-setting had been placed at the intersection of “the profession”, 
“the market”, and “the public interest” -  a position which had a noticeable effect on 
the ways in which the boundaries of accounting reform were set.
As chapter four illustrated, a process of seeking to align public and private spheres 
of ordering economic activities was also a key factor in the growing calls for a 
mandatory OFR during the British Company Law Review (CLR). The chapter 
outlined how a process of realigning law, accounting, and “the State” led to the 
inclusion of non-financial and future-oriented reporting on the agenda of the CLR. 
The discussion illustrated how a combined regime of law and accounting emerged 
as a “solution” to “problems” with the international competitiveness of the British 
economy. The introduction of a general framework of “inclusive” directors’ duties 
in company law was supposed to focus the attention of directors on factors that 
were perceived to promote the success of the company in times of new global 
competition. This included, amongst other issues, a long term perspective on 
decision-making and goal-setting, the proactive management of stakeholder
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relations, and consideration of the impact of the activities of the business on the 
environment and the wider community. At the same time, OFR reporting was 
expected to make this regulatory regime work. Narrative statements on strategies, 
resources, and objectives were assigned a role in rendering the application of “best 
practice” visible and amenable to interventions by “the market”. Chapter four 
concluded that the CLR was a unique event in which law and the economy were 
closely aligned. Chapter four, therefore, suggested greater attention should be paid 
to the intersection between “the State” and “the market”. This meant to understand 
the interplay of law and accounting in regimes of governing that were, on the one 
hand, inscribed in centralised state-laws, but, on the other hand, supposed to be 
widely dispersed in private governance networks.
3 Explaining destabilising moments
To make sense of the destabilising moments of “mistrust in numbers” and the rise 
of regulatory frameworks for non-financial and future-oriented reporting since the 
late-1980s, this thesis drew upon a set of interlinked literatures from many different 
areas and disciplines.2 A small number of papers that addressed similar processes of 
accounting change, in which the roles and purposes of the financial statements as an 
issue for governing were called into question, inspired the conceptual and 
methodological approach to the study of the OFR events in this research. They 
proposed studying changes in financial reporting in terms of the constellations of 
events, processes, and ideas (Burchell et al. 1985) in which financial reporting 
numbers were problematised and calls for non-financial and future-oriented 
accounting emerged (Robson 1991). Further, these studies suggested that regulatory 
changes could be explained in large part in terms of the programmatic ideas in 
whose name financial reporting reform was mobilised (Young 1995) and the spaces 
in which regulatory interventions in accounting were agreed upon (Young 1994). In 
addition, this research used ideas from socio-legal scholars to explain the moments 
in which accounting was caught up in the making of centralised forms of regulation
2 The accounting literature that has been referred to in this research relates to multiple strands of writings on the 
role of accounting in organisations and society, which have attracted considerable interest in accounting 
research over the past 30 years (cf. Burchell et al. 1980; Hopwood & Miller 1994; Napier 2006). These 
studies have established an interdisciplinary discourse of accounting from the perspective of multiple concepts 
and theories, such as new institutional perspectives in sociology (cf. Powell & DiMaggio 1991) or 
Foucauldian writings on govemmentality (cf. Burchell et al. 1991; Miller & Rose 2008a). In addition, political 
economy approaches, which have not been further drawn on in this research, have emphasised the study of 
power relations in research on the roles of accounting in organisations and society (cf. Tinker 1980; Cooper & 
Sherer 1984; Puxty et al. 1987).
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in state-law. This interdisciplinary strand of research has focused on the intersection 
between law and society from a variety of perspectives such as sociology, history, 
political science, or anthropology (Friedman 1986). These studies share a view of 
law and regulation as social practices which equally shaped and were themselves 
shaped by broader social, political and economic ideas, institutions and relations (cf. 
Friedman 1986; Banakar 2009).
This thesis suggested that it was crucial to bring these conceptual considerations 
together to redraw and explain the complex processes in which the abstract 
programmatic ideas of economic government and the particular practices for 
intervening in economic activities were problematised, reinvented, and realigned in 
the last two decades of the 20th century. The next sub-section reflects in more detail 
upon the benefits and limitations of drawing upon studies of govemmentality, the 
concepts of the accounting constellation, regulatory space, and logics o f  
appropriateness in generating additional insights into the different processes of 
problematising financial reporting numbers as an issue for governing. The 
discussion outlines how the concepts complemented each other and helped to study 
changes in accounting and regulation as elements of the complex and always fluid 
networks that govern economic life. The remaining two sub-sections outline the 
implications the use of a multi-concepts framework had for the methodological 
approach in this thesis. They review, first, the combination of case studies and 
notions of genealogy (Foucault 1980a, p. 140; Miller & Napier 1993) and 
eventalisation (cf. Veyne 1979a; Foucault 199Id) in the research design; second, 
they outline the benefits of using archives and interviews in the data collection and 
analysis.
3.1 Explaining change in accounting, regulation, and government
This thesis has suggested that the rise of non-financial and future-oriented 
accounting in accounting standard-setting and regulation in the UK in the 1990s can 
be analysed by considering the multiple events and processes through which 
accounting, regulation, and government have been called into question. These 
processes of change were seen to be constituted in discursive processes of 
translation and problematisation (cf. Callon 1980; 1999) between multiple 
accounting and non-accounting events, high-level ideas of governing business 
enterprises and the economy at large, and specific practices of government, such as
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law and accounting (cf. Miller 1991; Robson 1991; Rose & Miller 1992; Miller 
1998a).
Ideas of accounting as an element of govemmentality helped in framing more 
broadly the programmatic shifts which gave rise to the doubts about financial 
reporting numbers as an issue for governing in the OFR events. They led this study 
to pay greater attention to the rationalising language which outlined governance in 
terms of rationalities, programmes, and technologies, allowing for reflections about 
wider changes in the language of framing the organisation and governance of 
economic activities in the UK (cf. Miller 1990; Miller & Rose 1990; Rose & Miller 
1992; Miller & Rose 2008b). As part of that process, changes in accounting 
regulation were also viewed as processes of continuous failure and reform in which 
the solutions of the past became the problems of the present (Miller 1990; Miller & 
Rose 1990, p. 10; Miller & O'Leary 1993; Hunt 1994, pp. 79-80 & 82; Miller 
1998b, p. 606). In addition, references to a sub-strand of writings on the law-society 
interpenetration, which approached the study of law from the perspective of 
govemmentality (cf. Hunt 1994), helped to address the close alignment between 
public and private spheres of ordering conceptually. They suggested the importance 
of seeking to bring closer together the study of accounting and law as elements of 
regimes of governing that are widely dispersed in private governance networks, but 
centralised around a notion of “the State” at the same time. However, to have 
limited the conceptual framing of this research to the concept of govemmentality 
would have restricted the study of the rise of non-financial and future-oriented 
accounting as an issue for financial reporting regulation. Studies of accounting and 
high-level ideas of governing have so far largely failed to address the factors that 
made the linkages between the two possible and allowed for their incorporation in 
regulatory reform projects. This research, therefore, addressed the question of how 
regulatory issues and mandates were constructed through references to additional 
analytical concepts. They included the concept of the accounting constellation, a 
notion of regulatory space, and ideas of logics o f  appropriateness.
This thesis has used the concept of the accounting constellation (cf. Burchell et al. 
1985) to analyse the processes through which accounting practices and ideas of 
governing economic activities have emerged alongside each other. It has further 
developed this concept by examining the local and delocalised discourses that seek
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to operationalise accounting practices. The distinction between local and 
delocalised arenas of accounting change provided a way of examining the distinct, 
yet intrinsically linked levels on which accounting in governance reform debates is 
problematised. The idea of delocalised constellations gave meaning to the 
somewhat abstract ideas of accounting as an issue of managerial decision making. 
The idea of local constellations helped illuminate those policy discourses in the UK 
that linked their distinct governance concerns to the abstract ideas of accounting, 
management, and economic reality
Studying the local and delocalised discourses at play in this situation illustrated the 
reflexivity of accounting change in a particular social and institutional context (cf. 
Hopwood 1983b): On the one hand, the study of accounting change at the 
intersection of local and delocalised debates helped analyse the construction of 
abstract ideas of managerial “best practice” and organisational accounting 
techniques in extra-organisational forums (cf. Miller 1991).3 The study of the 
linkages which developed between various arenas of political discourse and the 
economic reality of managerial activities made visible die many meanings and 
rationales that have been associated with non-financial and future-oriented 
accounting. On the other hand, the study of the linkages between local and 
delocalised discourses also revealed the ways in which a rethinking of accounting 
practice mediated the emergence of new programmes of economic governance and 
regulation. It showed that a category of non-financial and future-oriented 
accounting provided the basis for constructing issues such as short-termism or 
backward-orientation in management as problems in governance reform debates - 
just the problems it was meant to solve: The view that accounting had the potential 
to integrate and represent the firm in financial, non-financial, and future-oriented 
terms made “new” problems of governing economic activities in times of new 
global competition as well as their “solutions” more intelligible. Although the study 
of local and de-localised arenas and constellations of accounting change was helpful 
in illustrating the ways in which a category of non-financial and future-oriented 
accounting emerged alongside new ways of discussing the “problems” and 
“solutions” of economic governance in the UK, the analytical approach could not
3 For a discussion on how organisational accounting change reflects upon social, political, or institutional 
demands beyond the boundaries of the organisation and how this enables or constrains certain courses of 
actions within the organisation, see, e.g. Covaleski and Dirsmith (1986; 1987) or Richardson (1987).
133
explain the moments in which the accounting issues which were of general concern 
in governance debates turned into issues for concrete regulatory interventions by 
private standard-setting organisations or “the State”. To address this issue, this 
research utilised the concept of regulatory space (cf. Hancher & Moran 1989b) to 
explain the more specific moments in which high-level programmes of governing 
and specific practices became an issue for regulatory reform.
In this research, regulatory space was used as an analytical tool for framing the 
areas of controversy which formed around the issue of non-financial and future- 
oriented reporting as an agenda item for accounting standard-setting or law-making. 
This took the study of accounting regulation beyond a supply and demand 
perspective proposed in economics-based writings on regulation and policy reform 
(Watts & Zimmerman 1978, 1979, 1986, 1990; Ogus 1994; Peltzman 1998).4 
Instead, the concept of regulatory space focused on the multiplicity of voices 
involved in the re-imagining of the roles and purposes of accounting in economic 
governance and their position in the wider cultural and economic context which 
shaped and was itself shaped by the relations and discourses around regulatory 
reform events (Hancher & Moran 1989b, p. 297; Black 1997). Although the 
analytical construct of regulatory space was consistent with the proposed socio- 
legal perspective on regulation as a social phenomenon, the analytical construct 
could not explain how the mandates of accounting standard-setters or regulators to 
deal with a particular issue were ultimately agreed upon among competing, 
complementary, and conflicting sets of practices and discourses (Hunt 1997, p. 
116). Therefore, this research also used the concept of logics o f appropriateness (cf. 
March & Olsen 1989) to explain the areas of agreement and disagreement on the 
mandates of accounting regulatory bodies in politically contradictory environments. 
This allowed for the analysis of the factors that contributed to the temporary 
stability and legitimacy of the OFR on the agenda of accounting standard-setting 
and legal reform. The notion of multiple logics o f appropriateness described the 
consensus on what was and was not “appropriate” in accounting reform and
4 From the normative perspective of a market-failure approach to regulation, regulators seek to overcome market 
imperfections in the interest of the public (Peltzman 1989; Baldwin et al. 1998a) in order to increase overall 
“social utility” or “net social benefit” (Diver 1998). Economic welfare justifications also imply a pluralist 
perception of the regulatory process (Noll 1989). This involves a positive perception of regulatory reform 
(Cheffins 1999), whereas a positive theory of regulation suggests that capture of the regulator by 
economically or politically powerful groups drives regulatory reform rather than public interest (Stigler 1971).
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explained how even “unusual” developments in financial reporting-regulation, such 
as the introduction of the OFR, became possible. Although not explicitly discussed 
in this research, an understanding of these temporary equilibriums may also help to 
explain regulatory failure. This is because new calls for regulatory reform become 
more likely when the logics o f  appropriateness outlining temporary stability and 
legitimacy for regulatory reform in politically contradicting environments begin to 
shift.
3.2 Case studies, genealogies, and eventalisation
In line with the view that “empirical studies of government -  of the regulation of 
madness, health, welfare, production [...] and so forth -  do not simplify: they 
generate complexity” (Rose 1999, p. 277), the methodological framework in this 
thesis also drew on a whole spectrum of approaches when it came to the collection 
and analysis of empirical data. Corresponding to the multi-concepts framework, 
they allowed for the simultaneous analysis of “the micro” and “the macro” in the 
study of the moments in which the programmes and technologies of government 
linked and co-emerged in die OFR events. The notion of eventalisation focused the 
data collection and analysis in this thesis on the “multiple processes” (Foucault 
199Id, p. 76) or “small events” (Hunt 1994, pp. 32-33) in which changes in the 
regulation of financial reporting became possible. Accordingly, the selection of two 
specific cases, namely the introduction of the OFR to the regulatory agendas of the 
ASB and the CLR illustrated the emergence of new governance regimes as part of 
the interactions between the multiple relations, ideas, and processes that constitute 
single events.5 These were placed in a wider historical and geographical context by 
brief comparisons of the OFR proposals of the 1990s with, first, similar calls for 
reform in British policy debates during the 1970s. This comparison highlighted the 
different ways of thinking about the roles and practices of accounting, the practices 
and objectives of business management, and the role of business in society at large. 
Second, a review of the introduction of similar regulatory frameworks for narrative 
disclosures in other jurisdictions showed the distinctiveness of the British approach
5 However, the focus on the programmatic discourses of reform agents in this study did not explain the 
assemblage of specific actors in the regulatory space or their exclusion from that space (Hancher & Moran 
1989a). This research has also not explained the factors that constituted the relative power of the reform actors 
to shape the regulatory outcomes (Hunt 1994).
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in regulating the disclosure of non-financial and future-oriented information as part 
of the financial reporting framework.
At the same time, the view that regulatory culture was not a “historical constant” 
imposing itself on all situations (Miller & Rose 2008b) kept the focus on more 
specific processes, in which different macro-ideas of governing emerged in 
individual regulatory reform events (cf. Veyne 1979a; Foucault 199Id). By using 
the notion of genealogy this research highlighted the multiple branches of 
developments and accidental encounters of different practices and ideas that gave 
rise to the British OFR. It led to the tracing of ideas of non-financial and future- 
oriented accounting in the various programmatic discourses which contributed to 
the problematisation of financial reporting numbers as an issue for governing 
economic activities in the UK. The analysis included short histories of the system of 
professional self-regulation of accounting practice in the UK, a review of the rise of 
a notion of “the market” in accounting regulation since the 1970s, and a discussion 
of the re-conceptualisation of management practice throughout the 1980s. These 
additional analyses allowed for a more detailed study of the wider factors and 
events at play in the two cases of regulatory reform under study. They showed how 
many ideas and practices made up a category of non-financial and future-oriented 
accounting by the time the British OFR events took place in the 1990s.
3.3 Archives and interviews
The data used in this research is based primarily on interviews and archive 
materials.6 The study of a wide array of documents, including discussion papers, 
draft standards, letters of comment, internal memos and correspondence, helped 
define the field in which accounting change took place. The published and 
unpublished documents provided the material traces of the events under study: They 
were the basis on which the key themes, activities, and actors that made up the 
mandatory and the voluntary OFR events were identified. The analysis of 
documents and interviews also had an influence on how the collection of empirical 
materials was structured. For example, a short series of exploratory interviews in 
early 2005 influenced the case selection for this thesis. The conversations with
6 The use of many different types of data to support the quality and robustness of findings in qualitative research 
has been referred to in the literature as methodological “triangulation” (Bauer & Gaskell 2000). The approach 
that has been taken in this research was, however, less structured. Different data sources were not selected ex 
ante but were chosen because they had been quoted in other documents or by interview partners.
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persons closely involved in national and international accounting standard-setting 
projects helped identify a research topic that was unique, but -  at the same time -  
had wider implications for future developments in accounting regulation. The 
documents or interviews were also used to trace further key documents or key 
persons who have played a role in the drafting of the agenda proposals for a 
voluntary and a mandatory OFR.
The analysis of published documents was limited by the fact that the material 
available to the public often took the form of institutionalised artefacts (cf. Wolff
2002). That is, its content was already the outcome of a careful rephrasing and 
structuring of events and decision making-processes (ibid.). Providing a detailed 
analysis of the points of conflict and their solution during regulatory reform debates 
was difficult when access to internal documentations of the process of drafting these 
reports was not possible. This study, therefore, had to make inferences about the 
key events and debates from the further analysis of additional documents that had 
been produced at the periphery of the OFR events. These included, for example, the 
contributions of persons also involved in the ASB project to other forums, a review 
of newspaper articles covering the OFR debates, and the study of other published 
comments and research dealing with the events under scrutiny. The collection of 
empirical data through personal interviews and other forms of direct 
communication with die persons directly involved in the reform projects at the ASB 
and the CLR contributed significantly to the advancement of this research. Their 
personal experience at different stages of the reform processes often provided new 
insights into the reading of published and unpublished texts. O f course, the ex post 
accounts were not taken to represent an underlying “reality” of events, but they 
were immensely helpful in understanding the dynamics, wider relevance, and 
historic developments of the accounting events under study.
Given the benefits of interview data in tracing and explaining the history of 
regulatory change, it is surprising that only very few studies of standard-setting in 
accounting draw on interviews with accounting regulators (cf. Young 1994; 
Ezzamel et al. 2007).7 The collection and analysis of a wide range of data produced 
as part of the OFR projects and at their periphery adds methodologically to existing
7 Similarly rare seems to be the use of interviews in studies of the implementation of accounting and auditing 
standards in practice (cf. Mennicken 2008).
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studies of the drivers of regulatory change. These studies seem to have been 
preoccupied with the counting, coding, and classifying of comment letters and the 
tracing of possible causalities in regulatory reform (Zeff 2007a). In addition, the 
combination of different types of qualitative data in the study of regulatory reform 
in this research allowed to step beyond a search for objectified causalities or 
“origins” (Foucault 1980a, p. 140) and allowed to trace the historically and spatially 
specific factors and encounters that made regulatory change possible.
4 Conclusions on accounting, regulation, and economic governance
This thesis has argued that ‘trust in numbers’ has been destabilised through various 
events. But it also acknowledges that this questioning of the neutrality and 
objectivity of financial reporting numbers may only be temporary. It is possible that 
the calls for supplementary non-financial and future-oriented statements in financial 
reporting, will be replaced by future calls for improvement in the figures contained 
in the financial statements. Nevertheless, the findings from this study suggest that 
the OFR events indicate a significant rethinking of the roles and techniques of 
accounting and regulation in economic governance during the last quarter of the 
20th century.
This section lays out the three key contributions of this thesis to the accounting, 
governance, and regulation literature; and outlines possible avenues for further 
research. It discusses how the OFR events constituted a significant challenge to 
conventional views of the role of accounting as, first, a means for representing 
economic reality in financial terms and, second, a mechanism for monitoring and 
acting upon economic activities in a neutral and apolitical manner. The third sub­
section extends the discussion of accounting as a “technology of transparency” and 
a means of “regulation by revelation” to a discussion of the mandatory OFR event 
in the UK as a possible indicator for the rise of regimes of co-goveming the 
economy governing that intrinsically link “the State” and “the market”.
4.1 Technology of transparency
This thesis suggests that the calls for non-financial and future-oriented reporting 
during the OFR events in the UK indicate a wider shift in accounting from a focus 
on aggregation and the reduction of complexity to viewing accounting as a 
technology of transparency. As a technology of transparency, accounting is
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supposed to capture and represent the multiple financial and non-financial, 
quantitative and qualitative aspects of business decisions in equally diverse 
measurement and reporting systems. This proposed rethinking of accounting is 
based on the observation that the calls for additional non-financial and fixture- 
oriented reporting significantly challenge the view that accounting as an element of 
economic calculation is mainly concerned with the aggregation and ordering of 
complex economic processes and their representation in neutral and apolitical terms 
(Hopwood 1992; Miller 1994b; Miller 2001; Power 2004). Instead, this study has 
shown that economic decision-making has been recognised as a process that 
involved personal judgement and that required managers to deal with a mix of 
qualitative and quantitative, financial and non-financial factors. This research, 
therefore, proposes that accounting was increasingly expected to extend the scope 
of the issues it represented and the techniques for representing them in order to 
make this complexity of the economic reality of entrepreneurial activities 
intelligible and calculable.
The conclusion that the OFR indicates a wider shift in thinking about accounting as 
a means of revealing the underlying complexity and subjectivity of economic 
activities is fiirther supported by other accounting studies that have observed an 
increase in calls for greater representation of complexity within performance 
measurement and reporting systems since the mid 1980s. The debates that have 
been observed in these cases include, for example, proposals to capture 
performance in economic, social, and environmental terms in so-called “triple 
bottom line” accounting; the production of risk maps; or activity based costing 
(Power 2004). Calls for accounting to provide transparency on an underlying 
complexity of economic reality have also occurred in debates on accounting for 
brands and other intangibles (see, e.g. Barwise et al. 1989) as well as in the 
ValueReporting™ initiative by the accounting firm PricewaterhouseCoopers 
(Eccles et al. 2001). Furthermore, Cooper and Robson (2006) pointed to the rise of 
a language of transparency in elaborations of accounting concepts and practices in 
corporate and public sector governance and regulation.8
8 In the area of public sector governance, transparency relates to ideas of public scrutiny in administrative and 
regulatory processes and ideas of “open government” at all levels of society (Grossman et al. 2008). They
139
The rethinking of accounting as a technology of transparency also has wider 
implications for the analyses of accounting standard-setting and regulation. So far, 
standardisation projects in accounting have been described as further enhancing the 
presumed neutrality and technicality of the process of producing accounting 
measures and reports (Robson 1992; Power 2004).9 Although the regulatory 
frameworks for a voluntary and mandatory OFRs were also concerned with the 
standardisation and stabilisation of their structure, they did not aim to ensure a 
“mechanical objectivity” (Porter 1995, p. 4) of accounting reports. Instead, the OFR 
was supposed to provide a vehicle for managers to explain in their own words how 
they made sense of increasingly global and dynamic competitive environments. 
Thereby, the OFR standardisation projects explicitly allowed for variations and 
subjective statements in external reporting, which supports the view that the OFR 
was a case of viewing accounting as a means of giving visibility to an underlying 
subjectivity and complexity of the economic relations and activities that it was 
supposed to represent.10 The findings from this study, therefore, suggests thinking 
more widely about the governing rationales in whose name accounting is mobilised, 
and which it helps to make intelligible in governance reform debates. Other authors 
have proposed that accounting has become “an indispensable ‘transparency 
infrastructure’ without which a modem economy cannot function” (Holzner & 
Holzner 2006, p. 224). This relates to the idea that ideas of accounting as a means 
of revealing rather than concealing the different aspects of economic life allow a 
broad range of policy debates to link their distinct concerns to accounting.
This thesis supports the view that accounting has increasingly been linked to a more 
general transparency-discourse in governance reform debates. While the issue of 
transparency has not been addressed explicitly in the core chapters of this thesis, it 
provided a common theme in the calls for accounting and governance change. For 
example, transparency mechanisms appealed equally to the supporters of a 
shareholder rationale in private sector governance, who aimed at facilitating the 
functioning of capital markets, and to the supporters of a stakeholder rationale, who
have become visible, for instance, in the emphasis on “notice and comment” procedures in regulatory decision
making (BRTF 1998; OECD 2002).
9 On the increase in standardisation projects as a form of regulation, see, e.g. Brunsson and Jacobsson (2000) or
Tamm Hallstroin (2004).
10 Olesen (2008) calls the accounts that are produced in the name of transparency “situated revelations”.
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favoured transparency as a means of democratic deliberation. In addition, ideas of 
transparency aligned different political views about how economic life should be 
governed. They provided a common reference point for those who emphasised 
individualism and entrepreneurship, those who preferred voluntary regulatory 
frameworks, and those who emphasised formalised behavioural standards and 
accountability mechanisms. It was, however, beyond the scope of this thesis to 
engage in more detail with the emerging literature on transparency in governance 
(cf. Holzner & Holzner 2006; Hood & Heald 2006; Florini 2007; Garsten & Lindh 
de Montoya 2008c; Grossman et al. 2008). These studies propose a more general 
rise of notions of transparency into a widely shared rationale of governing 
individuals, organisations, and societies since the mid-1980s. They have described 
the term as a “travelling keyword” (Garsten & Lindh de Montoya 2008a, p. 283) 
which easily connects with other terms and practices, facilitates communication, 
and aligns actors towards a common point of direction (Pateman 1970; Florini 
1996; Sage 1999; Birkinshaw 2006; Holzner & Holzner 2006; Garsten & Lindh de 
Montoya 2008b).11 This has been explained with the appeal of the abstract vision of 
transparency to “unveil the hidden” in the increasingly dynamic environments that 
were brought about by political and economic globalisation trends (Garsten & 
Lindh de Montoya 2008b, p. 19).
Further research may draw more explicitly on the rethinking of the practices and 
rationales that make up accounting as an element of economic calculation in 
relation to the rise of transparency programmes in national and transnational 
regimes of governing. These studies would contribute to the understanding of how 
accounting becomes “what it was not” (Hopwood 1983b, p. 289), because ideas of 
transparency may lead to a much wider variety of techniques than those for 
producing aggregated financial figures being subsumed under the label of 
accounting. Furthermore, studies of the ways in which accounting as a technology 
of transparency is called upon to “solve” a range of new “problems” of government 
may help to explain the continued and apparently unquestioned appeal of 
accounting as a technology of government even in moments of crises of trust in
11 This becomes possible because the ideas and practices of transparency are not clearly demarcated (cf. 
Grossman et al. 2008), but part of a “cluster of ideas” (Garsten & Lindh de Montoya 2008b, p. 3) that allows 
the use of the concept across organisational, social, cultural, and national boundaries and to mobilise a wide 
range of actors in the name of transparency (ibid.). Accordingly, a governing rationale of transparency differs 
according to the “areas of meaning” that refer to it in distinctive ways (Grossman et al. 2008).
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accounting numbers. In addition, future research may help to explain how widely 
shared aspirations to an abstract notion of “transparency” in economic governance 
contribute to the blurring of the boundaries between financial accounting and other 
practices that seek to make the economic reality of companies visible and 
governable. This thesis has only briefly touched upon the shared calls for 
transparency on economic reality in financial reporting standard-setting, corporate 
governance, and public economic policy-making in the UK that brought ideas of 
reporting in the financial accounts, corporate governance statements, the Directors’ 
Report, and in voluntary social and environmental disclosures closer together. 
Further research might engage more closely with the relationship between 
accounting and other forms of corporate disclosure. Future research might also 
study the potential for aligning managerial and financial accounting; internal and 
external accounting in transparency-oriented accounting regimes. Although not 
elaborated in more detail, the findings from this research suggest significant 
parallels between ideas of decision-usefulness in debates on providing information 
on non-financial and future-oriented strategic success in external financial reporting 
and internal performance measurement and management reporting systems.
4.2 Regulation by revelation
This thesis also proposes that the introduction of the voluntary and the mandatory 
OFR indicates a growing emphasis on ideas of “regulation by revelation” (cf. 
Florini 2003). This links to the idea that transparency has been closely associated 
with the creation of regimes of trust, accountability, and control in the context of 
economic governance of business enterprises and the economy at large (Holzner & 
Holzner 2006; Garsten & Lindh de Montoya 2008b; Grossman et al. 2008). 
Viewing accounting as a technology of transparency implies a rethinking of the 
modes of intervening in economic activities. The OFR events illustrate how the 
process of discharging corporate accountability was increasingly seen in terms of 
making the complexity and subjectivity of economic decisions traceable and, 
thereby, comprehensible to a wide range of stakeholders. In addition, this study also 
points at a growing distrust in those who were seen as responsible for the
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production and quality of accounting numbers, including business managers and 
accounting professionals..12
These findings on accounting as an element of “regulation by revelation” challenge 
the view that the regulation of financial reporting was concerned with replacing 
personal judgement and expertise in the process of producing accounting reports, 
turning it into a technical and apolitical act (Robson 1992). Instead, the 
acknowledgement that the narratives and numbers that were produced in the name 
of transparency would tell only one of many possible stories places the OFR within 
a wider gradual shift to a “show me” relationship between organisations and 
society. It defines a form of accountability in which business managers are expected 
to demonstrate their activities were in the interest of shareholders, wider stakeholder 
groups, and society at large (Roth 1999). In line with that view, the introduction of 
OFR-type reporting frameworks sought to encourage managers to present their 
individual evaluation of the business, and to explain the objectives and strategies of 
the business, from their point of view.
As an element of regulation by revelation, accounting reports were supposed to 
create opportunities for new forms of disciplining corporate activities and for re­
establishing accounting as a “technology of trust” (Vollmer 2003, p. 366). The 
introduction of the OFR aimed to make a broad range of processes and relations 
visible in order to open them up to continued scrutiny and contestation by internal 
and external stakeholders.13 Publicly available information about the financial as 
well as non-financial spheres of corporate activities in voluntary and mandatory 
OFRs was supposed to enable shareholders as well as other parties with or without 
a direct stake in the company to scrutinise and contest, first, the elements of 
subjectivity and ambiguity in the managerial decision-making process and, second, 
the scope of corporate activities and responsibilities. In turn, the accountability 
mechanisms that were established through self-reporting in narrative management 
commentaries were supposed to encourage managers to engage with their own
12 Other studies have observed similar links between calls for greater transparency and accountability and 
growing public uncertainty and decreasing trust in centres of power, such as Governments, corporations, and 
professions in times of increasingly dynamic and international economic activities (Holzner & Holzner 2006, 
p. 9).
13 Other studies of financial reporting regulation already recognised the role of formally inscribed accounting 
regulations in empowering actors who did not directly participate in the regulatory reform debates to monitor 
and intervene in corporate activities (Young 2006).
143
conduct and practices by creating responsibility for judgements and their 
consequences. This means that the OFR as an instance of regulation by revelation 
implied a process of self-discipline and self-learning that took a more reflexive 
perspective on the management principle of “what gets measured gets managed”.14
Consequently, this research suggests that the OFR was a case of re-allocating the 
responsibility for economic decisions with individuals in accountability regimes 
that sought to build trust through subjective narratives and financial as well as non- 
financial measures. This challenges the view that accounting contributes to the 
regulation of managerial activities by making corporate performance visible in 
highly aggregated and impersonal financial figures. So far, the regulatory effects of 
accounting on managerial decision-making have been linked to a self-disciplining 
effect of translating the outcomes of individual activities and decisions into 
accounting numbers that could be compared to norms and standards of performance 
that were defined elsewhere (Miller & O'Leary 1987). The willingness of 
individuals to comply with these standards was established through the apparent 
technicality and neutrality of the process of translating personal attributes and 
activities into impersonal accounting terms and the assumption that the standards of 
economic performance against which they were judged were equally neutral and 
apolitical (cf. Miller & O'Leary 1987; Miller 1990; Power 2004).
It is, however, too early to tell if the OFR events and other calls for more 
complexity in financial reporting imply a growing “trust in narratives” as a 
mechanism for discharging corporate accountability. Further research may, 
therefore, begin to disentangle the relationship between numbers and narratives in 
regimes of governing that seek to create accountability for and trust in the activities 
of corporate decision-makers. These studies may, for example, examine the political 
controversies that arise in the process of implementing OFR type reports in practice 
and study the ways in which the scope of OFR reporting is negotiated. In particular, 
the ambiguous role of large audit firms in the calls for non-financial and future- 
oriented narratives in corporate reporting would merit further research. Although 
not further discussed in this thesis, the OFR events in the UK point at significant 
tensions between a desire to drive financial reporting change and to open up new
14 For a further discussion of the self-disciplining effect of transparency-based accountability regimes on 
corporate conduct, see e.g. Florini (1998; 2003; 2007).
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business opportunities for consulting work and a reluctance to expand the scope of 
their audit responsibilities into these new areas of corporate reporting. Furthermore, 
future studies of the relationship between numbers and narratives in regimes of 
regulation by revelation may look at attempts to establish “best practice” in the area 
of narrative reporting on the non-financial and future-oriented aspects of the 
business. The analysis of the opinion papers, research, and prizes that are produced 
and awarded by various organisation may shed further light on the question how far 
the accounting reports of the future will be expected to report on current and future 
performance in terms of financial and non-financial, quantitative and qualitative 
information (see, e.g. CIMA 2002; ACCA 2005; PwC 2005; ASB 2006; IASB 
2008; PwC 2008).
4.3 Co- governance by “the State” and “the market”
Finally, this thesis proposes that the voluntary and the mandatory OFR indicate a 
significant re-thinking of the relationship between public and private spheres of 
ordering economic activities. The OFR is a case of seeking to co-govem the 
economy through regulatory regimes in which the regulatory powers of “the State” 
and “the market” do not oppose, but reinforce each other. As this study shows, both 
the process of OFR regulation in the making and the proposed regimes for the 
voluntary and the mandatory OFR in action sought to closely align public and 
private spheres of organising economic activity. The use of the concept of 
regulatory space for the study of the agenda-setting processes at the ASB and 
during the CLR already highlighted the interactions among a wide range of ideas of 
governing in the name of “the State” and “the market”. Furthermore, the findings 
from this study suggest that the consensus that has been found in these regulatory 
spaces did not seek to provide closure on the process of contesting the economic, 
social, and environmental responsibilities of business organisations once the 
proposed laws or guidelines were put into action. Instead, the OFR sought to govern 
corporate activities through regulatory regimes that defined behavioural standards 
in laws, standards, or guidelines, but at the same time opened the governance 
process to further contest and agreement about the roles and responsibilities of 
individual business organisations.
The regulation literature has put forward several concepts to explain the 
phenomenon of state-enforced and yet market-based modes of regulation which rest
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to a great extent on self-control and public scrutiny rather than direct intervention 
by national governments. For example, ideas of enforced self-regulation and 
responsive regulation (cf. Ayres & Braithwaite 1992) have focused on the 
delegation of regulatory powers from “the State” to the markets and on the different 
degrees of formal regulatory backing of otherwise self-regulated standards.15 
Related studies of the rise of state-regulation in the deregulatory environment of the 
new regulatory state (cf. Majone 1994) have proposed to view the process of 
formalising market based self-regulation in statute as a colonisation of “the State” in 
formerly “private” domains of governing (Moran 2003, p. 93). Analyses of the open 
corporation and the concept of meta regulation (cf. Parker 2002) have also 
recognised the interplay between laws and markets in the regulation of corporate 
behaviour. They have proposed to view these regimes of governing as a “triple 
loop” of regulation and self-regulation (ibid.) in which the process of intervening in 
managerial activities is opened up the governance processes to democratic 
deliberation through dialogue with a wide range of stakeholder groups (Parker 
2002; Baldwin 2004).
However, regulation studies of the links between “the State” and “the market” in 
economic governance do not question a fundamental partition between the spheres 
of regulation and that of economic activity, but continue to view them as distinct 
and otherwise self-referential systems (cf. Teubner 1993; Luhmann 1995).16 In 
contrast, this thesis proposes that the alignment between law and the economy, 
which has been observed in the OFR events, indicates a rise in regimes of 
governing that overcome a dichotomy between public and private spheres of 
ordering economic activities. Both the voluntary and the mandatory OFR suggest an 
unusual mix of different ideas of governing that make regulation in the name of “the 
State” and “the market” not a question of either/or or a question of one dominating 
the other to different degrees. The cases in this study were characterised by a close 
interplay and continuous realignment of “private” market-based and “public” rights- 
based approaches to regulation that blur any boundaries between the two. Writings
15 For a discussion on state-regulation in the new regulatory state, see also Moran (2000; 2001) or Jordana and 
Levi-Faur (2004). For studies on the role of independent regulatory agencies and private standard-setting 
bodies in the governance of economic life in the UK and elsewhere, see, e.g. Majone (1994; 1997), Moran 
(2001), or Coen & Thatcher (2005).
16 For further critique of the rule-based conceptualisation of law, see Banakar (2009).
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on govemmentality have already proposed a rethinking of the conceptual distinction 
between public and private spheres of power. Their perspective on “law as a lived 
experience” (Hunt 1993) suggests to step beyond a notion of law as a representation 
of monolithic state power, emphasising the social and ideological dynamics in the 
creation and implementation of regulatory frameworks (cf. Hunt 1993, 1994, 1997; 
Banakar 2009). Moreover, this thesis suggests to further develop ideas of law as a 
social practice in studies of accounting regulation. The OFR events indicate a 
significant role for both, law and accounting, in the making and shaping of regimes 
of co-goveming the economy in the name of markets and society at large.
Further research might engage in more detail with the processes of making and 
implementing regulation that crosses the boundaries between “public” and “private” 
spheres of ordering. Thereby, a focus on the roles of law and accounting might help 
to explain how possibilities for the co-production of governance by markets, private 
regulatory bodies, and national or international regulatory agencies emerge. The 
study of the roles of law and accounting in intrinsically linking “the State” and “the 
market” in economic governance could, for example, be taken further to study the 
regulatory responses to the global financial crisis that began in 2007 and had 
disastrous effects on national economies worldwide. The regulatory responses to the 
economic crisis are another case of simultaneous calls for “the State” and “the 
market” to ensure the economic activities of business organisations are in line with 
wider social and economic objectives. A centralised notion of “the State” has 
gained a new presence in the British and other international economic rescue and 
stimulus programmes. In the UK, the measures that were taken by Government 
included, for example, the reduction of value added tax (VAT), the radical 
reduction of interest rates, and the introduction of new money into the financial 
system. In addition to these fiscal and monetary stimuli, Governments have entered 
the financial services domain, which was until recently the hallmark of the market 
economy, through direct investments in large financial institutions that otherwise 
faced insolvency. In 2007 and 2008, the UK Government nationalised the British 
banks Northern Rock and Bradford & Bingley and, amongst others, acquired a 70% 
stake in the Royal Bank of Scotland Group. However, although neo-liberal 
rationalities of government have experienced a significant shake-up following the 
full or partial nationalisation of some financial institutions, the recent developments
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seem far from being a mere return to Keynesian ideas of state ownership and 
management of nationalised industries. With the objective to return to frill private 
ownership as soon as possible, the recent national economic rescue programmes in 
the UK and other countries aim at restoring confidence in capital markets. For 
example, the creation of the private company UK Financial Investments (UKFI) to 
manage the public investments in a way that maintained commercial freedom for 
the banks in their day to day business highlights the strong presence of ideas of 
governing in the name of “the market”. These links between the objective to 
promote competition “in a way that is consistent with a UK financial services 
industry that operates to the benefit of consumers and respects the commercial 
decisions of the financial institutions” (UKFI 2009) and the aim to protect and 
maintain social and economic justice (ibid.) are, therefore, consistent with the 
findings on a growing emphasis on processes of co-goveming which intrinsically 
link “the State” and “the market”. 17 In addition, the current national and 
international regulatory debates imply that future economic governance regimes 
will place significant emphasis on making the complex networks, transactions, 
subjective judgements, and power struggles that constitute economic reality more 
visible and, hence, governable (FSA 2009). The emphasis on disclosure in the 
proposed regulatory responses to the financial crisis, therefore, supports the view 
that notions of transparency will continue to play a central role in thinking about the 
governance of economic life. Correspondingly, this would open up a field for 
further studies of accounting as a technology of transparency, modes of regulation 
by revelation, and the co-production of governance in the name of “the State” and 
“the market” in a mix of accounting and other forms of ordering, such as law.
17 In the UK, the wholly government owned company UK Financial Investments Limited was created on 3 
November to manage public ownership of financial institutions in the UK (UKFI 2009).
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Appendices
1 List of abbreviations
ACCA Chartered Association of Certified Accountants
ANT Actor-Network Theory
APB Auditing Practices Board
ASB Accounting Standards Board
ASC Accounting Standards Committee
ASSC Accounting Standards Steering Committee
ASSC Accounting Standards Steering Committee
BERR Department for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform
BIS Department for Business, Innovation and Skills
BR Business Review
BSC Balanced Scorecard
CBI Confederation of British Industry
CCAB Consultative Committee of Accountancy Bodies
CLR Company Law Review
CLRSG Company Law Review Steering Group
CSR Corporate Social Responsibility
DTI Department of Trade and Industry
EC European Commission
ED Exposure Draft
EU European Union
FASB Financial Accounting Standards Board
FRC Financial Reporting Council
GDP Gross Domestic Product
IASB International Accounting Standards Board
IASC International Accounting Standards Committee
ICAEW Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales
ICAS Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland
IFRS International Financial Reporting Standards
IoD Institute of Directors
ippr Institute of Public Policy Research
KPI Key Performance Indicator
LSE London Stock Exchange
MD&A Management's Discussion and Analysis o f Financial Condition and Results of Operations
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OFR Operating and Financial Review
OSC Ontario Securities Commission
RED Reporting Exposure Draft
RSA Royal Society for the encouragement of Arts, Manufactures & Commerce (RSA)
SEC Securities and Exchange Commission
SFAC Statements of Financial Accounting Concepts
STS Science and Technology Studies
TUC Trades Union Congress
VAT Value Added Tax
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2Year
1969
1973
1975
1977
1977
1988
1988
1988
1990
1991 
1991 
1991
1991
1992
1992
1993
1994 
1994
1994
1995 
1995
1995
1997
1997
1998 
1998
1998
1999
1999
2000
2000
2001
2002
Overview of key reports and discussion papers 
Organisation Title
IASB
CBI
ASSC
Department of Trade
Department of Trade
ICAEW
ICAS
ICAS
ICAS
ASB
FRC
ICAEW
ICAEW/ICAS
ASB
Cadbury Committee
ASB
AICPA
DTI
RSA
DTI
Greenbury Group 
RSA
Commission on 
Public Policy and 
British business 
Labour Party 
DTI
Hampel Committee
Tomorrow's
Company
CLRSG
Law Commission and 
Scottish Law 
Commission
CLRSG
CLRSG
CLRSG
DTI
Statement of Intent on Accounting Standards in the 1970s
The Responsibilities of the British Public Company: final report
The Corporate Report: a discussion paper
Report of the Committee of Enquiry on Industrial Democracy 
(Bullock Report)
The Future of Company Reports
The Making of Accounting Standards (Dearing Report)
Making Corporate Reports Valuable
Making Corporate Reports Valuable: the literature surveys
Financial Reporting: the way forward,
The ASB's Future Work Programme
The State of Financial Reporting
The Future Shape o f Financial Reports: research studies,
The Future shape of financial reports,
Discussion Paper: Operating and Financial Review
The Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (Cadbury Report)
Statement: Operating and Financial Review
Improving Business Reporting - A Customer Focus
Competitiveness: Helping Business to Win
Tomorrow's Company: the role of business in a changing world: 
interim report: the case for the inclusive approach
Competitiveness: Forging Ahead
Directors' Remuneration: report of a study chaired by Sir Richard 
Greenbury
Tomorrow's Company: the role of business in a changing world 
Promoting Prosperity: a business agenda for Britain
New Labour: Because Britain Deserves Better
Modem Company Law for a Competitive Economy
Committee on Corporate Governance: final report
Sooner, Sharper, Simpler: a lean vision o f an inclusive annual 
report
Modem Company Law for a Competitive Economy: The Strategic 
Framework
Company Directors: Regulating Conflicts of Interest and 
Formulating a Statement of Duties
Modem Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Completing 
the Structure
Modem Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Developing 
the Framework
Modem Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Final Report 
Modernising Company Law (White Paper)
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3 List of interviewees
Interviewee Organisation Date Duration Record
Standard-setter A Standard-setting 
organisation A
06/01 and 
11/04/2005
90 min. 
60 min
Notes
Standard-setter B Standard-setting 
organisation B
08/02, 
15/04, and 
19/12/2005
40 min. 
50 min. 
20 min.
Notes /
Taped & transcribed
Consultant A Consulting firm A 28/02/2006 45 min. Taped & partly 
transcribed
Standard-setter C Accounting firm A 03/03/2006 60 mn. Taped & partly 
transcribed
Accounting 
professional A
Professional 
accounting body A
27/03/2006 73 min. Taped & partly 
transcribed
Accounting 
professional B
Professional 
accounting body B
25/04/2006 60 min. Taped & transcribed, 
reviewed by interviewee
Standard-setter D Standard-setting 
organisation B
21/02/2007 70 min. Taped & transcribed, 
reviewed by interviewee
Standard-setter E Standard-setting 
organisation B
19/03/2007 15 min. Notes
Regulator A Think Tank A 30/08/2007 65 min. Taped & transcribed,
Standard-Setter F Standard-setting 
organisation C
03/10/2007 60 min. Taped & transcribed, 
reviewed by interviewee
Regulator B University A 10/10/2007 60 min. Taped & transcribed, 
reviewed by interviewee
Standard-Setter G Standard-setting 
organisation C
24/01/2008 60 min. Taped & transcribed
174
4 Excerpts from relevant legislation
4.1 The Companies Act 1985 (Operating and Financial Review and 
Directors' Report etc.) Regulations 2005 
234AA. Duty to prepare operating and financial review
(1) The directors of a quoted company shall for each financial year prepare an operating and
financial review.
(2) The review must comply with Schedule 7ZA (objective and contents o f operating and 
financial review), save that nothing in that Schedule requires the disclosure of information 
about impending developments or about matters in the course of negotiation if  the 
disclosure would, in the opinion of the directors, be seriously prejudicial to the interests of 
the company.
(3) For a financial year in which -
(a) the company is a parent company, and
(b) the directors of the company prepare group accounts,
the operating and financial review must be a consolidated review (a "group operating and 
financial review") relating, to the extent specified in Schedule 7ZA, to the company and its 
subsidiary undertakings included in the consolidation.
(4) A group operating and financial review may, where appropriate, give greater emphasis to
the matters that are significant to the company and its subsidiary undertakings included in 
the consolidation, taken as a whole.
(5) If  an operating and financial review does not comply with the provisions of this Part relating 
to the preparation and contents of the review, every director o f the company who-
(a) knew that it did not comply or was reckless as to whether it complied, and
(b) failed to take all reasonable steps to secure compliance with the provision in
question, is guilty of an offence and liable to a fine.
234AB. Approval and signing of operating and financial review
(1) The operating and financial review must be approved by the board of directors and signed 
on behalf o f the board by a director or the secretary of the company.
(2) Every copy of the operating and financial review laid before the company in general
meeting, or that is otherwise circulated, published or issued, must state the name of the 
person who signed it on behalf of the board.
(3) The copy of the operating and financial review delivered to the registrar must be signed on 
behalf of the board by a director or the secretary of the company.
(4) If  a copy of the operating and financial review-
(a) is laid before the company, or otherwise circulated, published or issued 
without the review having been signed as required by this section or without the 
required statement of the signatory's name being included, or
(b) is delivered to the registrar without being signed as required by this 
section, the company and every officer of it who is in default is guilty of an offence 
and liable to a fine."
SCHEDULE 7ZA
Operating and financial review
Review objective
1. An operating and financial review must be a balanced and comprehensive analysis,
consistent with the size and complexity of the business, of-
(a) the development and performance o f the business of the company during the financial year,
175
(b) the position of the company at the end of the year,
(c) the main trends and factors underlying the development, performance and position of the 
business of the company during the financial year, and
(d) the main trends and factors which are likely to affect the company's future development, 
performance and position, prepared so as to assist the members of the company to assess the 
strategies adopted by the company and the potential for those strategies to succeed.
Other general requirements
2. The review must include-
(a) a statement of the business, objectives and strategies of the company;
(b) a description of the resources available to the company;
(c) a description of the principal risks and uncertainties facing the company; and
(d) a description of the capital structure, the treasury policies and objectives and the liquidity of 
the company.
Details o f  particular matters
3.-
(1) To the extent necessary to comply with the general requirements of 
paragraphs 1 and 2, the review must comply with paragraphs 4 to 6.
(2) If  the review does not contain information and analysis of each kind mentioned in
paragraphs 4 and 5, it must state which of those kinds of information and analysis it does not
contain.
4. -(1) The review must include -
(a) information about environmental matters (including the impact of the business of
the company on the environment),
(b) Information about the company's employees, and
(c) information about social and community issues.
(2) The review must, in particular, include -
(a) information about the policies of the company in each area mentioned in sub-
paragraph (1), and
(b) information about the extent to which those policies have been successfully
implemented.
5. The review must also include -
(a) information about persons with whom the company has contractual or other
arrangements which are essential to the business of the company; and
(b) information about receipts from, and returns to, members of the company in
respect of shares held by them.
6. - (1) The review must include analysis using financial and, where appropriate,
other key performance indicators, including information relating to environmental matters 
and employee matters.
(2) In sub-paragraph (1), "key performance indicators" means factors by reference to which the 
development, performance or position of the business o f the company can be measured 
effectively.
Reference to and explanation o f  company's accounts
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7. To the extent necessary to comply with the general requirements of paragraphs 1 and 2, the 
review must, where appropriate, include references to, and additional explanations of, 
amounts included in the company's annual accounts.
Compliance with standards
8. The review must-
(a) state whether it has been prepared in accordance with relevant reporting standards, 
and
(b) contain particulars of, and reasons for, any departure from such standards. 
Application o f  Schedule to group operating andfinancial review
9. In relation to a group operating and financial review this Schedule has effect as if the 
references to the company (other than the last such reference in paragraph 1) were 
references to the company and its subsidiary undertakings included in the consolidation."
Auditors' reports on operating andfinancial reviews
10. In section 235 of the 1985 Act (auditors' report), after subsection (3) insert - 
“ (3 A) If the company is a quoted company, the auditors must state in their report -
(a) whether in their opinion the information given in the operating and financial
review for the financial year for which the annual accounts are prepared is
consistent with those accounts; and
(b) whether any matters have come to their attention, in the performance of their 
functions as auditors of the company, which in their opinion are inconsistent with 
the information given in the operating and financial review."
Reporting standards fo r  operating andfinancial reviews
11. After section 256 of the 1985 Act (accounting standards)[l 1] insert- 
" 256A. Reporting standards
(1) In this Part, "reporting standards" means statements of standard reporting practice which-
(a) relate to operating and financial reviews, and
(b) are issued by a body or bodies specified in an order made by the Secretary of State 
in accordance with section 257(4B).
(2) References in this Part to relevant reporting standards, in relation to a company's operating 
and financial review, are to such standards as are, in accordance with their terms, applicable 
to the company's circumstances and to the review.
(3) Where or to the extent that the directors of a company have complied with a reporting 
standard, they are presumed (unless the contrary is proved) to have complied with the 
corresponding requirements of this Part relating to the contents o f an operating and financial 
review."
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4.2 Companies Act 2006
172 Duty to promote the success of the company
(1) A director of a company must act in the way he considers, in good faith, would be most 
likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit o f its members as a whole, and 
in doing so have regard (amongst other matters) to—
(a) the likely consequences o f any decision in the long term,
(b) the interests of the company’s employees,
(c) the need to foster the company’s business relationships with suppliers, customers
and others,
(d) the impact o f the company’s operations on the community and the environment,
(e) the desirability o f the company maintaining a reputation for high standards of
business conduct, and
(f) the need to act fairly as between members o f the company.
417 Contents of directors’ report: business review
(1) Unless the company is subject to the small companies’ regime, the directors’ report must 
contain a business review.
(2) The purpose of the business review is to inform members of the company and help them 
assess how the directors have performed their duty under section 172 (duty to promote the 
success o f the company).
(3) The business review must contain—
(a) a fair review of the company’s business, and
(b) a description of the principal risks and uncertainties facing the company.
(4) The review required is a balanced and comprehensive analysis of—
(a) the development and performance of the company’s business during the financial 
year, and
(b) the position of the company’s business at the end of that year, consistent with the 
size and complexity of the business.
(5) In the case of a quoted company the business review must, to the extent necessary for an 
understanding of the development, performance or position of the company’s business, 
include—
(a) the main trends and factors likely to affect the future development, performance 
and position of the company’s business; and
(b) information about—
(i) environmental matters (including the impact o f the company’s business 
on the environment),
(ii) the company’s employees, and
(iii) social and community issues, including information about any policies of 
the company in relation to those matters and the effectiveness of those policies; and
(c) subject to subsection (11), information about persons with whom the company has 
contractual or other arrangements which are essential to the business of the 
company.
If the review does not contain information of each kind mentioned in paragraphs (b)(i), (ii) 
and (iii) and (c), it must state which o f those kinds of information it does not 
contain.
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(6) The review must, to the extent necessary for an understanding of the development, 
performance or position of the company’s business, include—
(a) analysis using financial key performance indicators, and
(b) where appropriate, analysis using other key performance indicators, including 
information relating to environmental matters and employee matters.
“Key performance indicators” means factors by reference to which the development, 
performance or position of the company’s business can be measured effectively.
(7) Where a company qualifies as medium-sized in relation to a financial year (see sections 465 
to 467), the directors’ report for the year need not comply with the requirements of subsection
(6) so far as they relate to non-financial information.
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4.3 EC Modernisation Directive 2003
Directive 2003/51/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 2003
amending Directives 78/660/EEC, 83/349/EEC, 86/635/EEC and 91/674/EEC on the 
annual and consolidated accounts of certain types of companies, banks and other 
financial institutions and insurance undertakings
(9) The annual report and the consolidated annual report are important elements of financial 
reporting. Enhancement, in line with current best practice, of the existing requirement for these to 
present a fair review of the development of the business and of its position, in a manner consistent 
with the size and complexity of the business, is necessary to promote greater consistency and give 
additional guidance concerning the information a ‘fair review’ is expected to contain. The 
information should not be restricted to the financial aspects o f the company's business. It is expected 
that, where appropriate, this should lead to an analysis of environmental and social aspects necessary 
for an understanding of the company's development, performance or position. This is consistent also 
with Commission Recommendation 2001/453/EC of 30 May 2001 on the recognition, measurement 
and disclosure of environmental issues in the annual accounts and annual reports of companies (1). 
However, taking into account the evolving nature of this area of financial reporting and having regard 
to the potential burden placed on undertakings below certain sizes, Member States may choose to 
waive the obligation to provide non-financial information in the case of the annual report of such 
undertakings.
14. Article 46 shall be amended as follows:
(a) paragraph 1 shall be replaced by the following:
‘1. (a) The annual report shall include at least a fair review of the development and performance of 
the company's business and of its position, together with a description of the principal risks and 
uncertainties that it faces. The review shall be a balanced and comprehensive analysis of the 
development and performance of the company's business and of its position, consistent with the size 
and complexity of the business;
(b) To the extent necessary for an understanding of the company's development, performance or 
position, the analysis shall include both financial and, where appropriate, non-financial key 
performance indicators relevant to the particular business, including information relating to 
environmental and employee matters;
(c) In providing its analysis, the annual report shall, where appropriate, include references to 
and additional explanations of amounts reported in the annual accounts.’;
(d) the following paragraph shall be added: ‘4. Member States may choose to exempt 
companies covered by Article 27 from the obligation in paragraph 1(b) above in so far as it relates to 
non-financial information.’;
10. Article 36 shall be amended as follows:
(a) paragraph 1 shall be replaced by the following:
‘1. The consolidated annual report shall include at least a fair review of the development and 
performance of the business and of the position of the undertakings included in the consolidation 
taken as a whole, together with a description of the principal risks and uncertainties that they face. 
The review shall be a balanced and comprehensive analysis of the development and performance of 
the business and of the position o f the undertakings included in the consolidation taken as a whole, 
consistent with the size and complexity of the business. To the extent necessary for an understanding 
o f such development, performance or position, the analysis shall include both financial and, where 
appropriate, non-financial key performance indicators relevant to the particular business, including 
information relating to environmental and employee matters. In providing its analysis, the 
consolidated annual report shall, where appropriate, provide references to and additional explanations 
of amounts reported in the consolidated accounts.’;
(b) The following paragraph shall be added:
‘3. Where a consolidated annual report is required in addition to an annual report, the two reports 
may be presented as a single report. In preparing such a single report, it may be appropriate to give 
greater emphasis to those matters which are significant to the undertakings included in the 
consolidation taken as a whole.’;
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